Showing posts with label Nazism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Nazism. Show all posts

Monday, 16 February 2015

Biopolitics on the Installment Plan*


1.  Other Temporalities
2.  The Deep State of Exception or Deep Police
3.  What is Agamben’s Camp?
4.  The Biopolitical Dispositif  


1.  Other Temporalities

Biopolitical thought or the thought of the biopolitical is trapped in the black hole of the so-called ontological difference, Heidegger’s name for the distinction between beings or entities and Being (the Many and The One) – precisely because Life has become a metaphysical principle – an ultimate ground, a cause.  For Agamben at least, metaphysics and politics of the West converge – so that in his biopolitical thought, Life is, as he writes in Homo Sacer Sovereign Power and Bare Life, “Not simple natural life, but life exposed to death (bare life or sacred life) (…)” and it is this peculiar Life which “is the originary political element.” (Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Stanford, 1998, p. 88) 

Life (bare life, bios etc) though – in the Heideggerian catechism – as a ground, is an Abgrund or a groundless abyssal ground – the need of the ground never disappears.  Perhaps that is why biopolitics is tainted with an immanent bipolarity of being both biopolitics and thanatopolitics – politics of life and politics of death.  Instead of a ground there is a sort of givenness of Being, a contingency of ‘thrownness’.  The lack of mediation or chorismos or unbridgeable break between a first cause (like for instance Spinoza’s natura naturans) and the unfolding of the cause as the phenomenal world – becomes itself a principle, a quasi-ground.

Life is a larva of Dasein.  Hence like Dasein Life (for biopolitics) is also a bizarre chimera whose ontic distinction is that it is ontological – by virtue of its reflexive ability, in being, to be an issue for itself.  Dasein is the only entity, which is also ontological – so in fact the ontological difference is suspended in Dasein – it is in force but does not apply – like the law, according to Agamben, in the ‘state of exception’.  Similarly, for Agamben, the ‘anomic’ construct of ‘living law’ – or law directly springing from the living body of the Führer or Il Duce – presumes the suspension of the ‘ontological difference’ between life and law.  Charismatic ‘auctoritas’ is opposed to ‘potestas’, the normative ‘rule of law’.  Yet at the same time ‘auctoritas’ – the amalgam of life and law in the charismatic ruler – is a quasi-transcendental illusion – the transcendental position or order of sovereignty – as Foucault would say ‘the place of the king’.  Sovereign power is once again irrevocably separated/severed from life.  And so the unceasing oscillation between the fiction of the immediate whole – life and law – and its continuous decay into its fragmented parts constitutes the perpetual work of the biopolitical machine.    

Hence I shall approach the question of biopolitics from both sides of the ontological difference – attempting to follow the moves and switches of its protean currencies. 

Dasein though in Heidegger’s magnum opus Being and Time undergoes at least one distinctive metamorphosis – especially crucial for biopolitical thought.  In Section 74 it departs its singular contingent/thrown mode, called fate (Schicksal), and co-historizes (Mitgeschehen) into a historical collectivity, a ‘generation’.  Dasein’s “full authentic historizing” (Geschehen) is a specific/particular destiny (Geschick) “of a community, of a people” -, here Dasein becomes ‘political’ and this ‘biopolitical body’ avant la lettre is implicitly German.

Heidegger, as a philosopher of Nazism, will later recognize Dasein’s Geschick (destiny) as being consummated in the German people, gathered in the Nazi movement and state.

The ontological difference inherent in Dasein and its ontic-ontological Mitgeschehen in the German Volk of the historical Nazi movement is reflected in other forms of ‘undecidability’.  Nazism itself in Heidegger’s philosophy inherits that exceptional ontic-ontological status of Dasein, especially after his ‘turn’ when Heidegger abandoned his overt existential analysis of Dasein in favor of the ‘history of Being’ (in a sense blurring the ontological difference).  The history of Being later flowed into the history of technology or techne: the encounter between technicity on a planetary level and modern man had been the inner truth and greatness of the Nazi movement – to paraphrase a well known interpolation in Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics from 1935 – first published after much editing in 1953. 

Each successive metamorphosis of Dasein can be seen as Heidegger’s attempt to efface the rootedness of his philosophy in the Nazi project.  To little avail – biopolitics in the Heideggerian key proclaims the utter necessity of Nazism for thought in most unambiguous terms – like the psychoanalytic return of the repressed:  Roberto Esposito in an essay entitled “Nazism and Us” disentangles Nazism from communism as two forms of a single phenomenon called ‘totalitarianism’ – but he does so not to shield communism – but to place Nazism ‘outside’ of history – in a temporality of its own made of the “decomposition of modernity”.   If communism still belongs to the paradigm of modernity, which has exhausted itself – Nazism is closer to ‘us postmoderns’.  But the temporality/historicity of Nazism itself is neither reducible to modernity nor postmodernity.  It floats in a kind of atavistic species-time.  The temporality of Nazism for Esposito alternates between the transcendental of Life – and the modern archaic (“the permanence of the origin at the moment of its leaving” (Communitas)) as opposed to communism’s transcendental of history. Agamben speaks similarly of Nazism’s modern rediscovery of arcana imperii.  Since – as Esposito posits – communism has disappeared from our contemporary field – all that’s left for us is Nazism and its unique temporality as the “realization of biology” out of the death of the modern. 
“(…) not only is the problem, or the terrifying laceration, opened by Nazism anything but definitively healed but, in a certain way, it seems to come closer to our condition the more our condition exceeds the confines of modernity. (…) That is why, once the conceptual lexicon (if not the political exigency) of communism was worn out, we turned to reckon with that of Nazism, only to find it stamped across our foreheads.” (Roberto Esposito, Terms of the Political, Fordham University Press, 2013, p. 86)  

Giorgio Agamben considers the anomalous temporality of biopolitics, which for him too is synonymous with Nazism or its metonymic representative – the camp – from the point of view of sovereignty or sovereign power and not realized biology: “The present inquiry (Homo Sacer) concerns precisely this hidden point of intersection between the juridico-institutional and the biopolitical models of power. (…) the production of the biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power.  In this sense biopolitics is at least as old as the sovereign exception. Placing biological life at the center of its calculations, the modern State therefore does nothing other than bring to light the secret tie uniting power and bare life, thereby reaffirming the bond (…) between the modern and the archaic (…)”(Homo Sacer, ibid., p. 6)  

If Nazism merely recovers the forgotten potential of antique secret techniques of power – the archaic – in what way is that also modern?  And if the ancient revenant homo sacer - the ostracized man who can be killed by anyone, but not sacrificed – all highly archaic terms – is ‘bare life’ in the camp – it becomes even more difficult to understand what Agamben means by the camp as the biopolitical paradigm of the modern? And although Esposito sees in Nazism the decomposition of the modern as the realization of biology, biopolitics is for him undoubtedly constitutive of our contemporary world. But why Nazism must be so necessarily implicated in biopolitics qua modernity remains the 'unthought' premise of both these biopolitical philosophers.

Biopolitics, striking its roots in Nazism’s historical collapse and ruin, its decomposition of the modern, becomes a positive theory of contemporary society and of sovereign power whether in the form of a state or some more diffuse ‘exception’/ ‘state of exception’.  In biopolitical philosophy, concept and fact – or the ontological and the ontic - tend to merge into a positive hybrid with no remainder - what Agamben calls "the fact that decides on its own application".    

Foucault’s ‘new’ or salient definition ushering in the epoch of biopolitics in social and political theory “Modern man is an animal whose politics calls his existence as a living being into question.” predates the distinction between politics and ‘the political’.  But it distinctly echoes the declaration of the ‘ontological difference’ and Dasein’s exemption or special status in Being and Time:  “Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities.  Rather it is ontically distinguished by the fact, that, in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it. (…) Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontological.” (Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford, 2001, p. 32)  Although as one knows – Heidegger expressly denies Dasein any biological meaning or substance – Dasein is spatial but not embodied. And yet  - in the dissolving of the ontological difference on its account – Dasein assumes a hegemony in Being – or if the ontological difference is a reflection of the finitude of being/entities in relation to Being – Dasein escapes such absolute finitude.  Is it so surprising that Heidegger wanted to protect his exceptional creature from biological finitude?  How strange though that such a non-biological non-corporeal quasi-transcendental ‘subject’ should give birth to biopolitics, which exposes life directly/ sans merci to politics, the political or power.  








2 .  The Deep State of Exception or Deep Police

What is the state of exception of the deep state?  The deep state of exception?  Was Nazism the unearthing of the deep state?  Nothing needed to be concealed any more.  Was it perhaps the liberation of the deep state?  Marcuse refers to the direct dictatorship of the economic powers ‘behind’ the Nazi throne.  They did not need the state any more to rule.   The deep Nazi state was also the dismantling according to him of the Rechtsstaat – that masterpiece of Prussian jurisprudence which Hegel at least in part held in high esteem.  Odd that one seldom refers to the Nazi apparatus as a ‘police state’ – although what was Eichmann’s Gestapo other than a secret branch of the police?  But in the unchained form of the police state, which Nazism was – there was little need of secrecy.  The racial völkisch bond of the German people loosened the inner constraints of secrecy just as, according to Albert Speer, the organization of mass murder could hide ‘in the open’ behind the humdrum whirring of the Big technological Machine. 
The actual size of the Gestapo reflects the relative ease with which the ‘secret police’ could operate within the cohesive German majority population: “The Gestapo in 1937 had just over 7,000 employees including bureaucrats and secretarial staff.  Together with a far smaller force of police, they sufficed to keep tabs on more than 60 million people.  Most Germans simply did not need to be subjected to surveillance or detention.” (Götz Aly, Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War and the Nazi Welfare State, Picador, 2008, p. 29 cited by Prairie Fire (llco.org) in LLCO, June 7, 2011)

Conversely, the Nazi ruling body was itself a state of dissolution from the start – its various porous segments composed of the Nazi party, industry or monopoly capitalism, the Wehrmacht, the old and new bureaucracies and the Führer were a disassociation of warring apparatuses – as Franz Neumann shows in his classic study Behemoth.  Eventually with the rise of Himmler the SS formed a nascent state in state drawing on all of the other apparatuses – especially the economy.  Neumann raises the question if the Nazi conglomerate ever was a state? When Heidegger asks himself in Introduction to Metaphysics – “What is the State?” – the only examples he can think of are the state police arresting a suspect, the Führer speaking to the English foreign minister and the sound of clacking typewriters in a Reichsministerium taking dictation.  

Adorno draws a striking analogy between the subject/particular under the ban and Neumann’s characterization of the Nazi German Volksstaat or Behemoth – or rather the totality in how it effects the particular – precipitating its own breaking apart. “The more the society steers toward the totality, which reproduces itself in the ban/spell of subjects, the deeper too its tendency toward dissociation.  This latter threatens the life of the species, as much as it denies the ban of the whole, the false identity of subject and object.  The general, which compresses the particular as if by an instrument of torture, until it splinters, labours against itself, because it has its substance in the life (italics sm) of the particular; without it, it sinks down into the abstract, separate and eradicable form. Franz Neumann diagnosed this in the institutional sphere in Behemoth: the disassembly into disconnected and warring power-apparatuses is the secret of the total fascist state.” (Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt, 1996, p. 337) 

But by another paradoxical movement of asymmetry – the singular is also a ‘beneficiary’ of the general – and in recognition of this effect – compulsively acts to repair (albeit futilely and temporarily) the tissue of the oppressive whole.  (For a study of the mutually beneficial symbiosis of the Nazi Volksgenosse and his/her Volksstaat see Götz Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und Nationalsozialismus, Fischer Taschenbuch, 2006/ Hitler’s Beneficiaries: Plunder, Racial War and the Nazi Welfare State, Picador, 2008)

The police state or the autonomous police acting within the nation state were rather late in developing – as Hannah Arendt notes in her work Origins of Totalitarianism.  Their extraordinary powers arose precisely in connection with the need to deal with those persons without a state, refugees mostly from Russia and Eastern and Southeastern Europe including Turkey – excluded from the normal legal rights of citizens after the first world war and its ensuing cumbersome ‘peace and minority treaties’ and fragile unsustainable new states.     In her analysis, these great masses of displaced populations eroded certain age old precepts of international law – especially the unwritten ones such as quid quid est in territorio est de territorio – whatever is on the territory is subject to the territory – which is the basis of the right of asylum.  These phenomena belong to the general complex of the “decline of the nation state” – out of whose decline or brokenness emerged the contrary movement – the rise of the police or the police state in the state. (Reiner Schürmann has described this topology in more noetic terms as “broken hegemonies”.)  The new state of the police is not to be confused with classic undercover or conspiratorial operations of the police in the style of the police minister Fouché, minister under Napoleon and under those who destroyed Napoleon – a type of police governance Stendhal describes so acutely and satirically in The Charterhouse of Parma nor with the enlightened police state of Joseph II of Austria organized around a system of spies and informers operating out of the tobacconist shops or Trafik in Vienna at a time when tobacco was a state monopoly.
Arendt makes it sound almost too simple:  “The nation-state, incapable of providing a law for those who had lost the protection of a national government, transferred the whole matter to the police.  This was the first time the police in Western Europe had received authority to act on its own, to rule directly over people; in one sphere of public life it was no longer an instrument to carry out and enforce the law, but had become a ruling authority independent of government and ministries.  Its strength and its emancipation from law and government grew in direct proportion to the influx of refugees.” (Hannah Arendt, Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1979,  p. 287)  She refers to the situation in France post World War I - where an order of expulsion issued by the police was far graver than one from the Minster of Interior – who could only rarely cancel such a police order.  Despite the fact, that constitutionally the police were under the authority of the Ministry of Interior.  

Before the outbreak of the 2nd World War the relations between the Gestapo and the police forces of other European countries were so cordial and independent of the official governments one could speak of a foreign policy of the police.  Such a policy had much to do with the transnational governance of exactly those stateless persons.  As Arendt describes – someone who had escaped from a concentration camp in Germany to Holland would be placed in an internment camp in Holland.  (Origins of Totalitarianism, ibid., see p. 288)  The ties between these self-governing police organs cleared the way for the later occupation.

[In the BBC series 37 Days about the prelude to World War I the characters discuss the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia after the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand – demanding Austrian policing or co-policing in Serbia.  When one of the British officials is amazed by such a breach of sovereignty – another says that it is nothing unusual for police to cooperate across borders.   Although historical fiction – it is a most plausible view, considering the fear of anarchist movements dogging the monarchies and dynasties of the 19th century – that the police began their autonomous life long before the refugees started their mass migrations.]

In light of this historical empirical situation, Carl Schmitt’s famous opening line of his Political Theology “sovereign is he who decides on the exception” (written at exactly this time in history) appears less the flaunting of sovereign supra-legal power (this is how Agamben will present it) – than a reaction to a defacto existing loss of power of the sovereign to other agencies – in this case the police.  
  
The ‘decline of the nation-state’ in Arendt’s phrase – or rather the ending of states and empires after the First World War, hollowed out sovereignty and consequently the status of citizens and subjects.  An absolute loss of power establishes in the minds of theorists such as Schmitt and Agamben the absolute sovereignty of the exception. Agamben’s idea of the sovereign ban is equally tinged by Heidegger’s “powerlessness of abandonment” – an effect of Dasein’s superior power of being free for death, its finite freedom.  What is more of an exception for a state than when it collapses and becomes extinct?  Is its collapse itself part of the state?  Or is the state’s in extremis part of the ‘deep state’?
Schmitt writing his Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, after the German Kaiserreich’s ignominious defeat and end in World War One, insists defiantly on an even more absolute sovereignty – the suspension of all law in the sovereign decision on the exception – with the idea/hope perhaps that this would prevent the worst from happening again.

If the sovereign decision is the negation of State law – then the positive ‘body’ to rise in this void is the biopolitical police – or the fusion of politics and police – whereby the police become masters of the ‘care of life’ hence Life’s overseer or governor.  The police are the instrument through which the state intrudes ever deeper into the despotic ancient regime of the oikos – the household – and inversely the paterfamilias’ absolute power over life and death (vitae necisque potestas) invades the functioning of the state.  The deep state of exception gives birth to the deep police.







In Benjamin’s terms in Critique of Violence written also during this time (1920-21) – the police became the fusion of law making and law preserving power or violence. Benjamin saw the coinciding of these powers in the hands of the police as a sign of the decrepitude of the Weimar parliamentary system.  Derrida in his essay Force of Law takes umbrage at this particular observation of Benjamin about the police in Weimar Germany - seeing it as an inexcusable slur upon ‘the spirit of the police’ in general.  More importantly, Benjamin violates Derrida’s and deconstructionism’s holy principle of iterability.
The identity of law founding power or violence and law preserving power or violence is one of its axioms.  Iterability means for Derrida’s concept of law and justice – the infinite repetition of the mystical foundation of authority at every moment as if happening now for the first time. 

Benjamin’s historical vision is the more lucid one – especially considering the post Weimar transformations of the police apparatus in Nazi Germany.
The organization most representative of the Nazi regime was the Reichssicherheitshauptamt – Reich Security Head Office – a hybrid of police and SS, a novel invention of the Nazi arcanum dominationis. Himmler who created it was its supreme ministerial head.  His double title was chief of German Police and Reichsführer-SS.  The official task of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt was to find and eliminate the enemies of the Reich inside and outside the borders of Nazi Germany.  Its numerous subdivisions included the Sipo, the security police comprised of the Gestapo and the Criminal Police, and SD, the SS intelligence service. The RSHA as it was called was in charge of all deep police operations inside and outside the Reich from domestic criminal police matters, to Nazi indoctrination to the death squads accompanying the Wehrmacht (the German army) in Eastern Europe and all other stages of genocide.

In effect, Agamben almost reduces biopolitics to the rise of the police – not yet quite the camp, the genealogy of the police is biopolitics’ rather unspectacular back entrance or back room.  But the police were not just suddenly entrusted with the administration of surplus refugee population (as Arendt suggests) – the so-called science of the police had been evolving since the 18th century, concerned with the ‘care and well-being of the population proper’.  

Echoing one another Agamben and Esposito follow Foucault’s cue – giving utmost weight to the role of the police, in the ‘genealogy of biopolitics’, above that of the Christian tradition of the pastorate (the confession), and a related ‘art of government’.  The old style sovereignty over territory influenced by physiocratic thinking saw in it a possession, granting sovereignty unlimited prerogative to extract value from its natural and human resources – now the ‘government of men’ must nurture and discipline the human resources qua population or species, of course ultimately to maximize productivity and benefit the state. 

Pastoral care is a form of disciplinary institution based on the relation of a shepherd and his flock.  A similar idea of governance emerged in the 6th century amongst the nomadic empires of Central Asia – nomadic conquerors such as the Avars or Huns had to change themselves from ‘shepherds of sheep to shepherds of men’.  The Ottomans later perfected this rather unstable form of government in the 14th century under Murat the First.  It was during his reign that the Ottomans (now sedentary nomads) with the Janissaries, Murat’s praetorian guard of Moslem converts, conquered much of the Balkans.  The Ottoman ‘art of government’ consisted of choosing and training ‘human watchdogs’ to manage and control the ‘herd of men’ and the human neighbors of the herd. (see Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, New York, 2002, pp. 51-53)
In the West, the disciplinary institutions and structures of schools, armies, barracks, hospitals etc were also the mode of hegemonic subjectivation and subjection. 

Von Justi the 18th century author of Elements of the Police introduces a new distinction between politics and the police.  Politics has a strictly negative authority – it is engaged in the control of the internal and external enemy – the sovereign defending the territory; the police though are positively concerned with the welfare of the population.  Agamben turns this distinction into an identity of politics and police which he discovers in Nazi biopolitics – claiming it cannot just be seen as ‘racism’ in a biological sense, but should be regarded in the context of this 18th century police science legacy:   “National Socialist biopolitics moves, (…) in a horizon, in which the “care of life” inherited from eighteenth-century police science is, in now being founded on properly eugenic concerns, absolutized. (…) National Socialist biopolitics (…) cannot be grasped if it is not understood as necessarily implying the disappearance of the difference between the two terms:  the police now becomes politics, and the care of life coincides with the fight against the enemy. (…) Only from this perspective is it possible to grasp the full sense of the extermination of the Jews, in which the police and politics, eugenic motives and ideological motives, the care of health and the fight against the enemy become absolutely indistinguishable.” (Homo Sacer, ibid., pp. 146-147)

In other words, following Agamben’s argument, National Socialist biopolitics – by and large consisting of the extermination/genocide of European Jewry – was in essence an action of this new deep police.  The police in Agamben’s words are modern politics’ method of “giving form to life” – not just in the Third Reich.  

Here Agamben’s concept of biopolitics parts ways from that of Foucault and Esposito – or rather they both remain undecided about how to classify biopolitics itself.  When sovereign power or the state dissolves into Agamben’s identity of politics and the police, does it then inexorably unleash or reveal the biopolitical ‘scythe’, so-called thanatopolitics?  Is biopolitics then rather a symptom or form of the decomposition of the sovereign political state of citizens and the general will (the declaration of the rights of man and citizen)?  Foucault, writes Esposito remains unresolved about his two models, ‘running in two directions’ – the sovereignty model (juridico-political hegemony) and the biopolitical model.  Are they one and the same or different from each other?  Esposito describes these two positions as ‘continuous’ or ‘discontinuous’ – meaning are sovereignty, biopolitics and totalitarianism implicit in one another or does biopolitics constitute a break or rupture of sovereignty?  In effect, Agamben admits that biopolitics is not seamlessly continuous with the sovereignty of citizens or the Rechtsstaat, noting that even in Nazi Germany – the most full blown biopolitical regime in history – Nazi officials felt obliged to completely denationalize Jewish German citizens before they sent them to the gas chambers.

The reason Foucault remains cautious, according to Esposito, eventually abandoning the biopolitical line of query is quite clear:  “(…) if the thesis of indistinction between sovereignty, biopolitics, and totalitarianism were to prevail – the continuist hypothesis – he would be forced to assume genocide as the constitutive paradigm (or at least as the inevitable outcome) of the entire parabola of modernity.” (Roberto Esposito, Bíos, Biopolitics and Philosophy, Minneapolis, 2008, p. 43)   

Foucault’s hesitation, the ‘abyss’ he looked into, though is precisely at the point where Agamben unveils his theory of modernity which he calls unambiguously – the camp as biopolitical paradigm of the modern or alternatively the camp as nomos of the modern.









3.  What is Agamben’s Camp?

Agamben develops his idea of the camp most thoroughly in his book Homo Sacer – Sovereign Power and Bare Life.  The English translation shows an architectural drawing on its front cover – one of the versions of the Auschwitz ‘master plan’– lest there be any doubt about the contents.  In Homo Sacer Agamben offers several definitions or situations/positions with which or from which to regard the camp – from a fairly minimal one, at a maximum distance from its exterminatory genocidal aspect, to a maximum ascription, at the minimal distance from its determinate genocidal form.  The minimal signifier camp means simply the ‘historical disjunction between birth and nation’.  Birth no longer automatically inscribes the individual in the nation.  Here Agamben defers to Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the impact of refugees on the political history or decline of the nation-state;
the plight of the refugee is both a prototype of this disjunction and its evidence. 

The old nomos, a term borrowed from Carl Schmitt again, was the trinity: land (physical territory), order (state) and birth (nation).  This nomos is now broken – its new regulator is the 4th pillar – the camp.  The camp decides on the inscription of birth in the nation.  Birth in that Heideggerian turn of phrase, is now an issue for the new nomos.  Natality thus is already bare life – even before it is born. “The growing dissociation of birth (bare life) and the nation-state is the new fact of politics in our day, and what we call camp is this disjunction.” (Homo Sacer, ibid., p. 175)  In this minimal definition there is little spatiality – let alone physicality.  The camp is a kind of bureaucratic stoppage – a break in the mechanism of sovereignty, a symptom of its brokenness and at the same time its regulative principle.  Birth today for Agamben thus has no place - or a non-place, - or rather every birth has its first ideal place – the camp.   The new nomos is at least in part the camp as the principle of including birth by way of excluding it from the nation-state, a variation of the sovereign ban. 

But Agamben does not stop at this minimal claim.  He contends that the camp is the biopolitical paradigm of the modern.  The camp thus is biopolitics itself and as such defines the modern era, modernity.  His minimal claim comes to soften or prepare the site for his maximal claim.  But one still does not know the spatiality of this camp – as a spatial entity it is again only a function of the juridical structure or condition he calls a ‘state of exception’ when the law is suspended – the camp is a localizing kit, where supposedly the state of exception has become the rule, hence permanent.  Permanence is both temporal and in some unspecific way potentially spatial.  One still does not quite see how the ‘state of exception’ can be so restricted as to be in only one space – and at the same time be everywhere. Whatever its locale though, the camp as a “dislocating localization (it) is the hidden matrix of the politics in which we are still living, and it is this structure of the camp that we must learn to recognize in all its metamorphoses into the zones d’attentes of our airports and certain outskirts of our cities.” (Homo Sacer, ibid., p. 175)  

Those non-places, however, refer only to Agamben’s minimal claim – 
that the camp is sovereign power discharging itself upon new kinds of nomadism,  asylum seekers, people without papers, migrant workers, refugees from war zones and natural disasters, terrorism etc.   The “hidden matrix” alias the camp, also includes the intensive care wards and laboratories where doctors and scientists, according to Agamben, exercise sovereign-like power over neomorts, faux vivants and overcomatose creatures – those who hover between life and death, human and animal tissue.

The maximal camp of Agamben’s argument – is not a refugee camp, a temporary holding zone for people whose papers are not valid, nor a hospital ward – it is the death camp, built especially for the purpose of meting out death.  Quite simply it is Auschwitz.   Auschwitz is not a localization, it was a historical physical space for the arrival of transports, for barracks, gas chamber and crematoria and for the ‘new town’ especially constructed for the SS and its industrial enterprises.  Auschwitz in all of its 48 sub-camps was built as an artificial disciplinary town in the middle of nowhere – modelled on another sort of camp - the Roman military camp whose 17th century revivals Foucault describes in Security, Territory and Population.  But unlike these towns Auschwitz was also destined ideally to ‘capitalize’ the still unfinished eastward expanding territory of the 1000 year Reich. 

But is it possible to combine these two camps – the minimal refugee camp, including the hospital ward and the maximal historical death camp?  Is the refugee question identical with the genocide of European Jewry and its localities?  It would seem rather, that the refugee question serves Agamben as a kind of ‘screen memory’ to borrow Freud’s term within the text for that other question ‘the final solution’ which must be suppressed and expressed at the same time – in other words a way of forgetting whilst remembering and enunciating.  Auschwitz is both erased and kept – in that refrain of Agamben – like the law, it is in force but does not apply. Law figures in his analyses as the term for the political, the sovereign, and the ban – the ontological.

The Nazi exterminatory drive was not haphazard nor opportunist – they did not wait for refugees to uproot themselves so they could denationalize them - they ripped the Jewish people as a group from their national habitats – where they were citizens – creating these circumstances in one European country after another.  This was done according to plan.  

The Jewish person caught up in the relentless mechanism of Nazi genocide was decidedly not a refugee. Refugees are a contingent mass – arising as an effect of major upheavals – wars, natural disasters, collapse of states, famine, plague etc. – Nazism was all of that in intentional human form.

The Jewish people were fake refugees – they did not flee and present themselves in a new place.  Rather they were made to look like refugees.  The familiar images from the midst of genocide – the lines or columns of Jewish men, women and children carrying their belongings tied up in blankets or in suitcases, marching through empty streets – their yellow stars on their coat sleeves, faces etched in weariness and a certain aloofness – these images are fabrications of the Nazi cinematography of genocide.  They had to look like refugees as they passed through Polish, Russian, Lithuanian, Ukrainian etc streets to keep up the fiction of resettlement.  Although no one was fooled for long.  It was a fake exodus of the people known for their exoduses – these were not refugee treks along lines of flight.  These scenes were as Agamben correctly recognized – the mise en scène of police actions.  Occasional armed police guards, as if there to escort them to safety are sometimes visible on the margins of these photographs.   

In whatever country the Germans had invaded and occupied, the stages of genocide followed a standard pattern – first was the definition of who was considered to be a Jew, then the legislation forcing these so defined persons gradually or quickly out of economic, political and social life, the confiscating of their property, this could even go on for several years as in the unusual case of the Jews of Hungary, but eventually they were ghettoized or incarcerated in a transit camp like Drancy – the pre-camp space of exception, only then stripped of citizenship, and the final stage was the transport to Auschwitz or one of the other death camps.  They were shipped like packages, already in the clutches of their murderers at discount rates paid for from their confiscated assets.   Their journey was not random; it did not have the uncertain destination of a singularly wandering refugee, the quarters awaiting them were not temporary constructions to house – but permanent constructions to murder.  Their itinerary was preordained by the German death machine and the railway timetable – as Alain Resnais says in his film Night and Fog – while the Jews of Europe were still living fairly carefree lives in all the corners of the continent – their barracks in the ‘new town’ – the camp and its crematoria were being built for them.   

It is this historical physical space which Agamben calls the most absolute biopolitical space ever – and it this site (his maximal claim) which is “the very paradigm of political space at the point at which politics becomes biopolitics and homo sacer is virtually confused with the citizen.” (Homo Sacer, ibid., p. 171) The space he speaks of here is one which cannot be duplicated – you won’t find it in our airports, or banlieues, – because besides its destructive, annihilatory task, the camp was a destinal, historial world in the Heideggerian sense.  Auschwitz was both locus and act of the genocidal rite de passage “by which the German biopolitical body is made actual” (ibid., p. 174) – in Agamben’s words. 

Auschwitz – and its brother and sister camps – is the historical unique space where Agamben’s two major concepts of bare life/homo sacer and state of exception coincided absolutely, the only space where mere killable but not sacrificable life (his definition of homo sacer) and the law of no law could invest each other with total grisly effect.  Homo sacer though continually changes costume in Agamben’s text – from werewolf, to outlaw, to man in the Hobbesian state of nature, to the sovereign himself, the Muselmann, the Führer and even the biopolitical body of the West – all are alternative persona/incarnations of homo sacer alias bare life.   
Agamben’s camp itself is an ontological allegory, a metaphysical topology, the biopolitical utopia of the West. 

If one had any doubt that Heidegger is inspiring this ensemble – Agamben confirms that Dasein is itself homo sacer – performing one of his typical re-investments of the same concept in a nearly opposite setting, the trick of the floating signifier. Suddenly, rising from the most abject depths of the Muselmann or the living corpse shuffling along its way to the crematoria - homo sacer becomes that ontic-ontological being “whose very own life is always at issue in its every act – instead becomes Dasein, the inseparable unity of Being and ways of Being, of subject and qualities, life and world.” (ibid., p. 153)  
Bare Life itself comes closest to Pure Being in the ontology of the west – just as metaphysics and politics in the West, according to Agamben, meet in Auschwitz on the so-called “ (…) threshold of absolute indistinction between law and fact, juridical rule and biological life.” (ibid., p. 187)  

This threshold crossing through Auschwitz is the defunct ontological difference.

Agamben’s provisional conclusion at the end of Homo Sacer is that the camp has replaced the city as the fundamental biopolitical paradigm of the West.  In Agamben’s ‘camp’ are buried his minimal and maximal versions, - the refugee camp cum hospital and the Vernichtungslager (extermination camp), the screen memory and the repressed forbidden content.  In this portmanteau form, the camp or Auschwitz has migrated from the extreme outer reaches, the outside of the permanent state of exception to the heart of Western politics –, now understood only as biopolitics - to become its ontological capital.









4.   The Biopolitical Dispositif

Esposito alone attempts to unravel what that ‘secret tie’ is between ‘us post-moderns’ and Nazism – it follows from his rejection of totalitarianism as a concept adequate to both Soviet Communism and Nazism.  In his essay “Totalitarianism or Biopolitics: Towards a Philosophical Interpretation of the Twentieth Century”, he contends that Nazism can no longer be filed away with Communism under the genus totalitarianism (the well-known thesis of Arendt), they must be disunited/separated.  Communism is more related to the Western political tradition of the French Revolution – egalitarianism, universalism, historical becoming, transcendence, democracy, rights of man – than it is to Nazism or Nazism to the French Revolution.  Hence one is free to discover Nazism’s secret ties to liberalism until now overshadowed by the paradigm of totalitarianism.  Citing Carl Schmitt’s essay of the 1920s The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy Esposito observes – liberalism is neither by nature nor necessity democratic – its logic is rather “anti-egalitarian, particularistic, and at times even naturalistic.” (Roberto Esposito, Terms of the Political, ibid., p. 108) 
Never mind that Carl Schmitt does not exactly make these claims in that essay – although he does point to affinities of dictatorship to democracy.  Liberalism in his view is not anti-egalitarian, but believes, as opposed to democracy, in an impossible ethical equality of all persons as persons – an empty equality – democracy in Carl Schmitt’s rendering is if anything more biopolitical than liberalism.  The equality of the sovereign people is substantive – they must be nearly homogeneous, consequently inequality of foreigners or aliens is a necessary condition of inner democratic equality.  But Esposito’s argument compels him to exaggerate the differences between liberalism and democracy in favour of his new correspondences. 

Relieved of the false alternative of totalitarianism or democracy, one can today recognize that the hidden regime, which unites liberalism and Nazism, is biopolitics.  Nazism is closer to us post-moderns not because historical Nazism is necessarily returning – but rather the biopolitical paradigm immanent in liberalism has raised its biopolitical precursor from the dead.  The interrupted continuity between liberalism and Nazism has been resumed.  Not Nazism itself – or a longing for its historical return – makes it indispensable as a matrix (skeletal key) of the present, but the contemporary desire to interpret/illuminate liberalism’s present biopolitical dispositif via biopolitics’ previous life as Nazism.  Liberalism’s self-knowledge of its own reality passes through Nazism.

A similar idea might have been behind Gillian Rose’s cryptic remark in the introduction to her 1992 essay The Broken Middle regarding the submerged political history coming to light/surfacing in the wake of the ‘revolutions’ of 1989: “The Revolution in the revolutions of 1989 has not ‘destroyed’ Marxism so much as it has dismantled post-war state-Socialism. (…)  All the debates, all the antinomies of modern state and society addressed since Hobbes, Smith and Rousseau, have been re-opened as well as the opportunity to resume the examination of the connection between liberalism and fascism from which post-war state-socialism has proved such a dangerous distraction.” (Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle, Oxford, 1992, p. xi) 

If Nazism was state biopolitics, liberalism, says Esposito, is biopolitics of the individual.  In Nazi biopolitics ‘man’ is his own body and nothing more than that.  But the state owns it.  In liberal biopolitics man has his own body and he owns it in freehold too.  But what does that really mean?  If Nazism is that explosive conjuncture in which power collides with life immediately – basing itself “on an absolutely natural given that concerns the bare biological sphere” in Esposito’s words (Terms of the Political, ibid. p. 106)  – how can liberal individual ‘ownership’ or possession of one’s body have that same political immediacy?

Ownership itself, whatever the property, is a legal term, not biopolitical. If the difference between liberal and Nazi biopolitics is simply the question of who owns the body – the individual or the state – biopolitics does not depart from age-old juridical models predating modernity, which determine the formal legal status of the person.  Locke whom Esposito cites marks the historical end of the power of the head of the household, the oikos – each person is now invested with the power to sell himself, as his own property.  Marx will call the biopolitical unit of the body – the commodity of labor power, the only asset/property of value the worker has to sell.  Of course this separation of body-self and sellable commodity is already an effect of the fetish character of the commodity.
Nazi biopolitics though would have hardly endorsed Locke’s “right to revolution”. 







Perhaps it is capitalism which is biopolitical and as such both Nazism and liberalism as variants modify its biopolitical dispositif in their contingent ways.  Eugenics, Darwinism and historicist race theories, all powerful precedents for Nazi biopolitics – originated in late Victorian liberal imperial Britain.  
Houston Stewart Chamberlain’s Foundations of the 19th Century was the bible of Nazi propaganda before Rosenberg wrote its sequel – The Myth of the 20th Century.  Chamberlain already spoke of the supremacy of the Aryan race – of proto Indo European provenance.  Chamberlain rejected Darwinism though in favor of Gestalt – but Rosenberg in The Myth of the 20th Century advocated a mystical Darwinism as the basis of the new Nazi religion.
Are perhaps Darwinism and social Darwinism the biopolitics of British imperial liberalism?  But already classic liberal political economy presumed the inevitability of periodic mass death as a result of dearth, overabundance of labour (power) hence subsistence wages and semi-natural disasters such as famine. Foucault’s ‘letting die’ was built into Adam Smith’s theodicy of the providential ‘invisible hand’ and the free reign of the market. (See Warren Montag, “Necro-economics, Adam Smith and Death in the Life of the Universal” in Radical Philosophy, 134, (November/December 2005)  

[Greece’s current ‘humanitarian crisis’ – or the austerity imposed on it by the dictates of the ‘Troika’ (European Commission, European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund) is an example of such a market-induced ‘state of exception’.  Like in the times of Smith, Malthus and Bentham, if the poor refuse to die – the state or other authorities must intervene to assure that the 'regulative market mechanisms' are allowed to take their course.  As they continue to so successfully in present day Britain.  Some parts of the working class in ‘wealthy’ Britain earn such low wages they no longer can afford a new refrigerator when the old one breaks down – they are lured into ‘rent to own’ schemes, which eventually cost three times as much.  But when the Greek population rebels against a much more dire reduction of their living standard – the former Tory chancellor Kenneth Clarke condemns the rescue plans of those he dubs the “latter-day Trotskyites” from Syriza with a latter-day ‘let them die’: “It is nothing to do with just the Germans.  I can’t see why any other states should take a huge multibillion-pound hit again for the Greeks so they can hire more civil servants, raise their minimum wage, scrap all their labour market reforms and all the other things they want to do.” (Nicholas Watt, “Kenneth Clarke says Syriza victory risks Greek exit from eurozone” in Guardian online, 15 February 2015)]

But there must be more to biopolitics and its dispositif than this anecdotal evidence suggests.

If biopolitics is truly a dispositif, in the Foucauldian sense, then all the articulations of its reign – economic, political, architectural, discursive, gestural, technological, medical, criminological, bodies of grammar, bodies of pain, the world of things, the netherworld of thought, etc  - are captured within – including certainly philosophy and its methods.  Philosophy must be so formed in the biopolitical image that it too reflects that ascendancy of the bare biological sphere, the absolutely natural given, no longer needing the legitimacy of the idea, just the facts and nothing but the natural facts.  

And of course Esposito does not exclude philosophy from the biopolitical dispositif – particularly philosophy or rather its Heideggerian end – is at the heart of biopolitics.  But when he reflects philosophy’s turning within and towards biopolitics – it is not a biopolitical liberalism, which informs the new philosophical naturalism – it is once again simply Nazism.  Although, as he writes, Nazism suffered an absolute military and political defeat – it still commands a potent cultural and linguistic force – so much so that he recognizes in Nazism “the unprecedented attempt to liberate the natural features of existence from their historical distinctiveness” (Terms of the Political, ibid., p. 107). 

But Esposito claims that Nazism’s biopolitical being epitomized the 20th century even more profoundly – by far surpassing the totalitarian paradigm of the West – enacting the century’s real antithesis of nature and history, touching the deep vein of ‘the preservation of life’.  

But what Esposito describes, as Nazism’s singular deep attunement to the 20th century question of ‘the preservation of life’ in other words self-preservation would hardly amount to the specificity of Nazism or the 20th century.  Self-preservation is what Adorno and Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment call the Spinozist presupposition, the “true maxim of all Western civilization” (Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, Stanford, 2002, p. 22). “Conatus sese conservandi primum et unicum virtutis est fundamentum” (Baruch Spinoza, Ethics, Part IV, Proposition XXII, Coroll.) 
“The endeavor of preserving oneself is the first and only basis of virtue.”

Indeed preservation of life, freedom and property were the negative objectives of the liberalistic state of the 19th century.

‘Self-preservation’, as the ultimate rationale, sacrifices myth, nature and eventually bourgeois subjectivity itself to its self-alienated form in the capitalist technical apparatus.  As such, the preservation of life leads to utter denaturisation. Adorno relentlessly criticizes the tautological nature of the self-preservation principle – its rudimentary identity postulate – the means (self) and end (self) are the same/identical.  It is a crucial element of his critique of a certain kind of materialism or forms of ‘naturalism’ in philosophy – that are once again very popular or still popular today as one can see in Esposito or philosophies of the animal or the brain among others.  Naturalism (in philosophy) attaches itself to the idea of Life and the natural sciences/Life sciences – Bare Life – and is predominantly biologistic – hence ultimately the ‘birth of biopolitics’ is an aspect of this naturalism.

Adorno’s anti-Spinozist stance can illuminate some of the strategies of this argumentation – and their limitations. His critique of western metaphysics – or rather its post mortem – drives his almost obsessive disparaging of ‘stubborn self-preservation’ (Negative Dialektik, ibid., p. 336), especially in its function as a quasi axiom of western thought - the natural historical norm of conformity/adaptation/adjustment – die naturgeschichtliche Norm der Anpassung (ibid., p. 339). Natural history and world spirit (or metaphysics) become indistinguishable ‘under the ban’ – a mysterious expression which variously means experience as the equivalent of the fetish character of the commodity, the false identity of subject and object (identity philosophy), the sheer weight of ‘what is’ (mere existent – das bloß Seiende), interpersonal coldness – the bourgeois ideal of coldness.  So that spirit becomes natural history – a regression to animality (not second nature).  Animal behavior differs from human in that it is compulsive – but the animal species of humans has inherited some of this compulsiveness. Human reflection is our species-means to oppose or surpass this compulsiveness inherited from the animal species that we are.

But when reflection itself is ‘bestialized’ (a second corrupt degree of animality) and is recruited or hijacked by the ‘ban’ – this inversion of itself turns reason into what Kant calls ‘radical evil’, – neither human nor animal – a new order of mythical ban, a bewitchment, a wrongness of the heart, falseness  – inescapable universal claustrophobia of the closed system.  “As a ban” says Adorno “reified consciousness has become total.” (Negative Dialektik, ibid., p. 337) Instead of a transcendental subject or world spirit, the self-preserving subject is “bestialized self-preserving reason”, Adorno writes in Negative Dialectic. Such bestialized reason – in the service of self-preservation – is a kind of mutant reason – prevalent in a society which is devoid of spirit, where the Natural has assumed a “mythical violence/power” (recalling the terminology Benjamin uses in his essay Critique of Violence) and all categories of consciousness are ‘zombie’ effects of the ban, states of delusion. 

Bestialized self-preserving reason or reified consciousness is a grotesque spiritless spirit – the force that drives spirit out of the species, which it in turn idolizes, meaning spirit. (“Das Vertierte selbsterhaltender Vernunft, treibt den Geist der Gattung aus, die ihn anbetet.”, ibid., 339)
And this demonic mechanism, Kant refers to a ‘Satanslist’ (a satanic ploy) – encases human society as a whole and each particular/individual within and of it – so that in nothing do society and the individuated harmonize so greatly and completely as in the ban – it is the glue of society or the false identity between subject and object.  Agamben also speaks of the ban – but it is the infinite distance between sovereign power and bare life, the void of bare life’s abandonment by the law and its total subordination to sovereign power.

If though in Agamben’s ban it is only the misfortunate singularity homo sacer who is included by being excluded from the community, polis, society, - for Adorno it is all of society, which is under the ban, excluded from itself without knowing it.

Perhaps the ‘ban’ is the biopolitical dispositif itself – all knowing and as unknowable as Kant’s thing-in-itself.

Under the ban, ideology is the element of fatality – and through ideology one arrives back at the biological origin of the principle of individuation – the seemingly incontestable Spinozist sese conservare - leading eventually to the repression of nature and subjectivity.

What lives – obeys, says Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.  







Bíos in Esposito’s sense is the term in which preservation of life and self can be read as the same.  In both liberalism and Nazism, the real victors of the last world war, according to Esposito’s biopolitical interpretation of history, the ‘corporeal dimension’ displaces the abstract subjectivity of the juridical person.   A true exemplar of identity philosophy – “bios is the object and subject of politics”. (Terms of the Political, ibid., p. 107) 

The reversals in Esposito’s biopolitical text, always lead back to Nazism – but now excluded, situated outside of Western philosophical tradition in a fortified space all its own.  If previously in the Western tradition, the philosophy of history gave meaning to otherwise senseless facts – now for Esposito’s trained biopolitical eye novel events are in themselves carriers of meaning or meaningful, in other words philosophic.  Events are philosophy – but only the major ones such as war, technology, freak eruptions like the Twin Towers, etc – and as immediately philosophical such events, like Nazism itself for instance, exude a power or will to power in a struggle to take over the world and consequently to dominate how the world is interpreted.  History has not vanished – it is the field where these event-philosophemes battle one another.  As Esposito claims: “(…) more than oil, arms or democracy, the metaphysical stakes of the conflict underway lie in the definition of the meaning of contemporary history.” (“Totalitarianism or Biopolitics: Towards a Philosophical Interpretation of the Twentieth Century”, Terms of the Political, ibid., p. 1o1)

In a philosophy conceived within this unique space of Nazism, after identifying the concrete event – which is already a philosophical will to power - there is a next step. 
Biopolitics is not just based on facts, ‘the absolutely natural given, the bare biological sphere’ – it requires and utilizes “effective languages to render these facts intelligible.” (ibid. p. 105)  So biopolitics has brought us back to philosophy – or even worse metaphysics.  A simple working definition of metaphysics would be precisely – a system of the intelligible which dominates or gives form to that which is not intelligible (like facts) – the sensible, the chaotic, the contingent.  Such intelligibility could also be called logos, the idea, the symbolic, a philosophy of history or modernity, mundus intelligibilis – the non-intelligible is nature, the sensual, the stochastic, mundus sensibilis – that which can only be apprehended through the medium of the intelligible such as consciousness, the unity of the person, a system of norms and values, the ‘new gaze’, the metaphysics of the subject.  But since the biopolitical event or fact is already laden with philosophical meaning – in other words ontic-ontological – both fact and law (as Agamben would say) – the ontic and the ontological – have become indistinguishable. Biopolitics has refashioned Nazism itself into an effective language granting intelligibility to all its own facts – something of the nature of what Reiner Schürmann calls a ‘hegemonic fantasm’: “(…) it justifies all that may become a phenomenon in the linguistic epoch that bears its hallmark; in this respect it is hegemonic.” (Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, Bloomington, 2003, p. 7)  Through its linguistic power it commands phenomena, made intelligible for itself.  Nazism’s biopolitical power (or in Agamben’s terms – sovereign power) is the metaphysical doctrine of the intelligible,  – giving form to non-intelligible bare life, making it intelligible for power.

For the biopolitical dispositif that it constitutes, Nazism is a singular unity or positive totality: both a novel philosophical event and at the same time the effective philosophical language in which it renders its bare facts intelligible to itself.   Regarded translocally from the outside of the ban, – Nazism in its biopolitical incarnation is an undead faux vivant ‘hegemonic fantasm’ fatally unable to phenomenalize the fact of its own extinction.



* A version of the above text was first presented in the series “Sociology Talks” at the Sociology Department, Boğaziçi University, Istanbul on 27th March 2014. 

Sunday, 16 November 2014

Heidegger and the West (Introduction to Community)




1. Is Community an Allegory of the West?
2. From Community to “Broken Subjects” 
3. Being-Guilty
4. Heidegger as a “Hegemonic Fantasm” or “Broken Hegemony”
5. The Stranger



1. Is Community an Allegory of the West?

Just as in Letter on “Humanism” when Heidegger praises Hölderlin for his other vision of Greece as a beginning, he removes Greece from its historical even geographical moorings – places it ‘adrift’ in the open – the world as a shoreless ocean – so that it is nowhere and everywhere – but rather “world-historical” and a “nearness to the source” per se.  This then is the West escaped from its historical and terrestrial boundaries.  Speaking of Hölderlin’s poem Homecoming (Heimkunft) in Letter on “Humanism”  – Heidegger situates only the West within the domain (so-called “clearing”) of Being – and leaves out the East as Orient and the West as Occident.  So that the destiny of the West with which Hölderlin is exclusively concerned is the homecoming of and to Being.  Such nearness to Being is called, following the thought of Being and Time, the “Homeland”.

Esposito reveals this peculiar identity not just of the West and Being – but of the West and community.  So that whenever community is questioned – it is the West that is in question.  Homelessness – and its opposite(s) Homecoming and Homeland – are of the West.  This is what Esposito refers to as “the objectively communitarian arrangement Heidegger assigns to Hölderlin’s poetic experience.” (Roberto Esposito, Communitas, The Origin and Destiny of Community, Stanford, 2010, p. 103)  So that Heidegger through Hölderlin both deterritorializes Germany into the sheerness of the West then deterritorializes the West from its regional limitations as mere Occident in contrast to Orient (not merely as Europe) – and as such doubly deterritorialized thinking the West becomes simply “world historical out of nearness to the source.”  In a similar movement “German” (as in Hölderlin’s German) is not spoken to the world so that the world should be cured through German essence (am deutschen Wesen soll die Welt genesen), [the exclusively German world-historical mission] – but German is spoken to Germans [even more local patriotic] so that Germans will realize their “destinal belongingness” to other peoples [turn inward to turn outward] so that they might become world-historical along with them (Martin Heidegger, Letter on “Humanism”, 1949 edition, translated by Frank A. Capuzzi, (first German publication 1946) in Pathmarks, p. 257) 

Homeland and historical dwelling is a nearness to being, which one assumes is the same as “nearness to source”.  All of that is also what is meant in the Heideggerian philosophical Diaspora as “community”.    

Community is meant anywhere Heidegger speaks of homeland – but especially in his thought of ‘homelessness’ – so prominent in Letter on “Humanism” – according to Esposito the heart of the relation of Hölderlin to Kant is also one of community – the same as that raised by Heidegger’s ‘homelessness’.  Recollecting that Esposito’s definition of Heidegger’s impolitical or non-political philosophy is ‘the deconstruction of political philosophy in the thought of community’ – so homelessness belongs to this thought.  






2. From Community to “Broken Subjects” 

The line of breakage is a temporal one – between the subject’s present and future.  (the past is memory and regret – the present and future is the axis of action, anticipation, ‘care’, will – none of these can be directed towards the past.)  Although for Heidegger as is well known – the past, especially the Greek past was interrupted, the pre-Socratic past before the Platonic devastation of Being – when logos and physis cease to be one.

Being is swallowed by the Idea - chorismos is the separation of the idea as what really exists from what does not exist but only seems as a mere copy of the Idea.  We must return to the Greek past before it was seized by the hegemony of the Idea for the recommencement of the history of being.  Such recommencement is Heidegger’s esoteric naming in Introduction to Metaphysics of the ‘national socialist revolution’.  As Reiner Schürmann notes: “Heidegger was only partly mistaken when, for a few months in the 1930s, he expected a new beginning of the West responding to Homer and Solon.” (Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, Indiana University Press, 2003, p. 526)  But why should Heidegger see the destiny of the West embodied in the “uprising” of Germany – one can perhaps imagine how he was mistaken – but in what part was he not mistaken? 
The Greek past as such a ‘new’ beginning is much closer to Being than the future.   But each and every Dasein must also heed his ownmost (je meines) ‘call’ of conscience (Gewissen) which inevitably calls him back to a more originary site – and as such – to a past even if not his own - before he can propel himself into his authentic mode – which in Being and Time he finds only within the collective – Mitsein or Volk (people).  Of course paradoxically he had always been there - inauthentically lost – in ‘das Man’ (the They) – just as ‘das Man’ is itself Mitsein in a deficient mode.  In his incisive reading of Being and Time - Johannes Fritsche explains that not only is Dasein lost – the past to which he must return is itself lost, buried under an inauthentic past of ‘the modern’, some of whose effects in the ‘kairos of today’ must first be purged. (See Johannes Fritsche, Geschichtlichkeit und Nationalsozialismus in Heideggers Sein und Zeit, Nomos, 2014)
The Nazi ‘revolution of the past’ anticipated in Being and Time (1927) is a Doppelgänger of the projected return to an ‘authentic’ Greek past in Introduction to Metaphysics (1935); both are virtual stations in the renewed history of Being before the ascendancy/hegemony of the Platonic Logos.

This split between present and future is Kantian – because Kant evades the dialectic “as the mode of resolving opposites in a world defined by the originary of the split.” (Communitas, ibid., pp. 104-5)  For Hegel the split is also originary – it is resolved in totality – but totality remains a contradictory unity.  Kant resides in the unresolved split – escaping totalization (Adorno would also be Kantian in this sense).   No Vermittlung (intermediate term) between opposites – sensibility and reason, human and divine, existence and essence (Heidegger’s Dasein pair) – resulting out of this implacable split – is a broken transcendental subject (from the start): “(…) a fracturing of the subject, divided and in conflict with itself, beginning with its own temporal constitution.” (ibid., p. 104)

[Why is it when Esposito claims only Heidegger took up Kant’s question of community – he immediately speaks in the next sentence of Kant’s supposed abyss of the self.  How is this jump to be explained?  The abyss is the temporal structure of the self – the empty space is time.  Yet, returning to Hölderlin, the Kant Esposito finds in Hölderlin – is the fearless Kant arguing for the finitude of the subject – whose inner split, divided in itself begins with its temporal constitution.  Or as Hölderlin calls the subject – “die Sterblichen” (the mortals) always in conflict with their masters “die Himmlischen” (the heavenly ones) who are not all powerful, they can’t do everything – and the mortals arrive in whatever way they can at the abyss.  “Time is long” – what happens, says Hölderlin, the event is “the truth”. (Mnemosyne 2nd Version) 

The split is the one from present to future – never knowing anything beforehand, never expecting anything to repeat itself – “between what was and which can no longer be.”  Then again the jump to community in a quote from Hölderlin: “Thus compare that time with ours: where will you find a community (Gemeinschaft)?” (ibid.) ]

This community as lack or the lack which is community – is neither a destination nor something we have lost.  We are condemned to such community. But how to look back to something, long for a lost community, we never had?  Hölderlin could be cryptically saying – where will you have found anything but a lack then or now?  ‘Homelessness’ is far closer to community than home or ‘homeland’. 

Esposito differs from Balibar’s version of the transcendental subject – the subjectum, hypokeimenon; Balibar makes Kant and the French Revolution responsible for its articulation.  On the contrary, says Esposito, at the moment of its invention, despite the French Revolution – the transcendental split subject has no identity with itself – it is not the synthetic unity of experience – a constant ‘I think’ to accompany my representations – but a “non-subject”. (ibid., p. 87)
Time is what breaks the subject at its very beginning.  “Time – here is Kant’s “un-said” that Heidegger “makes” him say – extends, “stretches” the subject to the breaking point, opening and exposing the subject to a constitutive alterity.” (ibid.) (His broken Other?)

Kojève says the same thing of Hegel – Selbst (Self) is the pure negativity of time/negative time.  The self is time – and negates time and itself – in its historical action.  But since the self is time – it can know itself only through an unrepeatable act of remembering.  Only because the subject/self is time does the philosophical concept – “the thought of the world” - take the form of a remembering (Erinnerung), but only after a “form of life has grown old” (Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, cited in Alexandre Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, Basic Books, 1969, p. 163).

Philosophy always comes too late, says Hegel.  Once though such a form of life has aged – no philosophy could ever rejuvenate it – in the manner of Heidegger’s ‘recommencements’.  Otherwise the form of life would have been neither historical nor time.

Heidegger (according to Esposito) removes universality or the transcendental from Kant – so that what remains is a subject which is its own presupposition – qua immanent law.  Or “the law’s immanence to the subject that it, the law, “decides”.” (Communitas, ibid., p. 89)  So that the law comes before, but is at the same time of the subject – the law partakes of the same finitude as the subject (das vergängliche Gesetz) – and is not that through which the subject transcends itself into a sphere “of an infinite universe of freedom” – the position Cassirer espoused in his controversy with Heidegger.
So here again is the before and after question of the subject – the subject as subject (split in and through its temporal constitution) comes before and after itself.  How different from Balibar’s Kant – who even intimates that Kant’s opposition of radical finitude and universal sovereignty is a “paradoxical unity”.
“The “call” (of conscience in Sein und Zeit) is no longer an instance outside of Dasein that demands obedience from the categorical imperative, but the exteriority or extraneousness of Dasein from itself.” (ibid.)  Here something like community begins to loom – in the outside of Dasein which is also inside of Dasein.  But a community as an impossible realization.  Why?  Not because it is unreachable as a destination – destiny – but because it is already there (Da-Sein).  It is another presupposition of Dasein.  So that the question of the subject is a decoy for the question of community – because (in this interpretation) the abyss at the centre of Kant’s seemingly unassailable transcendental subject – the emptiness of the subjectum is the cum-munus  – the figure of community.  Munus means donation (the gift) – the gift of Being – but not solitary being – a being-with.  The subject is broken – not in itself – but in its being-with others.  Hence existence is always co-existence – essence lies in co-existence – not I am – only ‘we are’ – no alterity in the sense of a separate Other – because there is never any distance which can or must be bridged.






3. Being-Guilty

In a variation upon Esposito’s Heideggerian Kant – Balibar collapses Kant’s transcendental subject and ethical-practical subject into one – bound by the categorical imperative – but in Esposito’s case – the finitude of the ethical creature (carrying the law within, the law which his being presupposes) is the finitude of ethics itself – from which he concludes that ethics (for Heidegger) is itself finished.  The emptiness at the heart of the transcendental subject - that is the temporal structure - turns into an ethical lack in the ethical subject. For Balibar the sovereignty of the transcendental subject, which means being the condition of its own experience – is mirrored by the ethical subject who is the universal self-legislator of its own laws of moral conduct.  In Heidegger – it is rather a double lack grounded in finitude. 

This “ontological declination of ethics” (ibid, p. 89) begs the question of the original (ontological) guilt of Dasein in Being and Time – and the ‘call’ of conscience which initiates Dasein’s self-removal/transition/telekinesis from the inauthentic to the authentic mode.  How else to define or classify ‘guilt’ than in the ethical key – even if in the case of Dasein as Heidegger says – guilt or Being-guilty precedes any act? (quite the opposite of the presumption of innocence in the conventional court of law). 

“The meaning of the “call” becomes plain if, in our understanding of it, we stick to the existential sense of “Being-guilty”, instead of making basic the derivative conception of guilt in the sense of an indebtedness which has ‘arisen’ through some deed done or left undone.  Such a demand is not arbitrary, if the call of conscience, coming from Dasein itself, is directed towards that entity alone.  But if so, the “summons to Being-guilty” signifies a calling-forth to that potentiality-for-Being which in each case I as Dasein am already.  Dasein need not first load a ‘guilt’ upon itself through its failure or omissions; it must only be ‘guilty’ authentically —‘guilty’ in the way in which it is.” (Being and Time, Oxford, 1962, p. 333)  If in Kant (and Balibar) law as the categorical imperative is immanent to the subject of practical reason  - for Heidegger and Esposito it is guilt or being-guilty which is at the core of Dasein.

Heidegger’s guilt is as such a positive existential lack : “Though the call gives no information, it is not merely critical; it is positive, in that it discloses Dasein’s most primordial potentiality-for-Being as Being-Guilty.” (ibid., p. 334)

Is not such guilt also a source or an origin almost a foundation (Grund)?  Being-guilty is an apriori condition of Dasein – a guilt which Dasein (in German “dieses Seiende”) can never load on itself or more significantly unload – it stands before any factical guilt – it is the pre-factical prerequisite for any sort of factical guilt and of conscience. If such preordained guilt is not ethical or moral or legal then it can only be understood as an onto-theological transposition/trace of the Christian doctrine of original sin – itself not far from ancient mythical thought for whose gods, in the words of Benjamin’s Zur Kritik der Gewalt (Critique of Violence), mere natural life was the marked bearer of apriori guilt – a guilt whose seeming takes the form of fate, another one of Heidegger’s preferred terms.  Such mythical thinking becomes in Benjamin’s ‘Kritik’ the historical ground of legitimate violence. 

Strange that Althusser in his late text The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter could applaud Heidegger for the radical contingency of his ‘thrown’ Dasein – without mentioning Dasein’s distinctly non-contingent “being-guilty”.  What is contingent about a guilt one has not incurred but can never atone – but which obliges you as the ground of your existence?  Such guilt implies Dasein’s radical ontological heteronomy – the opposite of the possibility of another world – implied in the contingent ‘rain of atoms’ and their swerves.   The moment of the unexpected implicit in the notion of clinamen does not exist anywhere in Heidegger.

Heidegger’s Being-Guilty could have been read at the time of the Weimar Republic as a polemic against what Fritsche calls “the business-model” of guilt in liberalist ethics and law – where guilt like debts could be cleared and quantitatively weighed against one another, a normative world based on equivalents and commensurables.  “Gegen das business-Modell der Schuld interpretiert Heidegger Schuld als das “(nichtige) Grund-sein einer Nichtigkeit” (1972:285), als eine Schuld die nicht abgetragen werden kann, und als Verpflichtung, einen Grund zu übernehmen, den man selbst nicht gelegt hat (1972:283ff).  Was immer Heidegger mit diesen Formeln sonst noch meint – sie schließen die Notwendigkeit ein anzuerkennen, daß Dasein wesentlich nicht die autonome Person oder das Subjekt ist, als welches moderne Gesellschaft und Aufklärung es ausgeben.” 
(“Against the business-model of guilt Heidegger interprets guilt as the “(nullified) being-the-ground of a nullity”, as a guilt which can never be paid off, and as an obligation to take on a ground one had not laid oneself.  Whatever else Heidegger means with these formulae – they include the necessity of recognizing that Dasein is essentially not the autonomous person or subject, it is rumoured to be by modern society and Enlightenment.”, Johannes Fritsche, ibid., p. 302)

Whatever happened though to ‘being-guilty’ in Heidegger’s texts after 1933?  Did being-guilty vanish with the ‘flight of the gods’ (Introduction to Metaphysics)?  At least, there is no talk of being-guilty in Letter on “Humanism” – homelessness comes perhaps in its stead?

Back to Kant: Kant is – through Hölderlin’s eye – the philosopher of the never-ending battle of the parts – anti-synthesis, recalling Kant’s “stroke of genius” (Adorno) on the first page of the preface to the Critique of Pure Reason – that metaphysics is nothing other than a battle-ground – a force-field for endless disputes/controversies about “principles”.   Reason flees (to the principles and the battle-ground) in the attempt to put an end to its compulsive need to question beyond the possibility of experience or empirical test.  (Isn’t Heidegger’s perpetual question of Being or the Meaning of Being a classic example of such a compulsive question?)

In Hölderlin the Kantian irresolvable split becomes more world-historical.  The relation of Europe to an origin which is missing.  Esposito then suggests a relation between the origin (of European identity/subjecthood), which is missing, and the community that is missing because it is always there – and therefore cannot be a destination – or a ‘coming community’ (as per Agamben).  Thus Heidegger who reflects upon community as Mitsein is not a political philosopher – but Heidegger supposedly deconstructs political philosophy in the thought of community.  Although one can ask – how to understand Heidegger’s thoughts about hierarchy, command, world power, will, rank and order – his emulation of Jünger, bending and pressing Nietzsche’s Übermensch into Jünger’s ‘Arbeiter’ mould – the whole tone of  Beiträge zur Philosophie (Von Ereignis) (Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning))?  This is not just Mitsein (being-with).  The concept of Volk itself breaks out of ‘community’ –“geschichtlich ist immer nur ein Volk.” (From the Freiburg Version of Origin of the Work of Art)) – “Only a people are historical”.






4. Heidegger as a “Hegemonic Fantasm” or “Broken Hegemony”

“A phantasmatic hegemony has a life.  It begins, it consolidates itself, and finally it loses its integrative power and vanishes.” (Johannes Fritsche, unpublished Preface to a proposed publication of Reiner Schürmann’s lecture courses on Being and Time and Kant)

“The play of functions and dysfunctions, no longer in ancient or modern texts, but at the level of Heidegger’s utterance itself, makes this utterance the most pathetic document of broken hegemony.” (Reiner Schürmann, Broken Hegemonies, ibid., p. 524)

Heidegger is known for his esoteric and exoteric writing in one in the same phrase or text.  The ‘impolitical’ Heidegger – prescribing organized power over the many and – the thought of community – is the exoteric plane – for public consumption.  Organization is always that which the many – the uprooted groundless (rotten) masses must endure.  “Die Herrschaft über die frei (d.i. bodenlos und eigensüchtig) gewordenen Massen muß mit den Fesseln der “Organisation” errichtet und gehalten werden.” (“Power over those who have become free masses (that is ground-and-landless and egoistic) must be constructed and held with the fetters/shackles of “organization”.” Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Von Ereignis), 25. Geschichtlichkeit und Sein, Frankfurt, 1989)
Organization can only mean that some sort of complex society – Gesellschaft – is unavoidable – community or Gemeinschaft alone can’t keep the masses on the leash.  But what masses?  Is Heidegger bemoaning the demise of the land-owning peasant or the end of serfdom?  The flux of the freed agricultural slave into the urban proletariat?  Or are these masses more ontological, spiritual?

The ‘political’ Heidegger, the esoteric plane – the one frozen in the Nazi time warp of January 1933 – writes cryptic missives to the hidden few – the “founders to come” who will first have to create new stands in being from which the “renewal” can commence.  Heidegger’s ‘deep state’ or hidden domination imagines willed power for the few so that constancy (Beständigkeit) in the strife of world and earth can happen again.   But “those who know” must will this “renewal” of Being which ‘incidentally’ is also the ‘rescue of the West’.  These are the lonely few – especially the poet, the thinker and the creator of the state – who are also the “anointed of Being” (see Introduction to Metaphysics).

Both “forms of domination” (“Herrschaftsformen”), the revealed one for the “freed masses” and the silent restrained hidden preparations of the isolated few, says Heidegger, although fundamentally different from one another – must at the same time both be willed and affirmed by the knowing ones, those of the future (see Broken Hegemonies, ibid., pp. 521-522, Beiträge zur Philosophie, ibid.).   What exactly is the difference between willing and affirming – isn’t willing – at least since Schopenhauer – also affirming (Bejahung des Willens zum Leben – the affirmation of the will to live)?  For Schopenhauer though it is the sexual act.  Willing which is negating would be the negating of willing itself – a kind of renunciation.  Heidegger breaks the will (to power) down into pseudo particles, which introduce false beings in Being – willing without affirming, willing with affirming and affirming on its own, with all the possible delays between the two.  But more jarring than that – for Schürmann – is that Da-sein and Being itself is left to the machinations of the few – their contingent will.  He measures the distance to Being and Time by the intensity of the return of a voluntarist subject in other words the ‘sovereign beast’ into Heidegger’s portfolio of Being.  

Despite all the “counter strategies” always ‘ready-at-hand’ even Schürman must gasp at the change – the self-dating and out-dating – Heidegger afflicts on Dasein: “Reading Being and Time, who would have ever thought that a few years later Heidegger would go on to submit Da-sein to the will of a few?  This establishment of a contingent will ruling over the there determines the anthropologism, the theologism, and the populism we have just seen.” (Schürmann, ibid., p. 521)  But what does Schürmann object to the most – wasn’t the Dasein of Being and Time who in its authentic Mitsein was fused into a destinal people (section 74)– not already under the rule of a contingent will – the “resoluteness” of the many?  Those who must choose their hero?  And isn’t Heidegger’s program of the willed power of the few in Beiträge zur Philosophie – better described as elitism and not populism? Or does Heidegger as usual turn at once in two different directions as a kind of primitive ersatz dialectic: Being itself is cleft – its essence is split between the highest singularity and the flattest of the common. (see Beiträge zur Philosophie, ibid.)

Both chapters – 74 in Being and Time (1927) and 25 in Beiträge zur Philosophie (1936-1938) feature the term – Geschichtlichkeit – historicity – in their heading, suggesting that Heidegger himself was aware of his own underground currents.  Historicity in both instances details the mode in which Dasein must aspire to lasting power in and for Being in the face of all contingencies.

What does Esposito mean then when he says Heidegger’s impolitical philosophy is the deconstruction of a political philosophy in the thought of community?  When did this deconstruction take place – or does it pervade all of his oeuvre?  Or is it not the description of the post-apocalyptical ‘necessity’ of his thinking – or what the German ‘apocalypse’ (Zusammenbruch) imposed on his thinking after 1945 at the latest?  The “deconstruction of a political philosophy” is the mark of historicity in the process of his thought – the very opposite of a thinking sub specie aeternitatis. 

Heidegger himself speaks elliptically of a thought, which has been shattered – distancing himself from those who merely “philosophize” about a shattered thinking.  Such a shattered thinking – the failure of Being and Time for instance - is the only true ‘gift of being’.  A thinking that is shattered by being is itself a gift of being – mere ‘philosophizing’ is done from a safe distance – hence ineffectual – impotent. 
“Darum ist das “Philosophieren” über das Scheitern durch eine Kluft getrennt von einem scheiternden Denken.  Wenn dieses einem Menschen glücken dürfte, geschähe kein Unglück.  Ihm würde das einzige Geschenk, das dem Denken aus dem Sein zukommen könnte.” (Brief über den “Humanismus”, in Wegmarken, Frankfurt, 1976,  p. 343 – “Thus to “philosophize” about being shattered is separated by a chasm from a thinking that is shattered.  If such thinking went right for someone/ were someone’s good fortune, no misfortune would have happened.  He would have received the only gift that could come to thinking from being.”)  Heidegger’s version of “Fuck you, Jack, I’m all right!”





One could also ask – how can thinking shatter (zerbrechen) on its own – thinking which ends so violently must have come up against something hard.  Its breaking must be in some way an act – an ‘event’ – or invested in such an event.  If though it shatters – it is pulverized – and its countless particles mingle with the atmosphere – a quasi kabbalistic ‘breaking of the vessels’.  Heidegger mythologizes the German collapse in the same manner as he spiritualised the Nazi regime – as a chapter in the history of being or the “truth of Being” (see Jacques Derrida, Of Spirit Heidegger and the Question, Chicago, 1991, pp. 31 ff.), “Truth of Being” (Wahrheit des Seins) is that which thought has to think.  In Heidegger’s case what his thinking thinks is the ‘truth’ of Nazism.  Just as his thought formed itself around the “hardness of thought’s thing” – he must find an equivalent form in his thinking for the breaking of this hard thing and the breaking of his own thought of it.  His thought of breaking and the breaking of the thing create in his thinking a new whole.  “Das Ganze ist das Unwahre.” (“The whole is the untrue.”) as Adorno says in Minima Moralia.

Heidegger’s thought is intimately complicit in both the rise and the fall of Nazism.  Being and Time, that thinking of German destiny, in which he seems to anticipate a German epoch in Being shatters ‘naturally’ within the collective disaster – his thought and that epoch/chapter are inseparable for Heidegger.  Such a ‘shattered thinking’ emanates what Badiou would call an extreme ‘fidelity to the event’ of Nazism.  Although as Lacoue-Labarthe observes, the “injunction of 1933” which Heidegger will sustain to the end – will no longer be addressed exclusively to Germany – after 1945 – but to Europe and the West.  The form of this address is nothing less than ‘a new mythology’ – perhaps in the measure that Heidegger finds mythology – after the collapse of Nazism - a more obliging topology than historicity. (Philippe Lacoue Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Politics The Fiction of the Political, Oxford, 1990, pp. 13-14) 

Heidegger himself dates his thoughts,– aware of the longue durée inside of thinking – the temporal contamination.  Schürmann sees in his “calculation of dates” the surreptitious return of the forbidden “system”.  Most obviously in his Letter on “Humanism” when he connects the text to thinking ‘begun in 1936’ – most likely referring to the manuscript Beiträge zur Philosophie.  (In a first footnote – he also distinguishes between ‘languages’ he will be using in the letter – the ostensible or ‘exoteric’ language of the letter is couched in the idiom of metaphysics – the other language more associated with that thinking begun in 1936 “remains in the background” – quasi-esoteric – but not totally obscured.)

Thinking which began in 1936 would certainly have undergone some revisions – despite the slowness/inertia of the history of being.  Historicity or historiality deconstructed Heidegger’s thought for him – the aleatory or the unexpected invaded the stasis/constancy of being.  In Introduction to Metaphysics – a thinking from 1935 – his philosophy is suffused in the savage idiom of the raw Greco-German new beginning. The resounding Greek word he appropriates from Sophocles’ Antigone is deinon or strangeness – man is deinotaton – the strangest, which he translates as das Unheimlichste (recalling the term Unheimlich from Sein und Zeit describing Dasein’s originary anxious mood of not being-at-home-anywhere-in-the-world).  The arch must be stretched to 1949 – when mankind, he says, has entered a period of ontic and ontological homelessness, abandoned by being.  Here Heimatlosigkeit seems to mean something quite physical and real.  He does not say when this condition arose in the numberless periodicity or ahistorical history of being.  But one senses it is rather recent.  In some way a fresh loss.  He speaks of the “homelessness of modern human beings”. (Letter on “Humanism”, ibid., p. 258)
Homelessness implies an impossibility of return, an irreversible loss – a new nomadic phase of being – whereas the violent beginning of 1935 posited “a violence-doing Dasein” a dangerous powerful unfamiliar human being who has never been at home.       

But considering the nature of man – the Parmenidean theme he follows in Introduction to Metaphysics – man’s nature as Sophocles’ chorus declaims – is ever so – he is aporos – without an exit or destination although he is constantly en route and apolis – without a city or fixed place on earth.  So nothing new under the sun in 1949.  Why then the deep sorrow in the text – the unsaid one of course – about the present lot of Dasein’s homelessness?  Greek man – the originary Dasein in the sense of the precursor of German man (homo teutonicus) to whose inception the German Volk is returning – is not ‘homeless’ (heimatlos), he is ‘uncanny’ (unheimlich).  “The saying “the human being is the uncanniest” provides the authentic Greek definition of humanity.” (Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven, 2000, p. 161/p. 116)  Such a human being is the very opposite/antithesis of home – his being the uncanniest is “the basic trait of the human essence” and not just a mood or an emotional impression (as in Being and Time) – meaning that he does not just dwell in the midst of his own uncanniness – he is perpetually moving beyond “the limits of the homely” from the uncanny to the overwhelming (das Überwältigende) (ibid.).  

Something happened to the composition or de-composition (unravelling) of Dasein or Da-sein between 1935 and 1946 or 1949 in other words Introduction to Metaphysics and Letter on “Humanism”.  A footnote on the first page of the letter from 1947-1949 confesses that the content wasn’t just thought up then when the letter was written – to Jean Beaufret – but is based on a course of thinking begun in 1936 persisting until that moment.  And yet there is a distinct difference in tone – from Introduction to Metaphysics. 

Until 1945 Heidegger’s trio in charge of the new beginning of the West in Germany, its spiritual middle,– the poet, the thinker, the statesman – was complete. Its three members were Hölderlin who first hears the call, from whose poetic anticipation it passes to the thinker Heidegger who in turn conveys it in prose to the statesman – who for Heidegger was the new Solon – Hitler. 
In his lecture course from 1934-1935 on the Hölderlin hymns Germania and The Rhein – Heidegger introduces this triangulation of historicity and fate (Gechichtlichkeit and Geschick) – all three are necessary to force inauthentic Daseins into their authenticity – the mode of community, comradeship and the gathering of Volk, ‘the metaphysical people’.  In those days of the violent new beginning - as Johannes Fritsche notes – Heidegger had no need to be so subtly esoteric: “The poet is without doubt Hölderlin, the other two – for any listener of those days – could only have been Heidegger and Hitler.” Or in the words of Reiner Schürmann: “The founding in the realm of language, responding to the Greek epic, thus bears the name Hölderlin.  For a few months, Heidegger also thought he could name the new Solon.” (see Fritsche, ibid., p. 311 and Schürmann, ibid., p. 519)

After 1945 only Hölderlin and Heidegger are left from this triad of historicity and fate  – Heidegger’s politics must ‘limp’ along without its third leg.  The underlying tension in the text Letter on “Humanism” – figures not only in what Heidegger can still say and what he can no longer say (always trying to exceed the unsaid limit)  – but also between what historically stays the same and that which has been voided.  Can Heidegger’s thinking and saying renounce that third signifier – Hitler the state creator – now missing, without itself ebbing away? 

Heidegger subscribes in 1935 to that Ur-Greek ‘virile’ view of the struggle of man and god-nature which Heidegger equates with Being or phusis, – both violent to the extreme – whether on land or sea. Already then – he contemplates the “necessity of breaking/shattering” of “perdition” (Verderb) as an unavoidable consequence of Dasein’s fatal exposure to Being.  “Doing violence must shatter against the excessive violence of Being, as long as Being holds sway in its essence, as phusis, as emerging sway.” (Introduction to Metaphysics, ibid., p. 173/ p. 124)

Greek Dasein is not autochthonous, rather a Dasein from nowhere going nowhere with much passion and suffering in between.  Those cities and kingdoms he founds are crushed as easily as he – offering him no respite or shelter from his wanderings. After tragedy strikes – in the Greek tragic concept of truth, the hidden – the uncanniest - is revealed.  Though blinded – the hero ‘sees’ more – as captured in Holderlin’s apothegm – which Heidegger likes to cite - “Oedipus had one eye too many, perhaps”.  But even before all tragedy – the Greek ‘violent-doer’ longs for the disaster/downfall –“ as the deepest and widest Yes to the overpowering.” (Introduction to Metaphysics, ibid. p. 174/p. 125)   Is that a hint of Heidegger’s own premature “euphoria of defeat”?  Dasein’s lustful shattering on Being?

Being assumes the persona of Moloch – its supreme violence (Übergewalt) breaking in as it appears in the breach made of historical sacrificial Dasein(s) – who as this breach (diese Bresche) must shatter against Being. (see ibid., p. 173/p. 124)  Perhaps one of the few erotic moments in Heidegger’s oeuvre  - when vaginal Dasein (the breach) is ravished by overpowering phallic Being.

Why does Heidegger emasculate this wild originary tragic Greekness which in 1935 is his model for German Dasein - when extracting or filtering it through his interpretation of Hölderlin’s poetic homage to Greece in Letter on “Humanism” (1947-1949) – when Dasein shrinks to nothing more than a “shepherd of Being”?  

Hölderlin is Heidegger’s poetic straw man for the West or the Greeks, but hiding behind Hölderlin in Heidegger post 1945 is the missing signifier - the empty throne - of the statesman - the state-creating hero - this ‘monstrous’ absence – in the historically interrupted chain of transference from the poet to the thinker to the statesman.
The overpowering trio of historicity is in full flower though in Heidegger’s interpretation of Hölderlin’s hymns in 1935 – nothing ‘impolitical’ in sight there: “Die Mächte der Dichtung, des Denkens, des Staatsschaffen wirken, zumal in Zeitaltern der entfalteten Geschichte, vorwärts und rückwärts und sind überhaupt nicht berechenbar.” (“The powers of poetry, of thought, of state founding work forwards and backwards, especially in times of unfolded history – and they are not at all predictable.”, Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein”, Frankfurt, 1999, p. 144)  They can even go unrecognized for a long time – but still whether they know of one another or not – act for one another.
Falling into the tone of Introduction to Metaphysics with its inventory of “greatness” (Größe) –‘ as in the inner truth and greatness of the national socialist movement’ – Heidegger sees this epoch as the unfolding of the power of “these three creative authorities (Gewalten) of historical Dasein” – only they can bring about that je ne sais quoi to which alone we can attribute greatness. (ibid.)  

This trinity limps on (Reiner Schürmann uses the phrase 'political limpings' for Heidegger's esoteric instructions in Beiträge, see Broken Hegemonies, ibid., p. 522) with only two members still intact - the poet and the thinker.  The absence of this other figure (Hitler - or Heidegger’s reincarnated Solon) is what Heidegger calls esoterically the 'homelessness' of Being in Letter on "Humanism".  This shattering event is what happened to Being between 1935 and 1949.






5. The Stranger

Geophilosophy is philosophy, which is earthbound.  Territory is immanent to it – but territory has a history, is a history, a contingency – so that through territory such philosophy is bound to history or its history is identical with the history of territory.  Territory and not just Dasein is an incident/accident. But then how can an incident have roots? Or is Dasein just another sort of flora and fauna – bound not by Fate (Geschick) to a piece of earth – but only through its biology and zoology?  In other words – in Heidegger’s terms – without a world? What is the relation between land and sea/water in Hölderlin?  In the sense of home, of returning – to the sea or from the sea?  Isn’t Heidegger’s Being whatever it is – not sea rather the opposite of sea – Anwesen, anwesend: a solid ground, present, a dwelling, even his Ab-grund (chasm, abyss) is solid; Nietzsche calls Being a ‘vapour’, an error – an indignity to Being which Heidegger labours at dispelling in Introduction to Metaphysics.

Water does not have chasms, abysses or traces.  It is the trackless element.  Anwesen means substantial landed property; ‘West’ is almost a declension of Wesen – as in es west – it abides.  Only the few can claim possession of water – as the Venetians say about one of their local oligarchs –he is so rich he ‘owns’ a wave.

Being is landed, it has neighbourhoods, it’s local – there are no neighbourhoods or localities in the sea where the human being could be the neighbour of Being.

But since Heidegger’s Greco-German man in 1935 had not yet become a defeated peasant abandoned by the ‘homeland’ alias Being– why do Deleuze and Guattari see in Heidegger’s writings only the bogus Greek Autochthon or the German impersonator of the Greek? 
“He (Heidegger) views the Greek as the Autochthon rather than as the free citizen (and, as the themes of building and dwelling indicate, all of Heidegger’s reflection on Being and beings brings earth and territory together): the specificity of the Greek is to dwell in Being and to possess its word.” (Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, New York, 1994, p. 94)

Landed territorialized Being pulls the Greeks into the neighbourhood of National Socialism/Nazism, the neighbourhood of the West – a movement Deleuze and Guattari describe as circular and inverted.  “But in Heidegger it is not a question of going farther than the Greeks; it is enough to resume their movement in an initiating, recommencing repetition.  This is because Being, by virtue of its structure, continually turns away when it turns toward, and the history of Being or of the earth is the history of its turning away, of its deterritorialization in the technico-worldwide development of Western civilization started by the Greeks and reterritorialized on National Socialism.” (ibid., p. 95) 

But is this recommencement possible even for Heidegger?  What is the West which has to be rescued?  Is Heidegger not as much ‘anti-Western’ as he is Western or Greek?  He repudiates the separation of Logos and Being at the origin/commencement of Greek-Platonic philosophy.  Instead he formulates the demand in the name of Being to erase that separation – so that he and Nazism can appear as the power which violently reverses the history of philosophy and the West in favor of Being.  Or is he the hyper-Western who locates Being solely in the West – but one transcending geographical boundaries, a supra-geophilosophy, transcendental geography?  Is the West just Germany and ancient Greece?  The West encompasses (for Heidegger in 1935) in its ‘vulgar’ sense even Germany’s arch rivals in Being who between them hold Germany-the West in its pincers - American technological civilization but also that other geopolitical malevolence - the Soviet Union – itself not just ‘East’.  Should they all be rescued? 

How did Heidegger and Nazism propose to reverse a history – upon which the ‘West’ depends for its subsumption of all of the earth under its dictate – the hegemony of world capitalism through its method of provoking internal crisis into profitable disequilibrium between systems?  The history of the West and the history of Greece are not a continuum – rather the relation between modern philosophy to capitalism is anticipated in the relation of ancient philosophy to Greece.  “(…) the infinite movement of thought, what Husserl calls Telos, must enter into conjunction with the great relative movement of capital that is continually deterritorialized in order to secure the power of Europe over all other peoples and their reterritorialization on Europe.” (Deleuze and Guattari, ibid., p. 98)

When he asks himself the “dangerous” question in Beiträge zur Philosophie – who are we? – Heidegger must admit/concede that even Bolshevism is originally European, of the West just as the ‘rootless masses’ (who must be re-rooted) and the rise of industry, technicity are all an effect of the West, which can be traced back to Greek ‘techne’ or craft also in the sense of craftiness, and to Christianity itself a form of Platonism (here he will rely on Nietzsche’s arguments). 
“(…) but insofar as the dominance of reason as equalization of all people is merely the consequence of Christianity and Christianity is fundamentally of Jewish origins—cf. Nietzsche’s thought on slave-rebellion in morality—Bolshevism is actually Jewish; but then Christianity is fundamentally Bolshevist!” (Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), Indiana University Press, 1999, p. 38) 

By identifying the West (and Germany) with Greece – a hegemonic fantasm which was itself supplanted by another – the Roman, is to charge/levy the beginning with something which disappeared, was surpassed or overtaken – this is also the mood of Hölderlin’s Mnemosyne – Eleutherai, the city dedicated to the goddess Mnemosyne – goddess of memory once stood on Mount Kithaeron, but no longer, the death of the heroes, the treacherous menacing landscape – the indifference of the gods.  Hölderlin evokes the image of Greek heroes dying just anywhere – far from Greece – as if he were one of the broken host.  

“My Achilles 
Died on me near a fig tree,
And Ajax lies in the caves of the sea
Near the streams of Skamandros
Great Ajax died abroad/ in a foreign place
Following unmoved Salamis’ fixed customs (…)
Many others died as well.” (Mnemosyne)

The very paths on the hills of heaven are dangerous/evil –“We” though don’t want to look where we are going – neither forwards nor backwards – but let ourselves rather be rocked to sleep as if in a boat on the open sea.  Yet - a longing – for Greece of the heroic epic? – strays always into the unbounded. 

Where is Hölderlin’s Greece?  Esposito comments on this – Greece as a dug up and cut apart country, territory, land – but of course this assumes that there is a native or autochthonous strata which can be lost – and thereby Greece – the Greece of philosophy is lost with it. 
Greece is ‘outside of itself’ – Hölderlin alludes to this in the beginning of the second version of Mnemosyne: 

“We are a sign without meaning,
Without pain we are and have nearly 
Lost our language in foreign lands, (…)”

Doubly alienated or foreign – first as a meaningless insensible sign – (without pain) – an element of language which has lost its meaning – and second someone who has almost forgotten – the language which he is.  
The border between language and those who speak it – both close to extinction – tends to fade.   

Heidegger predictably interprets these lines as Hölderlin’s prophetic call to arms to the German Dasein of 1935.  ‘The diviners of signs have to be educated – so that dead languages regain their meaning.’  The Germans in 1935 are in a state of urgency (Not).  The general location is the “metaphysical need of the West” within which “Western Germanic historical Dasein” confronts “the Asiatic”. 

The same three verses serve Heidegger to introduce his lecture course What is Thinking? in 1951-1952.   But nothing is left of the battle of the Titans – the West versus the Asiatic – or any mention of the West’s Germanic avant-garde.  The simple verb-less question remaining is: “Who we?” (Wer wir?)  Heidegger cannot even utter his favorite verb ‘ist’ (is), otherwise the grammatical carrier of Being.  His answer is vague – we, the humans (Menschen) of today, but a today which has already lasted longer than any historical reckoning (the longest of all possible longue durées) – a generic indifferent event-less empty today.  It is almost as if Heidegger himself doesn’t quite know what to ask Hölderlin anymore, somehow the thrill is gone – as the oracle of German historical Dasein, the mysteries seem to have dried up.  

But perhaps Hölderlin’s vision already takes place in the afterlife – on the “hills of heaven”.  Mnemosyne was also the name of a water in Hades where the newly dead could drink to remember their past lives – the opposite of Lethe.  On this water “we” let ourselves be cradled as if in a boat – in the manner shades are transported around the underworld on its streams and rivers.  Hölderlin’s sea in Mnemosyne is in the afterlife – a dead sea – not as Esposito proposes – the open sea of a life voyage.

Here he wanders Dante-like amongst the spectres of Greece, of the Iliad  – my Achilles, Ajax, Patroclus.  Many died – some in the fields, some facing their destiny (Geschick).  But as he speaks in the “we” form – he is already amongst them – himself a dead language.  On one of those high roads half covered in snow – now in the Alps – wanderers speak of the cross set there for someone who has died – the continuity of the West takes place in an ideal underworld in the Swabian alps.

Even the law seems to have died – but which law?  Divine or human, the law of nature?  Does Hölderlin echo the old lament – Pan is dead?  But the severe gods are “unwilling” when someone doesn’t rein in his soul, prove his nerves are cold – but when he does – then soon all grief is gone.

If the Greek human is the “strangest” – it seems only natural that the philosopher should be (at the least) the stranger – historically, ontologically? Deleuze and Guattari make such a claim in What is Philosophy? (see ibid., pp. 87 ff).  Nietzsche himself – in his genealogies of philosophy - calls the original philosophers “disorientated strangers” – the pre-Platonists who arrived amongst the Greeks – escaping the archaic empires of the East like Persia.  The first philosophers were émigrés. (cited in Deleuze and Guatarri, ibid., p. 223)
Is it impossible to be in a certain sense a philosopher and not a stranger?  Is there such a thing as an autochthonous philosopher? But if philosophy were the ‘gift’ of the stranger to and in Greece, the stranger and philosophy cannot be lost – neither is bound by any temporal hegemony.  Hence the power of the stranger.

Philosophy had at its inception – not an origin in some atavistic soil of Being - but an encounter, a conjuncture sparked by the arrival of the émigré philosophos from the borderlands of Greece, then an interconnected ring of colonizing cities, and the old empires - into the Greek ‘milieu of immanence’. This milieu bred a particular sociability of exchange and commerce, characterized by friendship, association and opinion or discourse.  So did philosophy begin like commodity exchange itself – on the borders of a milieu or between communities?  But exchange (like friendship, enmity, love) is asymmetrical – non-equal – and contingent, in this case between the stranger and the unfamiliar milieu.  Like in chess – the stranger’s moves introduce instability into the static line-up – without instability nothing new can ever happen.  Friendship turns into rivalry, associations break up and opinions induce dissension.  The Greek type of the polis is the Friend.  Yet Derrida’s book The Politics of Friendship revolves about the sentence attributed to Aristotle which Montaigne quotes in his essay “On Friendship”: – “O my friends, there are no friends.” (Till this day members of the same party in the English House of Commons address one another as “my Right Honourable Friend.”)  

The true philosopher then is the Stranger not the Friend.

Isn’t the exchange between the Stranger and the Friend always an exchange of no exchange – a relation of no relation – or as Bataille writes “a community of those without community”?  In Derrida’s logic of dissolving binaries – the Enemy is only the Trans-Friend, just as the Trans-Enemy is the Friend.  The Stranger though exceeds that logic – neither Friend nor Enemy.

Compared with the hierarchical static East – the West was geographically an ambience of freedom – figured in the plebeian type of the cunning Ulysses.  The émigré coming from the outside was more the ‘spectator’ of the milieu.  The everyday meaning of the Greek word teoria is to look upon.  The outsider is naturally less involved in the milieu, observing the ‘shipwreck’ of life with greater ataraxy/remoteness. 

Still somewhat perplexing – Deleuze and Guattari claim that the philosopher must always have a sort of spiritual yet tangible homeland, but only to lose it – (like Hölderlin’s “lost language”) so that he starts out apriori forced into exile from it.  “But why is this fatherland unknown, lost or forgotten, turning the thinker into an Exile?” (ibid.)  

On the other hand – the philosopher is a Stranger – for example the figure of the Stranger in Plato who appears in various dialogues.  His “conceptual persona” verges on the conman, the impersonator.  One can never know the true pedigree of the Stranger.   The authors then ask without offering an answer: “What sort of stranger is there within the philosopher, with his look of returning from the land of the dead?” (What is Philosophy? ibid., p. 69)

Is the land of the dead then his homeland,– near to Hölderlin’s sea of Mnemosyne?  

From the lack of originary source – the homelessness of being – or the human in being – Esposito follows Hölderlin’s traces to the ‘Orient’ – as the ‘unoriginal origin’ – the Oriental stream though carries the ‘Oriental mystical principle’ to the West?  And this source evokes fear.  So Greece the origin is a non-origin – just as Kant’s subject is a non-subject.  It is rather a lack – alienated from itself, extraneous to itself as ‘we’ (the West is) are to it.  

Hölderlin finds only foreignness and otherness in the Greek model – the origin of the improper, originating from the foreignness of Asia.
Perhaps that is why “We (the Greeks) are a sign without meaning.” 
(Mnemosyne 2nd Version)  
He could have also written – a sign which cannot be translated.

The image Esposito uses to show this uprooted-ness is that of the sea – the mariner – the impossible homecoming.  Doesn’t that sound like the improper Odysseus once again?

What if homecoming never takes place – as in shipwreck.  Shipwreck is neither homecoming nor homelessness.  In shipwreck one is no longer on the way to anywhere.  But in Hans Blumenberg’s genealogy of the West – the mariner is not on the way home.  Seafaring with all its risks is a necessary and desirable transgression of terrestrial and communitarian (community) borders without which world commerce and ‘world’ would (have never come to be or) cease.  It cannot have escaped Esposito’s attention that the history of the West and its seafaring is bound up with the history of capitalism (commerce and war) – the West’s world-making mechanism par excellence.  

“Es beginnet nämlich der Reichtum 
Im Meere.” (“Wealth namely begins in the sea.”, Friedrich Hölderlin, Andenken (Remembrance) )

Like Coleridge’s ‘ancient mariner’ doomed to wander the earth and tell his tale of shipwreck - Esposito warns: 
“That we are mariners has no other meaning than this: our condition is that of a voyage that takes us far away from ourselves.” (Communitas, ibid. p. 107)  That is another sort of illusion – or wishful thinking.  If there is no origin – we can never leave it either – origin being considered ‘ourselves’.  The worst condition of all – for any mariner – is a becalmed sea. The voyage is also from East to West – now citing Hegel – from the improper (foreign) to the proper “free and beautiful Greek spirit” – the Greek re-formed the foreign into something new.