Showing posts with label Benjamin. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Benjamin. Show all posts

Tuesday, 22 February 2011

Infinite Coup - Notes on the Egyptian Revolution


1. Unknowing (Non-Savoir)
2. The Tao of Deception
3. Power of Degeneracy
4. Time of Tyrants
5. Badiou’s Infinite State
6. Bonapartism or Pétainist Transcendental?


1.  Unknowing (Non-Savoir)

There are many forms of unknowing – as many if not more than those of un-being.  One state of not knowing is that of never knowing – that which ‘induces’ this never knowing is unknowable (dare one say ‘object’), but perhaps only from the state of a particular unknowing.  The state of unknowing may also conceivably be one preceding all (any) knowing.
The “cloud of unknowing” is a semi-permanent darkness which merely borrows the ‘relation of no relation’ of unknowing to mark a state in which knowledge is unattainable – even undesirable.  This state cannot be transcended or altered in any way.  It is permanent unknowing.  Mystical states of beatitude or relations not based on knowledge are typical examples of such unknowing.  Knowledge is used to hold back knowledge similar to instances of will used to hinder will – as an intra-monadic action.

Unknowing in the sublunary literary cosmogony of relations refers to the strange but very common occurrence – when something known becomes unknown.  It is the reverse of mystical unknowing – yet potentially more disturbing – because accompanied by unspecific loss.  One had been familiar with something or someone – a person, a place, a thing – that person, place or thing becomes unfamiliar, strange.  One had been connected by knowing, perhaps without even noticing it - if this knowing was habit or ‘second nature’ – but suddenly one is disconnected.  Knowing reverts back to unknowing.  The ‘present’ unknowing could be a kind of temporary lapse, an amnesia, or a second new kind of unknowing.  When you don’t recognize someone you know, you’ve forgotten that you know them, this is the ordinary experience of unknowing.  An old woman at the wake of her husband wonders if she ever ‘knew’ him – knew in the biblical sense – “Did I have sexual intercourse with him?”.

The second type of unknowing is similar to second innocence – harder to lose than the first innocence.  One knows nothing – one is unknowing – this unknowing is agitated by a first knowing – one leaves the state of naiveté – the step from the first unknowing to knowing is irreversible.  One is astonished at how everything is changed and one cannot even imagine how it was to have been so unknowing.  From the point of knowing - unknowing becomes the “first fine careless rapture, which can never be recaptured”.  This first unknowing casts that of which one is unknowing as the unknown – once this shell of the unknown is cracked or perforated it can never be repaired – it is irreparable – knowledge or knowing is a kind of damage done to unknowing.  The perfection of unknowing has been forever marred by the imperfection (and incompleteness) of knowing – this imperfection could also be called the ‘original sin’ of unknowing – the source of all insincerity.
Although this kind of irreparable move from unknowing to knowing seems to hold only of other knowing or unknowing subjects – the inorganic unknown or animal unknown do not radiate (emanate) this fatal irreversibility.  Only when the unknowing is of another unknowing subject whose move to knowing may or may not emulate (mimic) one’s own can any sort of irreversibility (irreparability) of this move be contemplated.

But sometimes the first knowing can be undone – when one ‘unknows’ someone – they become unfamiliar.  One sees them again with the eyes of a stranger, although they themselves see nothing different.  You the second unknower or unknower to the second degree have become the stranger.  This means you look again with unknowing eyes on what you had previously looked with knowing eyes.  In the sense that knowledge is a kind of servility of consciousness  - exercising its power of knowing for the purposes of serving some kind of recognition – unknowing is sovereignty – or the ‘miraculous’ subject.  “I define unalloyed sovereignty as the miraculous reign of unknowing.” (Georges Bataille, “Sovereignty”, The Bataille Reader, edited by Fred Botting and Scott Wilson, Oxford, 1997, p. 312 note 3)

You unknow yourself in the new body of drill – the new body of the ballerina, the soldier, the terrorist, the castrato.  You sacrifice yourself to the Other who is you – like Odin – I to myself.  “Zucht und smart-sein” (drill and being-smart).  In the accident “nothing gives place to the unknowable of the moment” (Bataille, op. cit., p. 312) – but one anticipates the value of drill for the accident – just as drill or discipline are not dissociable from Wittgenstein’s ‘random’ method of philosophical investigation.  To be ‘smart’ is not just a question of the uniform, but especially of what is underneath it.  Does one have to have heard anything about Sparta to conduct oneself as a Spartan?  Would it not be better to know nothing of Sparta.  Discipline is an unknowing of the absence of discipline.  Self-preservation of knowing is at the heart of the Enlightenment – sacrifice of knowing is at the root of the ‘community’ (without community).  How does the one become the other?  You unknow yourself in the community or community is an active non-knowledge (non-savoir) of yourself.  As Bataille warns: “Il n’est loisible à quiconque de ne pas appartenir à mon absence de communauté.” [“No one is free not to participate in my absence of community.”  From “Prendre ou Laissez” 1946 (?) quoted in “Georges Bataille: incarnation, destruction, et absence de la communauté”, Lyon, Horlieu, 1999 (supplement au n°9 de la Lettre Horlieu)  Note: Thanks to Greg Yudin (Moscow School of Higher Economics) who brought this principal thought of Bataille to my attention.]

The second unknowing is much more permanent – it can neither go back to a first knowing nor forward to a second knowing.  This is a state one wants to achieve.  Hence it is innocence, which cannot be lost.   All of this could have some implications for the Heideggerian notion of the “unthought” in or of a philosophy.  The unthought of a philosopher.  Unthinking can mean without thought – or prior to thought.  Like in unknowing.  A kind of innocence of thought.  Thought before it is thought is unthinking.  Heidegger seems to mean – the part of a philosophy, which is permanently unthought – the dark unpresentable side of thought – the formless ground in which thought is ungrounded.   But unthinking can also mean the reversing of thinking.  A thought, which had been thought, unravels (itself) into unthought.  This would be the second unthinking.  Such unravelling is more of the nature of entropy than innocence.  Given that philosophy (in a Heideggerian sense) ‘originates’ in the formless ungrounded ground of unthought – every thought (philosophy) could be said to have an innate ‘death drive’ of its own – to return to this state of total equilibrium of the unthought.  It would be the aim of a critique of philosophy to unthink its thought – to reflect on the question “what is unthinking” – to propel its thinking into unthinking or to show how its thinking is already an unthinking.  (Unfortunately this already sounds like a kind of counter ‘Destruktion’ or deconstruction – but one has to resist the automatic sirens of unthinking.)

Axiom:  Every thought, which has been thought, can be equally unthought.

If what Ernst Bloch says is true – that every philosopher has one thought – (and why shouldn’t it be true being the paraphrase or imitation of all those other onenesses – every writer has one story, every composer one song etc.) – then potentially by unthinking that one thought one could unthink that philosopher too.

One is also unknowing when one thinks one knows but doesn’t.  This is particularly dangerous – the state of thinking one knows when one doesn’t is typical of a person with a sense of false security.  The philosophical stance – to know that one knows nothing is to be in a perpetual state of being on guard, to resist any quietude imposed by a sense of security.  To shun such knowing.  To always strive for the aporetic.

Oddly those in power although perhaps obsessed with their security or with the uninterrupted prolongation of their power – are not immune to such a sense of false security.  The paranoia of the tyrant (Gewaltherrscher) is the other side of his ostentatious representation and colossal ‘public’ works.  The infamous tyrant Giangaleazzo in 14th century Milan undertook massive dam constructions costing 300,000 Goldgulden on the Mincio of Mantua, the Brenta of Padua, so as to be able to divert these rivers at will, leaving those cities without a defence.

An odd analogy exists between the philosophical stance of unknowing and the permanent watchfulness and distrust of the absolute ruler – the ruler of the state of exception.  As Burckhardt remarks about the tyrants of Renaissance Italy – their states (lo stato) were founded on illegitimacy rather than on a “mystic foundation” (Montaigne) of law.  Although Montaigne qualifies this “mystic foundation” as being  a necessary “fiction” of authority and
devoid of justice.  “Now laws remain in credit not because they are just, but because they are laws.” (Montaigne, “Of Experience”, Book III, 13, The Complete Essays of Montaigne, Stanford, 1965, p. 821)  The laws are also “grossly and widely and ordinarily faulty” (ibid.) making them into sacred things.  Sacred things tend to be defective, badly made, because the sacred is not useful, it is not work.  The proof of the mystic foundation of the authority of law is their faultiness – if they were just or equitable in themselves, men would obey them for their own sake and not for their mystic foundation.  So “in spite of everything, the sacred thing ends up having utility.” (Bataille, op. cit., p. 314)

In the tyrant state all relations within the entourage and family (often the same) are equally illegitimate – or based on unknowing of the fidelity of such a relation.  In a state of illegitimacy no loyalty could be nor was expected.  The only ‘rational’ behavior was one of constant distrust and elaborate precaution against betrayal and assassination.  Any act of loyalty to the ruler on the other hand could be seen as a microcosmic legitimation of the state.  The briefly serving vice-president of Egypt Omar Soleiman is portrayed as someone who once saved the life of the then President Mubarak – this is especially remarkable not just as an act of personal fidelity – but in the sense of the “two bodies of the king” – by ‘saving the life’ of the president he had also legitimated this specific rule or state of exception.  The act itself was the logistical decision to ship Mubarak’s armoured Mercedes with him on a state visit to Addis Ababa during which an attempt on his life occurred – not a personal act of bravery or sacrifice on the part of Soleiman.  But in the history of the reign of Mubarak – similar to the absolute states in the past – even such a bureaucratic decision was coated in glory – being itself an exceptional act of fidelity in a state based on infidelity and illegitimacy.






2.  The Tao of Deception

No organized retreat.  Just organized remaining.  Unchanged.  Sometimes one can retreat into a more rather than less dangerous terrain.  Especially if the enemy is scattered all over and the theatre of war is circular.  The inevitable distance sets in, what seemed to draw close was actually a pulling away.

How much does the rule – ‘war is the Tao of deception’ apply to the afterlife (of war).  The afterlife does not remove the constraints of life; it increases them and gives them a new tensility.  The old rules about when to lie and when to tell the truth assumed that one knew the world outside and one knew one’s own mind accurately.  But if one operates under a premise of unknowability and unpredictability this ceases to be the case.  Believing, the other side of lying and truth telling is similarly indeterminate.  One can believe to be telling the truth.  Error is another state.  One can be in error but truthful.  Better believe oneself to be telling a lie – but in terms of the universe to be telling the truth.  Truth can be an obstruction to real knowledge.  Truth of revelation is not provable, so it can be dismissed at any time as a lie.  A lie is more universal than a mere fact, which might be considered by ordinary judges to be true.  Facts are what people usually mean when they say truth.  As if a fact were so easy to obtain.  The secrets Ciceron, a Turkish spy for Nazi Germany, sold were not facts, they were threats – even if they described real invasion plans of the Allies.  He was the untruthful simpleton who served to deepen the German phantasy of being beyond defeat – already a sign of the euphoria of defeat.  Speer uses the words “euphoric ideas” in his book about his “conflicts with the SS” -  “Der Sklaven-Staat” (The Slave State).  The SS was a ‘euphoria engine’.

When one is happy together with someone else, does this mean that each person possesses his own happiness or that x parts of happiness (in the case of x number of people) formed one whole happiness?  The same question could be asked about the “will of the people” – “la volonté générale” (Rousseau) – out of which one whole state is reputedly formed?

In a remark in the Encyclopaedia expounding upon the notion of the one and the many in atomistic philosophy, Hegel fractures Rousseau’s idea of “la volonté générale”.  Each one is a one and one of many, so the one and the many are one and the same.  Each one though is also a negative relation to itself – one of exclusion or repulsion.  It repels itself from itself, which is another way of saying it is attracted to the other ones – all like itself.  So the excluding relation of the one to itself – its ‘for-itself’ sublates itself (hebt sich auf).  Hence Hegel can conclude, following an atomistic view of “the political”, “more important lately than the atomistic view of the physical”, that “the will of the singular as such is the principle of the state” – here seeming to allude to ‘lo stato’ of the tyrant – yet the “general, the state itself, is the external relation of the contract.” (Enzyclopedia der philosophischen Wissenschaften I, G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden 8, Frankfurt, 1970, p. 207)  He has dissected Rousseau’s “general will” into the “will of the singular” (the one of the many ones) and “the general” which is the state itself, the contract exterior to the will of the one.  Hegel’s state is a hybrid of the absolute state of the tyrant and the Enlightenment concept of the state as social contract.

But as the principle “überhaupt” (above all) of atomistic philosophy is “the for-itself in the figure (Gestalt) of the many” – the many or the people are inherent in the “will of the singular”. (ibid.)

The undecidability of the one or the many as the foundation of the state appears to be resolved in this essential principle of atomistic philosophy.



3.  The Power of Degeneracy

Heidegger considers Nietzsche’s Zarathustra to be the ‘teacher of the overcoming of the spirit of revenge’ – by way of the eternal return of the same.  But isn’t it quite the opposite?  The spirit of revenge is the aversion of the will (being of Being is will) to time – or the ‘it was’ of time.  The return of the same overcomes ‘it was’.  Could Nietzsche mean though the return of the same in the world or history or the cosmos – or in thought itself – which in its recurrence ‘materializes’ itself in world, history, cosmos?  The Egyptian revolution of today is haunted by many recurrences of the same collective thought – on “The Friday of Farewell”, itself a repetition of the “Friday of Departure” – protestors in Alexandria are marching to the (presidential) Ras Al Tin palace where King Farouk stepped his final steps as king before being ousted by the 1952 officer’s coup led by Nasser.  They obviously hope for a recurrence of such a coup.  Note: A few hours later Mubarak stepped down and the military took charge.  Did the march to the scene of the first toppling conjure up the ‘return of the same’ finally?  A revolution is the apotheosis of the return of the same – at least it manifests a circular logic – of revenge.  Something which was the ‘state’ ceases to be so abruptly – as if a circle has completed itself at a strict point.

Soleiman delivered the final speech of the regime, in which Mubarak’s resignation was announced and power transferred to the army, in approximately 20 seconds.  This was the exact point or moment of the revolution and at the same time a ‘silent coup’.  Tariq Ali named it a “coup against the dictator” – but was it really that?  An abbreviated sort of revolutionary dialectic seems to be at work - the Egyptian revolution erupted simultaneously with its own counter-revolution.  (Interestingly, the disappeared police are now back on the streets in uniform – but as “protestors” in their own right, claiming they are also victims of the regime.)  Counter-revolution is not just the reverse or mirror image of the revolution.  It is a movement in itself – positivity without negativity.  In this case, counter-revolution is the positivity of martial law, which is not a state of exception.  Or can the object ruled by martial law be considered a state or sovereign?
In the Egyptian Revolution/Coup one can detect at least two versions of the ‘one and the many’.  The One of the People who united almost physically in their masses to transfer (convey) their will to the state (perhaps not quite willingly) and the Many of the multitude who cannot be One and resist this transfer of will.  By seemingly acceding to the “will of the people” unified in that one artificial construct of a “general will” (“Communiqué 1: all the people’s demands will be met”), the army for the moment seems to have been able to decapitate the revolution with one ‘coup’.  The “will of the people” has become the army’s effigy.

The One of the “will of the people” and the amorphous multitude form a “zone of indistinction” between them – where neither people nor multitude prevails.  Virno in his “Grammar of the Multitude” cites the medieval jus resistentiae – as characteristic of the pre-state multitude associated in a variety of corporations – who resist encroachments of the law of the realm on their particular ‘bodies’.  A tragedy of such an idée fixe of jus resistentiae is unfolded in Kleist’s “Michael Kolhhaas”.  Virno sees the contemporary multitude (following Spinoza and not Hobbes) as preserving and reviving a certain non-state concept of freedom found in those earlier multitudes – although in great contradistinction to the 17th century multitude, the contemporary multitude considers itself more rather than less universal than the state. (see Paolo Virno, Grammar of the Multiude, Los Angeles, 2004, pp. 42-43)  The universality of the multitude transcends the ‘nation-state’, corresponding, in Virno’s estimation, to the “general intellect” – a concept he derives from the chapter “Fragment on Machines” in Marx’s “Grundrisse”.

Virno identifies the multitude in the discourse of the seventeenth century in particular in Hobbes as the anti-state – this anti-state is in contrast to the people who are the necessary and proper complement of the state.  The Egyptian protest was conducted by a multitude in the process of becoming a people of the ‘coming’ unknown state.  The concept of ‘will of the people’ is already in Hobbes – it represents that which the people has (as its natural right) so as to transfer it to the sovereign.  The multitude has no unified will – hence it is in essence ungovernable.  Spinoza as Virno notes sees in the multitude the true “architrave” (armature) of civil liberties and civil society. (Virno, op. cit., pp. 22-23)  The multitude is the many, the people becomes the one.

The other binary of the “One and the Many” – is the One of the Ruler/Dictator and the Many of the subjects, individuals.  For Badiou, though there are no individuals in the state, they are only ‘present’ and ‘represented’ as countable singularities or singletons.  The multitude or anti-state might correspond to what Badiou calls the “void”.

The eternal recurrence of the same sounds less romantic or implausible when one sees it in light of the principles of  ‘accident theory’ – the accumulation of chance occurrences can lead over a period of time to amazing recurrent patterns.  Conversely – one minute flaw in a regular sequence can result in a catastrophic accident.
The recurrence of the same thought or thoughts is another way of overcoming one’s own time - this is not the same as memory, but the persistence for unknown reasons of certain irreducible and permanent thoughts – which keep returning without volition – such as the ‘power of degeneracy’.  Thinking of Andrei Tarkovsky’s film Stalker I had thought I had discovered something ‘new’ – that it was a fable of degeneracy from the perspective of a scepticism towards all human economies.  His images radiate a great ‘power of degeneracy’ using an old telephone which surprisingly rings, decaying railroad tracks, decrepit industrial barracks beyond all modernity, swampy caves in a depopulated rural hinterland and a lumpy crowded bed.  But already some years ago I had been observing phenomena in the ‘valley’ – which I compared with the Zone in Stalker – “not just the characters (degeneracy) but the physical surroundings with their outré sense of the ordinary:  “We saw an utterly bright immobile light in the eastern sky over the river.  Then it disappeared and came again.  It could have been an extraterrestrial visitor – all things are possible in our valley.”  The only ‘new’ thought is that the power of degeneracy is also the “will to power”.

Over the years the same thought faded only to reappear with slight revisions and deflections – first as degeneracy, then power of degeneracy then will to power – of degeneracy.  One could ask if every power is a ‘will to power’ – as in the power of degeneracy.  There is a fact of power– the power of degeneracy to promote degeneration – Verfall.  But is it a will to power?  Perhaps it is.  Bloch speaks of a “Rausch des Unglücks” (drunkenness of unhappiness).  Benjamin says in Einbahnstraße (One-Way Street) decline, degeneration is no more astonishing or less stable than ascendance (progress).  The groundless presumption, once one is settled in the stability of decline – is to imagine a rescue from this solid well-established degeneracy.  The anticipated miraculous rescue is often the ripening catastrophe.  In this sense – stability is inertia (entropy) – it can only be interrupted or altered or transformed by something extraordinary (not change as incremental progress) – this is the rescue.  (Hölderlin – “wo aber Gefahr ist, wächst das Rettende auch” – “where danger is, the rescue also grows”)  Only in the stability of decline does that extraordinary other grow – the catastrophe.  Nazism was both for the Germans – rescue and catastrophe.  One can see Benjamin’s writings about messianism or the messianic, as writing in anticipation of a catastrophe-rescue from the stability of a degenerate progression.






4.  Time of Tyrants

The time of the tyrant is dead time – even for the tyrant.  Or it is suspended time – the suspension of the law in the form of emergency laws.  For the people it is a time of waiting – for the end of the tyrant and his tyranny.  In a note in Das Passagen-Werk (The Arcade Project) Benjamin asks himself – how to remove the blemish of waiting from the ‘messianic’.  In the case of the tyrant – the ending of tyranny is the messianic anticipation (expectation), for the people, who wait for it every day.  Just as in the case of all messianic expectations – it could potentially come at any minute and through any door.  This is the excitement of the uncertain arrival of the end.  Such excitement is the only true frisson one can experience in the time of tyranny.  In a life without pleasure (which is the state of tyranny) the end of the tyranny is the only pleasure of pleasure.
One knows that there will be a violent end – because just as the tyrant begins his rule illegitimately – he cannot end it other than illegitimately – in other words he has no succession.  Mubarak when resigning did not observe the constitutional procedure of a written submission to parliament, after which power should be transferred to the Speaker of parliament – so even his resignation itself is technically illegal.  In tyrannies succession was always rare, even in antiquity – the passing on of the rule of Syria from the father Hafez-al-Assad to his son Bashar-al-Assad – could be seen as the exception in this present generation of absolute rulers.  Perhaps for the tyrant – the most difficult aspect of his tyranny is its ending – the period of tyranny has no natural conclusion – it has an indefinite mythical duration – as in the 1000 year Reich.  From the moment it begins it must search for its mode of retreat – this absence weighs not only on the people, it weighs equally on the tyrant.  For although it may be true – that the sovereign is the one who decides on the state of exception – or rather when it begins – he is not the one who decides when it ends.  That decision is always beyond the limit of the tyrant’s time – it is a decision, which approaches him from a time beyond himself – as if he were seeing life from the perspective of his own demise or afterlife.  The time of the tyrant is an exceptional time, which cannot initiate or conceive its own ending.

An Egyptian human rights activist in London scoffed, in an interview on Al Jazeera, at the planes flying over Tahrir Square.  “Does he want to establish an occupation of Egypt?”  The activist also said the ruling class when it loses power goes mad – it is living in a parallel reality.  But this parallel reality is exactly the state of exception.  It is for the tyrant and his entourage, his retainers a time without end – hence they can only live in its endless reality.  The time of the Führer-Bunker was a similar endless, never-ending time.  The protestors want to end the state of exception – they want a ‘normal’ state – but they have occupied a ‘state of madness’ – Mubarak’s state – so long (thirty years) that he cannot be convinced that this state can no longer hold them.  The protestors impose their own state of non-exception as the antinomy of the tyrant’s state of exception.  Their state of non-exception though appears to be a non-state of exception in relation to the tyrant’s state of exception.  Hence for him his state of exception represents stability – whereas their non-state of exception is chaos.  Quite logically – for the protestors the reverse is the case.  One of the protestors frequent chants is simply “Hosni Mubarak – batal” – “Hosni Mubarak – invalid”.

A placard presents the demand – what you did not do in thirty years, you won’t manage in three months – leave.  The placard’s text reminds the tyrant – he has lost track of time.  His reign must end like the Faustian bargain – eventually but right on time Mephistopheles (the army? the army’s backers?) appears and tells Faust “time’s up” (game over).  The time of tyranny is always endless – but it must always end abruptly.  Or rather it begins to end – the moment it begins its illegitimate visitation upon a population.  The actual ending is often counted in days – such as the “ten days that shook the world”.  Each moment of these days of ending – has a temporal density far higher than the preceding years of tyranny.  This is a law of revolution – time is not suspended as in the state of exception – time is raised to a higher power – a kind of temporal escape velocity – to rush an immobile presence, the paralyzed unrest embodied in the tyrant and his ‘mob’ of beneficiaries (security forces and business – local and global) off the historical stage.  The brevity of the time of collapse of such a regime is also a kind of law.  It represents an acceleration of events driven forward doubly by the protestors’ actions and the usual and extraordinary acts of suppression by a power itself already in a negative depleted mode.  The aggregate of power has been subsisting in an ‘afterlife’ for a long period before the ‘final push’ begins – the remnant of power at the end of a state must cannibalize itself to continue to project a phantasmagorical vitality.  Or – the power remaining in the state is only sufficient to accelerate the obliteration (disappearance) of its own phantasmal substance.

A man amongst the crowd of Egyptian protestors said – “Thirty goddamned years he ruled.”  But one wonders if at the beginning of the thirty years one would have spoken like that.  “One year he ruled.” does not convey the same kind of burden or pharaonic yoke.  The thirty years weigh most heavily at the end – it is the end weight (critical mass) which counts.  Or the first year of the thirty years (from the point of view of the end) seems as tiresome and oppressive as the thirtieth year – the time of overflowing rejection.  All years seem like the thirtieth year at the end.  Benjamin’s observation about the clocks during the time of the July Revolution (1830) seems to refute this principle of revolutionary time – he notes that on the first day of the battle revolutionaries in various parts of Paris independently of one another shot at the clock towers so as to freeze the time of the revolt.  It is rather the time of tyranny which is frozen – time unthaws, becomes a living time again only during the revolt against the dead time of the tyrant.

Besides the years of the tyrant, the days of the revolution, there is also another time, which echoes incessantly in the demands of the protestors – now.  Mubarak – leave now, step down now.  Even Obama could not resist using the ‘messianic’ word – now.  The orderly transition to democracy should start now.  One hears in that ‘now’ what Benjamin calls – “Jetztzeit” – Now-Time.  In the bipolar ‘algebra of revolution’ though the sign (symbol) ‘now’ also stands for ‘never’.

Omar Soleiman threatened the protestors with “dialogue or coup” (like the lady or the tiger?) – but how could a coup have a coup?


5.  Badiou’s Infinite State

Contemporary philosophy is hypnotized by the power of the state – although this fascination tends to veil itself in a preoccupation with militancy and revolution.  Agamben makes this most explicit in his introduction to Homo Sacer -  “Today, now that the great State structures have entered into a process of dissolution and the emergency has, as Walter Benjamin foresaw, become the rule, the time is ripe to place the originary structure and limits of the form of the state in a new perspective.  The weakness of anarchist and Marxian critiques of the State was precisely to have not caught sight of this structure and thus to have quickly left the arcanum imperii, as if it had no substance outside of the simulacra and the ideologies invoked to justify it.  But one ends up identifying with an enemy whose structure one does not understand, and the theory of the State (and in particular the state of exception (…) ) is the reef on which the revolutions of our century have been shipwrecked.” (Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Stanford, 1998, p. 12)

Axiom:  Communiqués are like axioms, Badiou’s favored mode of thought.  ‘Proving’ Deleuze’s and Guattari’s own axiom - “the great axiomaticians are men of State (…)” (A Thousand Plateaus).

Rather than considering the moribund state as a ‘negative power’, Badiou sees the power of what he calls the rioters in Tunisia to bring a regime to its collapse as itself the “negative power”.  “Its negative power is recognized, a lamentable power that vanishes fully into its own image.” (see Daniel Fischer’s transcription of Badiou’s seminar “What does “change the world” mean?”, from January 19th 2011, online at wrong+arithmetic, Alain Badiou on Tunisia, riots and revolution, February 2, 2o11)  Still, one must regard this vanishing power with sympathy (empathy) – because it shows that what appears “unfailing stable” can collapse (“all that is solid melts into air”).  That is its “minimal lesson”. The paradox implicit in his analysis – what Badiou cannot explain is why that lamentable vanishing negative power is precisely that, which can cause that whose appearance is “unfailing stable” to collapse – thus “changing the world”.  Why is changing the world then ‘minimal’?  Badiou seems unable to conceive of a revolution in the time of its occurrence – he describes our time as “intervallic” – between distinctive historical epochs.  Now is a time of riots.  He diminishes the status of the Tunisian protestor to a “rioter” – because the rioter does not present himself as an “alternative to the State” – which the revolutionary organized in his Party invariably does.  As if a revolution were merely the orderly transition from one state and party to the next – and not (in principle) the total destruction or at least interruption and as such change of what is.   The state of which he speaks is always the “ontological” state – in itself a non-volatile count.  A revolution, for Badiou, is only that which can immediately ‘substitute’ a ready-formed immobile set of subsets for the existing defunct one.  He sees the revolutionary overthrow of a state as analogous to following a mathematical rule or series.
Here Badiou lapses into a fallacy Wittgenstein criticized as a myth of continuity, a sort of utopia of the infinite and seamless following of a rule – reflected in everyday practices as well as in the application of mathematical rules.

Badiou cannot help judge the events in Tunisia as “illegal” – from the point of view of the situation of the state, his major ontological category.  “A vague uneasiness makes itself felt in the requisitely contented character, let’s call it consensual character, that must be displayed in spite of the inherent illegality of the events concerned.” (ibid.) (“(…)en dépit d’illegalité fonciere des événements concernés.”)

Perhaps the “unfailing stable” which has collapsed – is not just the empirical regime in Tunisia or Egypt – but the ‘western’ paradigm of the “mafia-esque dictatorship” (see Toni Negri: Letter to a Tunisian Friend, February 14, 2011, http://multitudes.samizdat.net/) as a katechon – ostensibly “the bulwark” against the threat of Islamism.  Although this katechonic legitimacy of tyrant states (proxy despots) – is itself dependent upon the veracity of such a threat – the sheer unbearability of these katechonic states unleashed another sort of Antichrist (rather than holding back its dominion) – the popular uprisings leading to their own collapse.  When the U.S. Secretary of State Clinton, in a kind of autosuggestive stupor, urges the governments of the region facing the revolts, for instance the government in Bahrain (home of the U.S. Fifth Fleet) or in Libya to use “restraint” – she unconsciously summons the figure of the katechon, the restrainer of chaos and lawless ones  – the failing golem of U.S. and ‘western’ foreign and military policy in the Middle East.

Paraphrasing Marx’s distinction in the 1844 Manuscripts –it is only necessary to think the thought of communism to overthrow the thought of capitalism– though of course not enough for the same in reality.  In Badiou’s thought it is impossible to even think a revolution.  His ontology of the state precludes the thought of revolution or any other kind of ‘interruption’ of the state.  How could the negativity of the evental rupture be ‘recognized’ by the positive state? First of all, the event has no structure and by definition “lacks being” – meaning it does not exist in the “situation”.  An event must undergo a torturous examination by a lethargic secretive “state” bureaucracy with no certainty of ever qualifying for the status of event.  (Typically, he asks of the Tunisian ‘rioters’ – what do they affirm?)  The event stands ‘before the law’ with little hope of ever entering.
Badiou’s philosophy is predestined to be part of what Jacques Ranciere names “the intellectual counter-revolution” (in the public discussion: “Importance of Critical Theory for Social Movements Today, February 1, 2011, YouTube), because his ontological premise is that of the state – the historical-political ‘nation-state’, the “figure of being” he finds admittedly indispensable to insure the “count”.

He is a statist in ontology – the state is simply “what is”.  “In the ontology of historical multiplicities I have proposed, the State, qua the state of a situation, is what ensures the structural count of a situation’s parts, a count of the situation that generally bears the proper name of a particular ‘nation’.  To call such a state, that is such an operation of counting, a State ‘of right’, basically means (…)the rule of counting (…)” (Alain Badiou, “Philosophy and Politics” in Conditions, London, 2008, p. 167)
Badiou criticized Althusser for “suturing” philosophy directly to politics – as “class struggle in theory”. (see “Philosophy and Politics” op. cit., p. 160)  But hasn’t Badiou also sutured ontology to politics by designating the historical state as identical with the ontological state – the bracket, frame he uses to decide or leave undecided the nature of an ‘event’, its discernibility or indiscernibility?  Badiou can seem to leave politics as it is by surreptitiously ontologizing it – not as politics itself but as a quasi ‘non-political’ state.  Politics though means state – not anti-state movement – or if a movement then only the movement of the state, bringing politics very close to fascism.  As Agamben says, echoing Adorno – we are still under the sign of fascism/Nazism.

In any situation the state determines the three sorts of “one-terms”, meaning the degree of inclusion or belonging in the state.  If something is presented but not included in the state it is singular, if both presented (belongs) and represented (included) it is normal, if represented and not presented it is deemed excrescent.  These three one-terms depend solely upon the state for their recognition or existence (the state confers the seal of the one) – besides “they are the most primitive concepts of any experience whatsoever.” (Alain Badiou, Being and Event, London, 2007, p. 100)  In other words, the state is all there is.

What state will ever decide to include its own destruction?  Badiou’s ‘ontological state’ immunizes itself against resistance, it is a state of immunity.  The state is the presentation of fullness or plenitude.  The anti-state interruptions are invisible, inexistent, indiscernible.  Dialectic has been discarded – as Badiou says, there is no becoming, hence no negativity.  The ‘romantic’ distance is the irreparable breach between singleton and state.  The state is tautological, the contract between self and self – the Ich=Ich of German idealism.  The state is the state because it excludes the presentation of the void – this is also what makes it necessary.  “The state secures and completes the plenitude of the situation.” (Being and Event, op. cit., p. 522)

Badiou prescribes impossible conditions for ‘deciding’ if an “intervention” will have been an event – always only in the future anterior tense.  For an event to have taken place (or to become established as such in the state or situation of the state) – a sort of phantom prior-event must have already taken place – a deferred pre-condition.  But as an event is only something, which is new and undecided, its pre-event disqualifies it permanently from ever having been an event.  “It is evental recurrence which founds intervention.  In other words, there is no interventional capacity, constitutive for the belonging of an evental multiple to a situation, save within the network of consequences of a previously decided belonging.  An intervention is what presents an event for the occurrence of another.” (Being and Event, op. cit., p. 209)

Despite his often-repeated slogan “The truth is first of all something new” – an event can never be new – there is only as Badiou says “evental recurrence” – sounding almost Nietzschean.  Any idea of a “radical beginning” or a “primal event” he dismisses as “speculative leftism”.  A radical beginning would be in Badiou’s system something wild and ‘unsubmitted’ to the order of the situation alias state – it is a false and violent thought of an “ultra-one of the event, Revolution or Apocalypse”.  But the event shrinks still further towards insignificance/unreality – even as recurrence its occurrence is negligible – it must have already been to be at all – it is existent only “after the fact” in its “consequences”, a mode of being Badiou calls “being-faithful”.  (see chapter on “The Intervention” in Alain Badiou, Being and Event, London, 2007, p. 210)

Just as Badiou refers to the Tunisian events as “illegal” – so the intervention whose status vis-à-vis the state must remain undecided – is first of all also “illegal”.

Badiou admits that this is a “circle”, part of the “long critical trial of the reality of action” (Being and Event, op. cit., p. 209).  These are almost magical conditions – such as those presaged by the witches to Macbeth.  Macbeth will fall only when Birnam Woods moves to Dunsinane Hill, though none of woman born can harm him and beware of Macduff.  Perhaps the contagion of uprisings in our time – does follow this logic: the moving of Birnam Woods is like Badiou’s ‘roaming void’ of the ‘rioters’, unborn but lurking in the ontology of the state.  Macduffs seem to be plentiful.

The undecidable event of the Tunisian ‘riots’ was the impossible unexpected pre-event for the fall of Mubarak in the Egyptian Revolution.

One wonders why Badiou, who casts himself as a thinker of the revolution, should so require the state for the securing of his ontology.  Why is the state so indispensable a category?  Peter Hallward hints at this dilemma at the end of a review of the second volume of “Being and Event” – “Logics of Worlds”.
“In Being and Event he developed an ontology which accepted the state as an irreducible dimension of being itself: consistency is imposed at both the structural and ‘meta-structural’ levels of a situation, and a truth evades but cannot eliminate the authority of the state.” (Peter Hallward, “Order and Event” On Badiou’s Logics of Worlds, New Left Review 53, Sept Oct 2008 p. 121, pdf, online at wrong+arithmetic, Alain Badiou on Tunisia, riots and revolution, February 2, 2011)
Hallward notes this complicity of state and being for Badiou’s ontology – but he does not give any reason for it.  Badiou himself is quite frank about the function and necessity of the state: “It is by means of the state that structured presentation is furnished with a fictional being; the latter banishes, or so it appears, the peril of the void, and establishes the reign, since completeness is numbered, of the universal security of the one.” (Being and Event, op. cit.,
p. 98)  Quite clearly, Badiou’s ontological state is also a security state, one in which coercion is a quasi-natural action of structure.

The state is so construed by Badiou – his whole artifice – as he says – to determine and act the criteria for inclusion and belonging in the set of multiples which count as one.  But such a multiple of multiples is haunted by something, which constantly endangers its consistency, but is equally unavoidable.  This something is as potently dangerous and constitutive for Badiou’s state as is anxiety (Angst) for Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein.  The void in Badiou’s construction is the equivalent of Heidegger’s Sorge, “the care of Being”.  “What Heidegger names the care of being, which is the ecstasy of beings, could also be termed the situational anxiety of the void, or the necessity of warding off the void.” (Being and Event, op. cit., p. 93)

The unpresented and unrepresented of the state – is its fatal (congenital) flaw. The quasi-unborn of the state is the void. (Note: The idea of the “unborn” is from Arthur Bradley, “Politics of the Unborn: Unbearable Life from Augustine to Schmitt” paper presented in “Force and the Worst” series, Inc, Goldsmiths, 15th February 2011)  At the same time – the state is a guarantee of the void – for where could it exist if not within the state.  If it were elsewhere immanence of the state would be even more severely threatened.  The state is necessary to contain the void, just as the void is an inevitable breach or gap haunting the multiplicity of the state.  The state is quite simply Being – and that must be preserved at all costs.  But the state is even more ensnared and precarious – as the Being of being is the void.  The utmost danger is that the void become fixated or fix itself.  To prevent that happening - above structure is another structure or meta-structure (the state) whose sole function is the un-localizing of the void.  The void is an inner limit of being within the meta-structure of the state – its own infernal region which Badiou calls “subjacent to chaos” or a “spectre to be exorcised”.  When one considers that precisely this void is where if anywhere a revolutionary event would be likely to arise – one can hardly imagine that Badiou’s thought edifice can conceive of the fragility of state-power.  The void qua event of revolution not only ruins the historical-political state in Badiou’s thought – it is the ruin of being itself.
“Evidently the guarantee of consistency (the ‘there is Oneness’) cannot rely on structure or the count-as-one alone to circumscribe and prohibit the errancy of the void from fixing itself, and being, on the basis of this very fact, as presentation of the unpresentable, the ruin of every donation of being and the figure subjacent to Chaos.” (Being and Event, op. cit., p. 93)

Agamben seizes upon Badiou’s absolutist ontology of the state – using its arguments about the event to reveal them as a precise illumination of what Agamben following Carl Schmitt calls the exception.  The State (as per Badiou) or the Sovereign (more or less synonymous for Agamben) is the exception and the event – the interruption or intervention in itself.  “Badiou’s thought is, from this perspective, a rigorous thought of the exception.  His central category of the event corresponds to the structure of the exception.” (Homo Sacer, op. cit., p. 25)  If the State is the state of the situation – the exception/event in excess of it – is the Sovereign.  One sees where Agamben perhaps simplifies or vulgarizes Badiou’s idea of the event – by seeing it as “excrescent” – meaning included but not presented in the state (or represented but not presented), whereas the event for Badiou is certainly not included/represented – even if its membership is undecideable.  It is neither included (not at all) nor is it a member – definitely not.  But Agamben is eager to draw out a potentiality from Badiou’s scheme – one that configures the event and the Sovereign as one – under the sign of the decision (in the sense of Carl Schmitt).  “This is why sovereignty presents itself in Schmitt in the form of a decision on the exception.” (ibid.)  The actions of the Egyptian Military council within or as a counter movement to the Revolution – is a prototype of the Event as the Decision on the Exception.  The Event according to this logic is not the Revolution, but the ‘temporary’ counter-revolution.  By fixing the sovereign as the event/exception of the State – Agamben’s interpretation of Badiou’s ontology of the state as a “logic of sovereignty” is the counter-revolution in theory.  Any position of subtraction of or in the State (count), is ‘always already’ occupied by the sovereign exception – a counter-revolution in permanence – to prevent the worst.






6.  Bonapartism or “Pétainist Transcendental”?

There is a One and the Many within the state – Badiou’s vision of the absolute state towering from the austere heights of power over its subsets of singletons is a fiction or myth.  Here Badiou seems blinded by the political-theological model of Hobbes’ Leviathan – a hierarchic monolith firmly in the grip of an absolute sovereign whose legitimacy derives from the “divine right of kings” and whose cosmic imperative is to inhibit the unbinding of itself into chaos.
The State (always capitalized) in Badiou’s system is basically infallible and non-political.  He sees it, citing a ‘despairing Lenin, ready to die’ – as ‘obscenely permanent’: “(…) for the State is precisely non-political, insofar as it cannot change, save hands (…)” (Being and Event, op. cit., p. 110)

Hobbes’ Leviathan itself was composed in the midst of the English Civil War and regicide; his system is based on fear, especially of the ever-present danger of the imminent dissolution of authority.  The acid stringency of his rule of commonwealth reflects the deep knowledge inherited from antiquity – that all power could end abruptly.  For what is any state but the temporary coalescence of power?  As Seneca wrote in answer to Serenus in his treatise entitled “From the Tranquillity of the Soul”: “What kingdom is not threatened by collapse, shattering, takeover and execution? And that without any long intervals.  An hour’s work: sitting on the throne and kneeling in front of it.  Take note: every position is changeable (…)” (Seneca, Von der Seelenruhe, Leipzig, 1980, p. 154)

Marx has shown, in 18th Brumaire of Louis Napoleon, his classical study of the collapse of state or the coup d’état of a post-revolutionary nation-state, how the action of the ‘One’ took 36,000,000 French citizens by surprise.  Louis Napoleon, president of the French Republic at the time of his coup, could use the state to capture the state – he manipulated the inconsistencies or loopholes in the constitution regarding the exceptional role of the president, elevating it to that of emperor for himself thus bypassing those rancorous elements of the national assembly and the system of official representation.  The State or the count reverted to Oneness of an absolute ruler by way of the coup.  The assertion of the one-of-the-count, the presidency, over the sub-sets of parliamentary representation exploited the vestige of absolute monarchy embodied in the office of the presidency.  The constitutional aporia was the basis for the coup – the coup of the One over the many within the meta-structure of the state.  By an odd twist, the errancy of the void reappears in the meta-structure itself, fixing itself as a coup d’état.  The coup qua void ‘restores’ or secures the One or Oneness of the state.
Non-being and Being (of the State) coincide in the coup d’état.

Varying the theme of the one and the many, the Egyptian military council, after the forced resignation of Mubarak, have taken over the One of the presidency as a collective leadership.  Similar to Louis Napoleon’s circumventing of parliament – though in apparent cooperation with the demands of the people’s revolution – the supreme military council has suspended the constitution and parliament, those tainted parts perpetuating the fiction of the representation of the many.  Since both constitution and parliament – as well as the cabinet which is still in power – are seen as corrupt relics of the old regime, the military rulers could appear to be acting in the name of the revolution whilst de facto carrying out what appears to be a ‘temporary’ coup.

The coup and the revolt are two opposing forms of interruption of the state, antithetical mirror images of each other.  As a kind of historical symmetry, following upon the reign of Louis Napoleon begun in a coup d’état and ended in ignominious defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, came the outbreak of the popular insurrection of the Paris Commune.  The coup d’état secured the one-ness of the state thus preserving being from within the meta-structure – the reign of Louis Napoleon lasted 18 years.  The “non-place of the place” created by the “fixated void” (those rebellious members of Paris national guard militias and army units who refused to return their weapons and cannons) attempted to realize a communist society for the three months of the Paris Commune.
They had the aim, as Marx writes, of destroying state power and its pretence of national unity: “The unity of the nation should have become real through the destruction of that state-power, which pretended to be the embodiment of unity, but wanted to remain independent and superior to the nation, on whose body it was only a parasitic growth.” (“Die Einheit der Nation sollte (…)eine Wirklichkeit werden durch die Vernichtung jener Staatsmacht, welche sich für die Verkörperung dieser Einheit ausgab, aber unabhängig und überlegen sein wollte gegenüber der Nation, an deren Körper sie doch nur ein Schmarotzerauswuchs war.” Karl Marx, Der Bürgerkrieg in Frankreich (The Civil War in France), in K. Marx und F. Engels, Ausgewählte Werke, Moskau, 1972, p. 303)

Which historical interruption of French state-power would Badiou’s system consider an Event – the ‘positive’ coup or the ‘negative’ revolt? Either, neither or both?  Is the Event for or against Being?

In his more immediately political work – The Meaning of Sarkozy – Badiou has analyzed an enduring unconscious pattern within French political and social history of the state – which he calls France’s “Pétainist transcendental”.  “I propose to say that ‘Pétainism’ is the transcendental, in France, of catastrophic forms of disorientation taken by the state.  We have a major disorientation, this is presented as a turning point in the situation, and is solemnly active at the head of the state.” (Alain Badiou, The Meaning of Sarkozy, London, 2008, p. 78)
He depicts it as a process of legitimacy of the state, whereby the state aligns itself with history.  Although he names it Pétainism, Badiou traces this pattern back to the time of the Restoration of 1815 in France.  The state is the historical actor, the rescuer of the people from a moral crisis and decline originating in a disastrous event.  The state of the restoration rescued the people from revolution, beheading of the king, etc; later for Pétain himself – the Nazi puppet state at Vichy was the “national revolution” against the disaster of the Popular Front; for Sarkozy, the disastrous event for which the state is the only medication was May 1968.  As Badiou explains:
“There is a historical element in Pétainism that consists in linking two events: a negative event, generally with a working class and popular structure, and a positive event, with a state, electoral and/or military structure. (…) This is a source of legitimacy for the new government, since all legitimacy of this kind is a link between the state and history.  The government represents itself, and has itself represented, as historical actor of the first importance, since it is this government that has finally embarked on the correction needed in the wake of the inaugural damaging event.” (Alain Badiou, op. cit., p. 84)

One can recognize in Badiou’s typology of the “Pétainist transcendental” the ‘unconscious’ model of Badiou’s own ontology of the state, his positive state of legitimacy of Being.  The government or meta-structure represents itself as the One or historical actor, whose function it is to safeguard and correct Being against any intrusions of the “unpresentable”.  The state/head of state is outside of the count –in Badiou’s terminology the equivalent for the ancient “rex solutus est a legibus” (the king is released from the laws).  Most notably, the name of the collaborateur state installed in Vichy under Pétain was changed from French Third Republic to simply the French State.
The two events in the Pétainist transcendental – corresponding to a “negative event” of social revolution and a “positive event” of state or head of state resulting in a despotic ‘correction’ of the negative event – bear great structural resemblance to the two apparently irreconcilable elements of Badiou’s ontology - Being (positive-state) and Event (negative-revolution) – more universally, state and history.

In essence, the only manner in which the infinite state could exist (or inexist), securing Oneness of Being infinitely, is as an infinite coup in permanence.

In a time though of uprisings and insurrections against the state and even the idea of the state, some of which have been able to shake the “unfailing stable” as Badiou has conceded – one might ask if an ontology such as his presuming the infinitude of the state – might itself be in need of a coup/rescue.

The incurable melancholy of the system (Baudrillard) will have been the infinite unthinking of this thought.








Tuesday, 28 December 2010

The Undecidability of Capital


1.  Prolegomenon
2.  Derrida on his Knees
3.  The Secret
4.  Spirit:Time
5.  What is Capital besides Capital? (or Postone ‘de-forms’ Marx)
6.  The Subject as Double Substance


1.  Prolegomenon

Why is it that capitalism does not have to work – in the sense that communism does?  Whether it works or it is perceived to be broken, almost irreparably – nothing can affect its survival – its perpetuation.  This seems to be anti-Darwinist or anti-evolutionary.  An organism which survives merely because it is – not because it is the best or fittest.  Broken eternal capitalism is a prime example of ‘inoperative power’.  Its indifference to perfection or even desirability is already rooted in the indifference of money to ‘whatever commodity’ as long as such a commodity can ceaselessly perform the miracle of turning money into more money.  As Marx writes: “The capitalist knows, that all commodities, no matter how shoddy they look or how bad they smell, in faith and in truth are money, (…) and besides that, miraculous means to make out of money more money.” [“Der Kapitalist weiß, daß alle Waren, wie lumpig sie immer aussehen oder wie schlecht sie immer riechen, im Glauben und in der Wahrheit Geld, (…) sind und zudem wundertätige Mittel, um aus Geld mehr Geld zu machen.” (Karl Marx, Das Kapital Erster Band, Marx Engels Werke abbreviated MEW Band 23, Berlin, 1975, p. 169)]  In a similar vein, Marx of the 1844 Manuscripts notes that the capitalist can make a greater profit from derelict ‘cellar-dwellings’ rented to the proletariat than from the rent from palaces – as capital although a science of wealth, is also a science of perishing (darben) – both in the commodities it can convert to ever greater value and the molding (including deforming) of desire necessary for their willing consumption.  “Das rohe Bedürfnis des Arbeiters ist eine viel größere Quelle des Gewinns als das feine des Reichen.  Die Kellerwohnungen in London bringen ihren Vermietern mehr ein als die Paläste (…)” [“The raw desire of the worker is a much greater source of profit than the fine one of the rich.  The cellar flats in London yield more for their landlords than the palaces (…)”, Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) in Marx Engels Werke abbreviated MEW Band 40, Berlin, 1990, pp. 551-552)] 

 Marx speaks of the ‘rawness’ of capital towards the underclass complementary to the ‘fineness’ towards the monied class corresponding to Wesen (essence) and Schein (appearance).  Capital or what Marx calls in his 1844 manuscripts – the national economy – acts upon the whole of what is human through its regime of desire and desirelessness.  It imposes on both the capitalist and the worker an unnatural asceticism.  They assume the ‘life mask’ of the “usurious miser and the ascetic productive slave” (Marx, op. cit., p. 549) – under the premise that what I expend I have taken away from the accumulation of capital.  Here capital is indistinguishable from the ‘science of morality’.  The uneasy duality of luxury and frugality (excess and dearth) flowing through capital and its national economy is split between the human agents of capital and itself.  Human renunciation nurtures the luxury of capital.  As Marx writes: money can travel, go to the theatre, to balls, eat, be a patron of the arts, knowledge, move in society…The less you are, the less of yourself you expend, the more you have deposited in your second alienated imperishable life, your capital.  On the other hand desire in the sense of a feeling of lack, a need aroused in me by the other in order to lure me into spending money on whatever commodity is supposed to fill that lack is an absolute condition of any accumulation of capital.  Long before the capitalist market, Socrates, standing in the agora, observed – “how many things there are which I don’t want.”  Epicurus following in that tradition of resistance to desire advised a correspondent who asked him how to increase his wealth - decrease your desires.

 Desire (Drang), which Schelling saw as “the pre-form of spirit”, is immanently corrupted and in a permanent state of mauvaise foi as a hostage of capital. (see Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Frankfurt, 1982, p. 202)  The ‘inoperative’ – saves himself up from labour – in the way the worker used to save his money instead of wasting it on “fleeting desires”.  The inoperative’s asceticism is the abstinence from activity, from action.  One renounces action.  Could this antinomy of luxury (debauchery) and asceticism in capitalism underlie the movement in Schopenhauer’s thought-construct from affirmation to negation of the will to live?      
     
Capital does not necessarily imply an ever evolving higher level of civilisation – but can do just as well or better with a worse one, as long as the basic conditions of capital or M-C-M’ (money-commodity-more money) themselves are given.  Self-preservation is not an absolute value – it should hover at the point of neediness.  Neediness is the appropriate mode for the self-preservation of the worker (includes all non-capitalists in capitalism); it is also “the principle of national economy”.  In this way morality protrudes into the “essence” of the national economy. 
Capital or money have desires (Bedürfnisse) which must be satisfied, the worker must practice being without desire, being wasted.  

The Roman Empire was built on Roman Army bread made of spelt flour, the Egyptian pyramids on pharaonic bread made of kamut flour – the British Empire (Bath), says an Englishman – an old Bluecoat boy – was built on ‘Mother’s Pride’.  One of those white nothing loaves.  Less than air.  The British are the Luftmenschen in the succession of imperialists.  The Scots at least have their oat biscuits – they eat them like the Indios in the Andes chew on their coca leaves – to stave off exhaustion while mounting the heights in thin air.

Just as in the figure of just going on there is an implicit ‘belief’ in the unending repetitive character of a series or rule, we carry around an apriori syllogistic rhetorical structure in thinking which presupposes that one thought must follow from another thought and so on.  But must it – does it?  In the same way actions, occurrences follow from other actions or occurrences in the empirical or historical world – otherwise they are merely ‘contingent’.  But can they both follow and not follow – be related and unrelated.  In an absolutely contingent world this would probably be possible.  The assumption that things or thought must follow from one another imposes a (science-esque) mimetic flux on the form of phenomena – their way of changing or passing by staying the same – a kind of flux of identity.  This is also a flux of logos – logos implies that everything must be connected with everything else.  Logos can appear in the form of a hierarchy of principles exerting force through various stages of methodical generalisation until it reaches bottom at the empirical data.  Both the flux and the scale are ancient models – although the hierarchical logos as Adorno and Horkheimer develop in Dialectics of Enlightenment was at the threshold of Enlightenment – in Bacon’s treatises on science. (see Max Horkheimer und Theodor W. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung, Philosophische Fragmente, Amsterdam, 1968, p. 17)  

Each moment of the flux is a repetition of the one before so that in going on there is only before never after.  Badiou is quite taken by Beckett’s ‘bad verse’ (vers de mirliton) about such a flux of the same – what are numbers other than this.  In the counting of numbers there is the utter assumption that more will always be the same as less – the unit of one added to a transfinite number is no different than the unit of one added to one.  Is this truth?  Is the following of the same by the same a kind of verification of the same?  Would then conversely a following of the same by the other be a falsification of the same?  Or of the other?  In the following of the same by the same there is only a change by substitution – that which was in the place of now moves out of this place – or as Badiou would say is then non-being.  But it is replaced by a replica of itself – so the following of the same by the same is an unending substitution of being by non-being.  This is the thing’s undecidability.  Beckett’s verse is a kind of faux-Heraclitean homily:
“Flux causes  (one notes already that flux itself is seen as a ‘cause’  sm)
 That every thing
 Even in being,
 Every thing,
 Thus this one here,
 Even this one here,
 Even in being
 Is not.
 Let’s speak about it.”
(quoted in Alain Badiou, “The Writing of the Generic: Samuel Beckett” in Condtions, London, 2008, p. 251)

This just going on expressed in Beckett’s verse has nothing to do with Hegelian being-becoming says Badiou, - it is a site of the generic human in a work of fiction – yet it is situated within the historical epoch of the ‘Hegelian’ becoming of capital.  How is that possible?  The generic human as a fiction of just going on of the same subsists within or parallel to the transformation of the same in non-human capital.  Are they then simultaneous to one another?  Badiou is “happy” to call the economy of Beckett’s texts “ancient”.  More precisely, Beckett’s fiction is composed according to the “five ‘supreme kinds’ of Plato’s Sophist” (Badiou, , op. cit., p. 254) .  “We could say that these supreme kinds, Movement, Rest, the Same, the Other, the Logos (…) constitute the reference points, or primitive terms, for an axiomatic of humanity as such.” (ibid.)

The truth of generic humanity in a work of fiction in the ongoing epoch of capital is ancient.  Although the generic in Badiou’s sense is a reduction of all quality to quantity, an unbinding of all that is bound, which can only occur in capitalism.  Between one nostril and the other lies the Sahara, says Giacometti.  Beckett’s art is a work of fiction – a “fiction of generic writing” (Badiou) – but in every fiction there must be something which is not fiction otherwise how would one recognize it as fiction?  In Beckett’s case it is the generic (“oriented towards essence, or Idea”, Badiou, ibid.) which is the non-fiction of his fiction. 

“That the thing can simultaneously be held in the place where it is and in the place where it is not is given in the image of the flux; this flux, however, is never the synthesis of being and non-being, and is not to be confused with Hegelian becoming.” (Badiou, op. cit., p. 252)  This balancing of the thing between being and not-being in the flux of the same (mimetic flux) is what Badiou calls its undecidability.  But Beckett’s flux of the same seems to elude simultaneity – for if something is to come, something else has to go.  What kind of myth is that?  The myth of the number?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 


2.  Derrida on his Knees

I saw an odd clip of Derrida on You Tube – speaking about Heidegger in some dreary shabby classroom (Jacques Derrida on Martin Heidegger 2000).  One sees a few smirking auditors behind him.  He is dressed in a pristine black jacket and grey trousers, as if one could take his sartorial elegance for granted although somehow out of place, he holds a microphone, he is in front of a table on a dais painted black or dark blue.  The table is covered with a blue cloth.  The most incongruous element in the scene is that he is ‘standing’ on his knees.  No explanation.  A sheer fact.  Hard to interpret.  Is that a partial definition of a fact?  It resists (desists?) any ultimate interpretation – but allows for an indefinite amount of speculation.  This could be an axiom of ‘speculative realism’.  The clip itself was not very revealing either.  Derrida disagrees with some things Heidegger says about “animality” (“that animals don’t speak, don’t die, are poor in world” – he is suspicious of this, - “it has heavy consequences”).  He also “parts company” with Heidegger about other things such as technology, epochality.  His tone of voice and facial expressions are emphatic, demanding.  Derrida’s tie hangs suggestively below his belt – the angle of his tilting – like a plumb line – showing how much he deviates from the shortest distance to the floor.  The impression is one of self-dwarfing.  Is Derrida assuming the position of the ‘penitent god’?  God who asks forgiveness from humanity?  Benjamin suggests this aspect of God-ness in his fragment on “Capitalism as Religion” – God is implicated in the debt/guilt of capitalism and must seek atonement.  Sacrifices are made to atone the guilt of God.  The crucifixion was another act of God asking forgiveness from his creatures for their creaturely-ness.  Or is Derrida rather enacting a kind of Dostoyevskian gesture of humility – such as those required or carried out by the various capricious holy men or holy fools who populate his novels.  In The Possessed penitents visiting a famous holy man must approach him on their knees.  When he elects to accept their penance they are made to drink a horribly over sweetened tea (according to their degree of sinfulness) all the while still on their knees.  The enigmatic holy man in The Brothers Karamazov, the ailing Starez, goes down on his knees in front of Dmitri, one of the brothers, during a tumultuous family audience of the Karamazovs in his hermitage cell.  No one knows why.  It is just the mystery of the divine holy impulse.  Although a sceptical monk who witnesses this genuflection – attributes it to the showmanship of the dying Starez.  The holy man senses a crime will take place.  Later one will say he foresaw everything.   
Dmitri had just ridiculed his father for wooing a woman desired and courted by both father and son.

Is Derrida the penitent at the feet of Heidegger, the holy man – or the self-effacing holy man bending his knee to the ‘sinner’ Heidegger in absentia?

The Starez, a figure much admired by Wittgenstein, is a monk whose historical religious function (not just his but the institution of Starez-hood) is to accept the soul and will of those coming to him and to rule it as his own.  This is the spiritual way – through slavery to freedom.  Something similar happens in de Sade’s societies (communities) – except it is solely of the body.  “Abolishing the property of one’s own body as of the other bodies is a phantasy inherent in the operation of the perverse; the pervert inhabits the body of the other as his own and thus infuses the other body with his own.” (Pierre Klossowski, “Sade und Fourier” in Lektüre zu de Sade, Frankfurt, 1981, p. 224)  The Starez rules the body through the soul, de Sade’s figures rule the body through the body.  Starez’ rule is theocracy – de Sade’s is biopolitics.  

Derrida was trapped/caught on a video by a random contingent spectator/camera who extracted this moment out of a continuum of an unknown duration.  Although some element of choice or decision can be read into Derrida’s kneeling position – at least it is physically difficult to spontaneously kneel while giving a lecture (like opera singers acting a role while singing) and equally difficult to abruptly end such kneeling.  This extract of less than a minute, the epitome of insignificance, could have remained a recorded fact among the millions circulating seen and unremembered on the internet (just like thought itself – you have to have thought much to forget much as Robert Walser said), if it had not been ‘seized’ by a second act – that of my protocol and futile (useless) interpretation.
Perhaps this fact is not just on video but also in writing somewhere already, a ‘curated’ video  - although unknown to me.  My act of impaling by writing is my own first appropriation of this visual fact – the ‘trace’ of an inexplicable gesture.  Is my writing a third degree of reality?  First the act of kneeling – the capture of that specific moment as in a witnessing by the camera operator is the second.  The use of knee bending in literature has less power than the fact of Derrida’s filmed kneeling, although it may have been itself an ‘onto-theatrical’ gesture.  In literature such an act would seem ‘excessive’.  In ‘life’ or the filmed version Derrida’s kneeling radiates the “brutality of the fact” (Francis Bacon) – no amount of interpretation can change or erase it.  One can only shake one’s head like the woodcutter sitting in the ruin of Rashomon Gate staring into the rain in the beginning of Kurosawa’s film Rashomon and repeat “I don’t understand.”

The imperviousness of the fact (factum brutum) is the ‘secret’ – Derrida’s secret is his own gesture of powerlessness.  The kneeling position mimics an amputee – one does not see his feet anymore.  That of course is the front view – the fortuitous angle.  Those behind Derrida were not privy to this illusion of a footless lecturer – as in any magic trick - it all has to do with the position of the spectator.

The room itself seems to be miniaturized.  The scale of the room where the audience is sitting is greater than the site (spot) where Derrida is kneeling on the dais.  The room seems to shrink down on him like an inverted pyramid.  As a dramatic character he is reminiscent of Mnouchkine’s interpretation of the tragic king Richard the Second in her staging of Shakespeare’s eponymous play.  Richard is obdurate and arrogant – unaware until too late of the conspiracy against him by his rebellious vassals.  The actor portraying the king was made up to an extreme pallor – looking almost Japanese – and confined to a wheeled vehicle – a hybrid of a wheelchair and a chariot – as if he had wheels instead of legs, already lowered in stature, before being toppled or floored by his adversaries.  Derrida is the king and at the same time one of the conspirators against the king  - “Je suis la plaie et le couteau!” (I am the wound and the knife!, Baudelaire, “L’Héautontimorouménos”).

Is Derrida’s kneeling a symptom of his circumcision neurosis?
 
 
 
 
 


3.  The Secret

The secret is like a fact, because it is of language but not only of language – it is also the withholding of language.  Otherwise it would not be a secret.  It can potentially be the infinite withholding of language, if the secret is ‘kept’ absolutely – it ceases to be just a secret, it ceases to be in total.  The absolute secret tends to nil, to void, to absence.  So it is a fact of absence.  The attributes of language cease to inform it – no rhetoric, no sophistry can take hold of a secret.  The secret can be of a fact – besides being a fact – for instance the secret identity of someone, the secret hiding place of something valuable, stolen – but all secrets must be susceptible to being known or unknown.  The ‘secrets of the universe’ are not really secrets – because no one ‘has’ them either to divulge or conceal.  Hence truth is not a secret as the concept of aletheia might imply – something which comes out of its hiding.  Wherever it is hidden or revealed – whether it is seen or unseen (told or untold?), the truth is indifferent to this hiding or disclosure.  Does Wittgenstein have anything to say about the secret – except that he is silent about what cannot be said?  But is that a secret?  A secret must be sayable – even if not said.  A secret is not the ineffable.  Truth is indifferent (adiaphoric) to its being true or being known.  So a secret could not necessarily be truth.  But could a fairy tale or a fiction be a secret?  A secret ‘must’ be true or its withholding would be of no consequence, but truth is not a secret.  As a secret withers away in its untelling – to this degree it exposes itself to the danger of the ‘unthought’.      

But what if anything does the secret have to do with semblance (appearance) or ‘Schein’ – with the veil of the aesthetic?   
Benjamin discovers a philosophy of semblance in Goethe’s “Elective Affinities” – and of what seems so nearly the same – of the secret, veiled being.  But he is rather confusing in his manner of determining the occult transitions from semblance to secret and the eventual revelation of the secret – and if this is the same as the unveiling of semblance.  Can semblance ever be unveiled?  One could assume that in the logic of Goethe’s aesthetic there is either semblance or no semblance (the unveiling of the secret) – nor can there be a slow crumbling away of semblance, just as fictions neither age nor become more true.  Ottilie is the character in whom Goethe lays the signature of beautiful tragic semblance.  She is semblance whose tragedy is to have been chosen as the semblance of tragedy.  She is both figure and transfiguration – the static center of what Hebbel likened to an “automaton in an anatomical theatre” (quoted in Walter Benjamin, Goethes Wahlverwandtschaften, in Illuminationen, Frankfurt, 1961, p. 135) – her semblance is not compelled by external suffering or violence to its demise.  The semblance, which represents itself in her beauty, is one of imminent departure – a figurine meant to be broken, a soft light soon to be extinguished.  She is Goethe’s idol of tragedy itself – an embodied fetish of the transition in the novel from the cathartic affect to the sublime. 
“Eben dieser Übergang ist es, der im Untergang des Scheines sich vollzieht.  Jener Schein, der in Ottiliens Schönheit sich darstellt, ist der untergehende.  Denn ist es nicht so zu verstehen, als führe äußere Not und Gewalt den Untergang der Ottilie herauf, sondern in der Art ihres Scheins selbst liegt es begründet, daß er verlöschen muß, daß er es bald muß.” (ibid., p. 139)
[“Particularly this transition is the one which occurs in the demise (Untergang) of semblance.  That semblance, which represents itself in Ottilie’s beauty, is a sinking one.  It is not to be understood, that distress and violence lead to Ottilie’s perdition, rather it is grounded (begründet) in the type of her semblance (Schein), that it must go out, that it must go soon.”]
 
When Ottilie fades away as it is inscribed in her semblance to do – she is not unveiled in her demise – she confirms rather Goethe’s belief in the Platonic doctrine that beauty is inseparable from semblance – the further removed from beauty and semblance, the closer to life – but not truth.  Beauty or the illusory beautiful in a work of art is closest in vicinity not to truth but to the expressionless (das Ausdruckslose), which seems to vaguely correspond to the secret. 

Plato’s theory of beauty does not refer first to beautiful semblance in art (as the work of art) but to beautiful life.  But this is because Plato is caught between despising and shunning art as unacceptable mimesis and his ideal of philosophy as anti-mimetic discourse.  Yet beauty as Schein is not merely an imitation of life – if it were it would be reduced to economy – the reproduction of life in its manifest sense where bodies represent other bodies – or so it would seem.  This mimetic nature of the ‘general economy’ (Bataille) can be traced back to its “abysmally mimetic” original event – the work of death or the sacrifice.  The body of the sacrifice represents or imitates the body of the community or its economy – which is the same thing. The ‘work of death’ is substituted for and anticipates the ‘work of life’.  This is almost the opposite movement to that of a Heideggerian ‘unconcealing’ qua aletheia – as the sacrifice or work of death ‘reveals’ in advance what is normally concealed by the ‘work of life’.  First comes the unconcealing – then the concealing. (see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, Mimesis, Philosophy, Politics, Stanford, 1998, p. 124, note 124)

Benjamin’s aesthetic of beautiful semblance as necessarily ‘irrevocably’ veiled has little to do with any kind of ‘unconcealing’.  On the contrary – beauty’s “law of essence” (Wesensgesetz) is such that it only appears (erscheint) veiled.  Without the veil, beauty would cease to be beauty.  The veil is also its constitutive secret – Adorno speaks of the necessary “enigma character” (der Rätselcharakter) of art.  That is why art cannot be appropriated through understanding – the more one ‘understands’ the further away the art, it veils itself in the misdirected understanding of the spectator.  The only art, which can be understood totally without a remainder, is not art at all.  “Als konstitutiv aber ist der Rätselcharakter dort zu erkennen, wo er fehlt: Kunstwerke, die der Betrachtung und dem Gedanken ohne Rest aufgehen, sind keine.” [The enigma character however is recognizable as constitutive, there where it is missing: works of art, that are exhausted in consideration and thought without a remainder, are not any.]
(Theodor W. Adorno, Ästhetische Theorie, Frankfurt, 1970, p. 184)

A standard move of deconstructionist philosophy – in the literary sphere, obviously most amenable to such procedures of extraction and subtraction, is to carve out a figure from a text (for instance Bartleby) which functions then as a type or model.  Rather than seeing this as the collapse of the aesthetic, the fabrication of such a type is the way of ‘mastery’ or conquest of the text.  The seemingly trivial question appearing as the title of Heidegger’s essay on Zarathustra reveals the predatory intention – “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?”.  One knows that whatever the answer  - it will have only one timbre – the destruction of the enigma.  Out of such a destruction of the source, power is set free for the reconstruction of an anti-aesthetic ontological monument – in this case of Nietzsche himself.  The monumentalizing drive articulates itself in Lacoue-Labarthe’s etymological frenzy (fever) surrounding the word Ge-stell (Heidegger) which he traces to its provisional ‘Greek’ origin in “stele”– meaning statue or monument as that which is present and erected.  “What predominates and what joins poiesis  (or even techne) and technology—in a common, though unequally, unthought [impensée] of aletheia—is precisely the static determination of Being.
Ge-stell is primarily and fundamentally the stele. (…) this amounts to saying that Ge-stell is a word for presence—with presence here interpreted as stele, or, since it is always necessary to conjugate everything with (the forgetting of) aletheia, unconcealment interpreted as erection.” (Lacoue-Labarthe, Typography, op. cit., p. 69)

(Heidegger and Badiou, two points on the curve of ontology, stand for non-metamorphosing or barren philosophy – never anywhere else than with itself alias Being – unable to subtract from itself (not even as sacrifice).  Although errors are fertile – the fertility of errors is a substitute or disguise for the sterility of philosophical monuments like Being.  Heidegger himself laments the impossibility of Dasein having or perceiving itself from a distance.  The asphyxiating closeness of Dasein and its shadow Angst or Sorge (Care) is reminiscent of baroque aesthetics – the nearest possible conjunction of vision and the visible, automatic sight. [See “Baroque Quantities”, Faust Series Opus 9, 13th November 2009 for a reference to the baroque and the monadic enclosure]  Heidegger in his regretting the loss of distance, longs for the romantic ‘mood’ – gone for ever.  Being is not romantic.  Philosophy as ontology is the economy of stagnant value – value from which all movement, speed of circulation has been extracted.  Although Badiou contends that philosophy circulates between ontology and truth procedures.  But why should the inverted world suddenly transport or convey truth?)        

What would be the purpose of such a bizarre collection of figures cut out of their original textual ambient and turned into statues – the purpose for philosophy (of the Heideggerian-deconstructionist provenance)?  It seems that for Heidegger it is the only way philosophy can engorge itself with poetry not for the sake of the aesthetic enigma – but to furnish itself with the means of representing itself in figures or types (Gestalt).  Thus one will find figures from Nazi propaganda such as Ernst Jünger’s Der Arbeiter Herrschaft und Gestalt (The Worker - Rule and Type) next to scavengings from poetic sources such as Rilke’s Angel and of course Nietzsche’s Zarathustra.  Once they have undergone philosophical branding – the ensuing types become indistinguishable convicts in philosophical detention, ‘bad’ and ‘good’ company herded together in one confinement.  The intention, desire, relentless strategy is that such figured types displayed behind philosophical bars, painfully unconcealed in a metaphysical freak show, can never become enigmas again.  Aesthetic loss is philosophical (ontological) gain.  Poetry (art) becomes directly metaphysical (truth bearing) but only when imagination (fiction) is seized upon by philosophy.  This approximates what Badiou (also in the wake of Heidegger) would call the state of being a “condition” of philosophy; he admits that all these conditions are necessarily external to it.  Art or especially poetry is one of those conditions.  Lacoue-Labarthe makes this ‘dependency’ of Heideggerian philosophy upon that which it would also subordinate most explicit: “For if Zarathustra is a figure, in the strongest sense (and we will see in a moment that for Heidegger it is a historical necessity that commits metaphysics, in the process of completing itself, since Hegel, to (re)presenting itself (sich darstellen) in figures, as well as to representing (vorstellen) transcendence, from the perspective of the “subjective” determination of Being, as the form, figure, imprint, type of a humanity. Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Jünger’s Worker, even Rilke’s Angel – (…)” (Lacoue-Labarthe, op. cit., p. 52).  More tentatively, Lacoue-Labarthe asks in a footnote if one shouldn’t add “Freud’s Oedipus and Marx’s Proletarian” to the row of “subjective” determinations of Being.  “Marx’s Proletarian” though would utterly resist being trimmed to a ‘type of a humanity’ – if any type at all, then a type of Capital.  If though Lacoue-Labarthe’s perspective is of a ““subjective” determination of Being”, then one could more plausibly conceive of ‘Marx’s Capital’ as fitting into this series of types.  Marx identified Capital as the ‘automatic subject’ of its own production process in the first volume of Capital – Capital in Marx’s dialectical presentation is already metaphysical and would not to have to undergo any forced conversions to achieve such transcendence.  The capitalist, another possible ‘type’, may seem to be pursuing ‘subjective purposes’, but only insofar as he is the ‘conscious porter’ (“bewußter Träger”) of “the objective content of circulation – the valorisation of value (…)” (Karl Marx, Das Kapital Erster Band, Marx Engels Werke abbreviated MEW Band 23, Berlin, 1975, p. 167). 

The capitalist is a conscious subject only to the degree that he ‘loses’ his subjectivity in his imitation of the restless movement of unceasing profit – the self-processing process of capital.  Capital, on the other hand, is the “automatic subject” of its own self-valorisation, because, despite its constant alternating metamorphoses into money and commodity, it never loses itself in this movement.  “It (value) moves constantly out of one form into the other, without losing itself in this movement, and transforms itself in this way into an automatic subject.” [“Er geht beständig aus der einen Form in die andre über, ohne sich in dieser Bewegung zu verlieren, und verwandelt sich so in ein automatisches Subjekt.” (Karl Marx, Das Kapital, MEW 23, op. cit., p. 169)]  The capitalist, as the subject who loses his subjectivity in the subjectivity of Capital, is only such when he functions as ‘personified capital’, or when his subjective purposes are those of capital endowed or gifted with his own “will and consciousness” (for what is subjectivity other than will and consciousness?) – those purposes being the “growing appropriation of abstract wealth”. (ibid., pp. 167-168)  
Could one speak of an ‘original’ or a ‘derived’ type – the archetype and its ectype?  Would Capital be the original (metaphysical) type, the capitalist the derived one – in the sense of the creator and the created?  The purposes of the capitalist, says Marx, are never use-value (Gebrauchswert), only profit – value for capital.  The authenticity of the derived capitalist type or subject – as type is a subjective determination of being according to Lacoue-Labarthe -  is greater, the more the ectype capitalist personifies the (original) archetype capital.  The more the capitalist is conscious of his will the more he (his will) personifies or transports the will of capital.  The more his will is the will of capital, the more authentic and free it feels, the more lost it is in capital.

The identity of the capitalist’s will and the will of capital is what constitutes the moral certainty of the type.  In an almost Schopenhauerian sense, the capitalist is an “appearance of the will” (Erscheinung des Willen) of capital, the same will which is objectified in any other thing alias commodity or money.  Musil writes in the second volume of “Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften” – in a conversation between Ulrich and Director F. “Das Geld ist ein Vernunftwesen.” (Money is a being of reason.) because money decides where it wants to be spent – he should have said – money is a being of will.  Ulrich, the logical mathematical hero of the novel seems to imply that the ‘ecstatic society’ Kakanien – Austro-Hungary in the last year of its belle époque 1913 - is at the most intermittently rational, whereas money is the guarantee of a continuous flow of ratio.  Money is always rational.  Money means “Großkapital”.  The ‘reason’ of money is also the model for the logic infusing Musil’s caricature of a scientific action-culture – quantitative, exact, barbaric– the “logical structure of the world” (Carnap).  Besides “Großkapital” – the types, which inhabit this world, are merchants, warriors, hunters and scientists.
The other half of the story – “world history” - is ‘love’ or passion.  “Denn die Weltgeschichte ist mindestens zur Hälfte eine Liebesgeschichte.” (motto of Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Hamburg, 1987, Band II)
Musil’s source for his observation “Money is a being of reason.” may have been Heraclitus – a fusion of two of his axioms: “Fire is gifted with reason.” [“Das Feuer ist vernunftbegabt.” In Heraklit Fragmente, München, 1986, B64a, p. 23] and “For fire exchange is everything and fire is for everything like money for gold and gold for money.” [“Für Feuer ist Gegentausch alles und Feuer für alles wie Geld für Gold und Gold für Geld.” op. cit., B90, p. 29]  By a simple substitution – fire is like money, money is thus gifted with reason.

This money though is not the money of the Schatzbildner (hoarder of treasure), who wishes to ‘rescue’ or extract it from the circulation sphere, it is money which follows money (which is to say capital, the ‘man of the crowd’), best rescued in exposing itself over and over to circulation.  Money follows money also means money imitates money in the pursuit of ever greater surpluses – even to its own perdition as in the case of a general crisis of finance, ‘credit crunch’ or more specific fraudulent schemes - the Ponzi scheme etc.  ‘Money makes the world go round’ deteriorates (disappears) into money chasing its own tail.

This moral certainty of the capitalist ectype translates into the cult of authenticity of the bourgeois subject – his supposed absolute identity with himself or ‘facticity’.  This authenticity, says Adorno, is a lie, a fiction of identity – or rather the true identity of the circulation sphere with itself.  As a type – the authenticity of the bourgeois subject – merely certifies (determines) its absolute replaceability or the ultimate fungibility of things, their quantifiability as epiphenomena of capital (fetish).

The ‘authenticity’ which Adorno rejects is an attribute of something which is in itself false – the bourgeois subject – the substrata of any ‘authenticity’, it is more than false, it is a ghost, says Adorno, following Schopenhauer.  For Adorno ‘inauthenticity’ is a way of rescuing the ‘human’ never in itself ‘original’ – always an imitation of other humans.  The ‘authentic’ is a cipher for the spectrality of the subject – or the “trotzige und verstockte Beharren auf der monadologischen Gestalt” [“defiant and stubborn insistence upon the monadological type (Gestalt)”, Theodor W. Adorno, “Goldprobe” in Minima Moralia, Frankfurt, 1980, p. 204]

Theatricality overturns the false life of Echtheit – authenticity.  Inauthenticity is a mimetic form – as in playing oneself (recalling Nietzsche) – the inauthenticity of the subject becomes true to the degree that his authenticity is revealed as a lie: “Die Gleichsetzung von Echtheit und Wahrheit ist nicht zu halten.”[“The equation of authenticity and truth is not sustainable.” Adorno, op. cit., p. 202].  

The inversion of Echte (authentic) and Unechte (inauthentic) leads Adorno to the conclusion – “Was nicht verdorren will, nimmt lieber das Stigma des Unechten auf sich.  Es zehrt von dem mimetischen Erbe.” [Whatever does not want to wither, accepts rather the stigma of the inauthentic.  It draws on the mimetic legacy.” Adorno, op. cit., p. 204]

But one cannot be sure if this is not a piece of counterfeit (spurious) advice – as Adorno calls this mimetic behavior the “Urform von Liebe” (Ur-form of love) in which the “priests of authenticity” scent “Spuren jener Utopie, welche das Gefüge der Herrschaft zu erschüttern vermöchte.” [“traces of that utopia, which could shake the structure of domination”, ibid.].  One can almost hear Adorno mocking Bloch as one of those ‘priests of authenticity’.  But is Nietzsche really one of them?     

Heidegger’s answer to the self-posed question, “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” - is that he is the teacher who has come to teach the overcoming of the spirit of revenge.  Revenge casts all objects as degraded objects.  This spirit of revenge (“persecution”) is supposed to have pervaded all thinking until this day – “(…) all representation to this day of beings with regard to their Being (…)” (Martin Heidegger, Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?, Review of Metaphysics, March 1967, p. 421)  Yet what is Heidegger’s or the onto-metaphysical appropriation of an aesthetic enigma in the vulgar attempt to demystify it – anything other than a revenge – Heidegger’s revenge on Nietzsche?  Considering Nietzsche’s self-stylizing of his philosophy as theatre (Schein) or the theatre of self-semblance, the antidote to Being – Heidegger’s requisitioning of Zarathustra for the moral improvement of ‘humanity’ is tantamount to the closing down of Nietzsche’s theatre.  “Meine Philosophie umgedrehter Platonismus: je weiter ab vom wahrhaft Seienden, um so reiner schöner besser ist es.  Das Leben im Schein als Ziel.” [“My philosophy (is) an inverted Platonism: the further away from true being, the more pure beautiful better it is.  Life in semblance is the goal.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe 7, Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzimo Montinari, München, 1988, Nachgelassene Fragmente Ende 1870 - April 1871, 7 [156], p. 199]
Still, Heidegger must admit at the end of his essay in the “Note on the Eternal Recurrence of the Same”, that he remains confounded by Nietzsche: “Nietzsche himself knew that his “most abysmal thought” remains an enigma.” (op. cit., p. 431)

There is no theatre without a revenge tragedy.  In this sense Tadeusz Kantor’s theatre of degraded objects, realities (such as the funfair) and actors is an exemplary theatre of revenge.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.  Spirit:Time

If the capitalist is the subject whose subjectivity is lost in capital – does that mean that the proletariat is the subject whose subjectivity can be found in capital?  Does Marx imply this symmetry – or are they both lost?

It would seem there is rather an asymmetry or even rupture in Marx’s theatre of capital.  The capitalist is the “character mask” of capital – but what mask does the proletariat represent?  Or – what does the proletariat personify in the sense that the capitalist personifies capital?  The proletariat qua proletariat seems to be so reduced, so much an appendage of the production process that he does not even have (need) a mask.  He does not personify labour – he is labour.  Or rather abstract labour.  Abstract labour is quantified labour – having no particular qualities besides being average social labour.  The measure of abstract labour is the time of its working.  Does the proletariat personify time – the particular time of the production process?  Does it acquire its potential universality – meaning beyond the regime of capital – from its intimate relation to time?  A time beyond capital?                                                                              

Although the capitalist is a personification of capital – in a sense possessed by capital, having ‘sacrificed’ his will and consciousness to its ‘eternal return’ – he is not conscious of such a sacrifice.  As the personification of capital he is not aware of himself as “pain and contradiction” (Nietzsche) – he regards himself in the glow of capital as ‘free and authentic’.  The eternity of capital imbues the capitalist ‘subject’ with a share of its own immortality.  As the character mask of capital the capitalist is pure pleasure (Lust) – and pleasure as Nietzsche writes in “Also sprach Zarathustra” seeks eternity.  But pleasure like will is semblance (Schein) and appearance.  Being, says Nietzsche, is only pain and contradiction – but we live in that other illusion or semblance – that of becoming – in every moment of which the “secret of pain” must lie dormant.  Semblance determines “empirical being” – although that is not “true being”- but there is no ‘way’ to this true being.

As the character mask of capital, the capitalist has no immanent relation to time, he is not constituted qua character mask by time in the way the proletariat is determined by time – the unitary socially average time of abstract labour.  The capitalist is ‘above’ time in the way capital is timeless, eternally metamorphosing in its repetitive fashion of self-valorisation and self- devalorisation (‘crisis’).  The proletariat is the embodiment of quantified unspecific labour time.  His ‘role’ in Capital is not ‘above’ time but ‘in’ time – he is of the order of finitude, hence ‘closer’ to being than the semblance of infinitude embodied in capital and its personified agent – the capitalist.  This being in time of the proletariat is another way of saying that the physical life and life in capital of the proletariat tend to ever closer identity.  The time for his physical reproduction is a quantifiable but varying fraction of the time he serves capital – the ‘remainder’ is gratis time in which value arises.  His life-time is a function of his formal quantified time for capital.  Hence, the capitalist feels ‘free’ and ‘authentic’ in his personification of the immortality of capital, its absolute semblance of eternal return or will (in Nietzsche’s sense).  The proletariat on the other hand feels inauthentic (closer to ‘true being’) and unfree as the ‘personification’ of abstract labour or his absolute identity (in terms of the absolute negativity of capital) with formal ‘empty’ time.  The proletariat is conscious of himself as finitude, as time, in his state of being the measure of the time of abstract labour.  “We are not measuring time, we are ourselves a measure of time.” (Shannee Marks, “Body of Grammar: Body of Pain” (Exhibition Writings from The Accident Colony Triptych, Austrian Cultural Forum London 2008) in Night Work Philosophy Interrupted, forthcoming)
For Marx abstract labour and the time of abstract labour as its measure fuse to near identity.  Time is also the mark of quantification – or ‘wound’, a kind of ignominy imprinted (branded) on the proletarian organism. He is nothing but time, nothing more or less than what he quantifies in his abstract labour.

Quoting a factory inspection report of 30th April 1860 in which the ‘open secret’ is acknowledged – “Moments are the elements of profit.” – Marx expressly describes the worker as “personifizierte Arbeitszeit” [“personified labour time”, Das Kapital, MEW 23, op. cit., pp. 257-258]  He refers not to Hegelian concepts but to the factory jargon of the time – the usual appellation for workers who worked full time was simply “full times”, children under 13 who were only allowed to work six hours were called “half times”: “Der Arbeiter ist hier nichts mehr als personifizierte Arbeitszeit.” [“The worker is nothing more here than personified labour-time.”, ibid.] 

The truism “time is money” refers to this obliquely in terms of circulation - the price paid by the capitalist in the circulation sphere for the purchase of time (the commodity labour-power) - the only commodity which yields more time than needed for its reproduction alias surplus value or money.  “When time money ist, so ist es vom Standpunkt des Kapitals aus nur die fremde Arbeitszeit, die allerdings im eigenlichsten Worte das money des Kapitals ist.” [“When time is money, then it is from the point of view of capital, only the strange (fremde) labour-time, which is in a literal sense the money of capital.”
Karl Marx, Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie, Europäische Verlagsanstalt Frankfurt, reprint of the Moscow edition of 1939 and 1941,
p. 528]

Average social labour-time and abstract labour collapse into one.  Here Marx follows Hegel’s determination of time as presented in the second volume of his Enzyklopädie:
“Weil die Dinge endlich sind, darum sind sie in der Zeit; nicht weil sie in der Zeit sind, darum gehen sie unter, sondern die Dinge selbst sind das zeitliche; so zu sein ist ihre objektive Bestimmung.” [“Because things are finite, therefore they are in time; not because they are in time, do they decline, rather things are themselves the temporal, to be like that is their objective determination.” G.W.F. Hegel, Werke in zwanzig Bänden 9, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften II, “Die Naturphilosophie” Frankfurt, 1978, p. 50]

Hegel refers to time as “die totale Negativität” [“total negativity” (op. cit., p. 55)].  Time passes into space and space into time as “the point”.  The concrete point is “the place” – unity of here and now (space and time).  Spirit is also a category of negativity – Hegel attributes to it the title of “absolute negativity”.  One can see a kinship between two ‘competing’ categories of negativity – time as total negativity ‘haunts’ spirit as absolute negativity.  Transposed to a Hegelian Marx perspective – one could regard these contradictory negativities as the site of an incongruous rupture between capital as spirit and the proletariat as abstract labour/average time.  Is that perhaps the contradiction intended by Nietzsche when he writes: “Wahrhaft seiend ist nur der Schmerz und der Widerspruch.” [“Truly existent is only pain and contradiction.” op. cit., p. 204]  There is perhaps no way to this “true being” – but the site of rupture indicates such an ‘abyss’ where the transfigured ‘pain’ of average time embodied in the proletariat (“the broken Ur-pain” – Nietzsche, ibid. p. 205) contradicts absolute semblance or “pleasure” (“the complete Ur-pleasure”, ibid.) embodied in what Nietzsche calls will, Hegel – spirit, Marx - capital.  Although for Hegel spirit (Geist) incorporates (is) both contradiction and pain even evil – its dividedness (Entzweiung) belongs to the nature of spirit.  Geist is constituted as a contradictory unity or identity of itself and not itself - necessarily exiting from itself into its negative, its other, implying pain and contradiction to return to itself as the idea – to become upon its return the idea returning to itself.
(see G.W.F. Hegel Werke in zwanzig Bänden 10, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, III, “Die Philosophie des Geistes”, Frankfurt, 1976, pp. 25-27)  Since Marx and to a certain extent Nietzsche are materialist thinkers – contradictory entities although mutually determinant remain painfully separate.

Following Nietzsche, the absolute negativity of spirit itself can also be translated into notions of time – it is the timelessness of total pleasure in eternal contradiction with the finite time of broken pain. The rupture between infinite capital and finite proletariat rives Marx’s oeuvre itself.  The early Marx saw the world primarily through the living being of the worker, the sensuous qualities of labour attesting to the specifically human in its species-being (Gattungswesen) and its capacity for suffering, hence under capital in a state of abject harm and alienation – the later Marx was obsessed by the demonic so-called esoteric abstraction capital, the baroque apotheosis of political economy.  This baroque tyrant endlessly contemplating itself – showing itself to itself in a broken mirror, its quasi-spirit, casting all its ‘exoteric’ parts in its own image.  The proletariat became a figment of the baroque ‘allegory’ of capital – and the bridge to the living being of labour was more or less interrupted – or at least so it would seem to some interpreters (like Moishe Postone) of Marx’s “mature” work.  Yet at the end of the chapter on the transformation of money into capital Marx conjures up a grotesque scene occurring after the buyer and seller of the commodity labour power leave the simple sphere of circulation “the veritable Eden of innate human rights” – and the “physiognomy of our dramatis personae” goes through decisive changes.  The antinomy of pain and pleasure implicit in the opposing personifications (‘masks’) of capital and abstract labour becomes physically visible.   “Der ehemalige Geldbesitzer schreitet voran als Kapitalist, der Arbeitskraftbesitzer folgt ihm nach als sein Arbeiter; der eine bedeutungsvoll schmunzelnd und geschäftseifrig, der andre scheu, widerstrebsam, wie jemand, der seine eigne Haut zu Markt getragen und nun nichts andres zu erwarten hat als die – Gerberei.” (Marx, Das Kapital, MEW 23, op. cit., p. 191) 
[“He, who before was the money-owner, now strides forward as capitalist; the possessor of labour-power follows as his labourer.  The one with an air of importance, smirking, intent on business; the other timid and holding back, like one who is bringing his own hide to market and has nothing to expect but—a hiding.”, Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I, translated from the third German edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, edited by Frederick Engels, New York, 1967, p. 176] 

Average labour-time though as a quasi-epithet of the proletariat is not directly (immediately) the biological temporality of the individual ‘Dasein’ who is a worker. 
The labour-time of the social body is infinite – it is the time of the species.  Not the individual lifetime is the measure of value (nor the reproduction of said lifetime) – but the total average lifetime of the species insofar as it is available as average social labour for capital.  The social body now and to come but also the past in the form of ‘dead labour’ is the infinitude of finite beings to be set against the infinitude of the accumulation of capital.  The singular member of this infinite set of finite beings is precisely not conscious of his own death in the mass of the species-time.  There is no being-towards-death of the species.  The species does not die, cannot die – not as long as it is needed by capital.
The temporal unit, which Marx emphasizes, is not the lifetime of (generic) abstract labour (the worker as ‘personified time’) – it is the working day.   Each day, the worker must be able to replenish his expended energy – muscles, brain, nerves etc – to be able to go on the following day.  His time is not the time-toward-death – he has little opportunity to be concerned with that – it is the time towards tomorrow and all the other tomorrows.  It is a time of self-preservation but not for self – for capital.  The ‘self’ of abstract labour, or embodied abstract labour is not really self – only the armature or phantom of a self.  How can one know (recognize) one’s ‘own’ time when it is merely devolved into the social average – in other words a statistic, a number?  The average social time is the ‘substance’, the essence – the lifetime of the individual is appearance, contingency, accident.

The time of production or average social time – the socially average labour time – implies at least two kinds of quantitative reduction of ‘human’ time.  Marx emphasizes that abstract labour is measured and has its magnitude in the time of simple labour – devoid of any particular qualities - for instance labour skills.  This is the invention of capitalism as the social totality.  In addition, being exchange value, the commodities are made equivalent to one another especially in their all being expressed in terms of the general equivalent money (‘the great leveller’), hence the labour time expended in their production must also be quantitatively equivalent. 
   
The aim for capital – is that the time abstract labour spends in production earning the means of subsistence should itself diminish – leading to more and more ‘disposable’ time for capital.  Disposable time (‘time regained’) is itself reified – it becomes a commodity, in its turn raw material (use value) for “varied new products which impose themselves on the market as uses of socially organized time.” (Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, Detroit, 1983, p. 151)  What else are ‘social media’ than reified time, what Debord calls “spectacular time” – “the time of consumption of images (…) and the image of the consumption of time” (Debord, op. cit., p. 153)?

Some of this time may even appear as leisure or holiday time for the worker – but as Guy Debord notes – in the society of the spectacle – all time in and out of the working day is subsumed under capital, becoming “pseudo-cyclical time”: “Pseudo-cyclical time leans on the natural remains of cyclical time and also uses it to compose new homologous combinations: day and night, work and weekly rest, the recurrence of vacations.” (Debord, op. cit., p. 150)  But this pseudo-cycle of the spectacular is only possible because the initial violent wrenching of the proletariat-to-be from his pre-capitalist setting creating ‘free’ producers – was the “violent expropriation of their own time”. (Debord, op. cit., p. 159 - italics in the original)  The time of abstract labour is also a degraded time and essentially static.
 
 
 
 
 
 

5.  What is Capital besides Capital? (or Postone ‘de-forms’ Marx)

Capital is the present owner  (whereby present=eternity) of all time – past, present, future – but itself has no time, is not time.  History begins with the loss of innocence – but not second innocence, the timeless time of capital.
As another second innocence, the work of art has a tenuous precarious correspondence with the semblance (Schein) capital.  Loss of innocence is always also the loss of time – that to which the work of art strives to return, to regain it.  The work of art is the imaginary place where the lost is found (although the finding is not imaginary) – the work is always past – dead labour (die tote Arbeit) just as capital is also ‘congealed dead labour’.  (Adorno saw Mahler’s music as one of “absolute lostness”, but in which like in Proust’s À la Recherche du Temps Perdu lost time files past again in a ghost parade.)  The dead work mourns itself and that which has been lost, but is at the same time necrophilia – hence the potential of baroque contagion in every work of art.  The baroque is a cult of the exquisite corpse (the crucified body for example) – a reverse vanitas, the side of life is more horrific than the side of death.  The baroque corpse (the dead work of art) keeps its secret like nature.  But does that mean the secret is objectified in the work of art, in nature?  In capital?  Or is the objectified secret already (in) second nature?  But how does one know if the secret is kept or not – if love and death have the power to strip away the veil of semblance, as Benjamin writes in his essay on “Die Wahlverwandschaften”, are they not nature?  Nature betraying its secret to itself?  Second innocence like second nature as in the work of art (der schöne Schein) does not aspire to the fullness of being (seinshaltig).  It claims for itself the fullness of not-being.  In this sense, Nietzsche as the philosopher of semblance and the destruction of semblance, is also a Gesamt-antidote to Heidegger.  Nietzsche’s point of departure is tragedy, theatre – the world as a work of art.
“Unser Schmerz ist ein vorgestellter:  unsre Vorstellung bleibt immer bei der Vorstellung hängen.  Unser Leben ist ein vorgestelltes Leben.  Wir kommen keinen Schritt weiter.  Freiheit des Willens, jede Aktivität ist nur Vorstellung.  Also auch das Schaffen des Genius Vorstellung.  Diese Spiegelungen im Genius sind Spiegelungen der Erscheinung, nicht mehr des Ureinen: als Abbilder des Abbildes sind es die reinsten Ruhemomente des Seins.  Das wahrhaft Nichtseiende – das Kunstwerk.(…)Das Sein befriedigt sich im vollkommenen Schein.”
[“Our pain is an imagined (one):  our imagination always gets caught in the imagination.  Our life is an imagined life.  We are not moving a step forward.  Freedom of the will, every activity is only imagination.  So also the working of genius is imagination.  These reflections in genius are reflections of appearance, no longer the ur-one: as images (copies) of the image (copy) they are being’s purest moments of rest.  The true not-being – the work of art (…) Being contents itself in perfect semblance.” (Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe 7, Herausgegeben von Giorgio Colli und Mazzimo Montinari, München, 1988, Nachgelassene Fragmente Ende 1870 - April 1871, 7 [157], p. 200 – emphasis in the original.
Note: Besides imagination Vorstellung means idea or representation.)]

The destructive impulse of Nietzsche’s philosophy of semblance is directly opposed to Heidegger’s ‘Destruktion’.  Nietzsche dissolves being in semblance – Sein in Schein – in the work of art.  There is no ground towards which ‘life’ is moving.  “We are not moving a step forward.”  We only heap copies upon copies.  We are not looking for an “Ur-One”.  The “copies of copies”, the forest of simulacra, are being’s moments of rest – but being (Sein) cannot exist without semblance (Schein).

So what is capital?  Capital is pure quantity, but cannot itself be quantified.  “(Das Kapital ist nicht einfache Quantität, noch einfache Operation: sondern beides zugleich.)” [“(Capital is not simple quantity, nor simple operation: but both at once.)” (Karl Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 519)]  Capital like semblance (Schein) as a category of aesthetics (in the sense of transcendental semblance) exemplified in the work of art is not opposed to an essence (Wesen) – but it is a self-sufficient semblance for us.  Like Benjamin’s “schöner Schein”, which he found absolutely formed in Goethe’s tragic figure of Ottilie – capital as semblance encompasses in its appearance its own decay.  Its decay is not its ‘essence’ – it is integral to its semblance.  But as semblance or semblance of decay – this decay in itself has no age, its decay is always new and always old.  All its self-negating properties such as the eternal return of valorisation and decapitalisation (‘crisis’) are included within its semblance or ‘totality’.  Capital thus is without history.  As a value-form, capital performing as semblance has its origins in another more elementary semblance – in money.  It cannot be deduced as an aesthetic category (as it appears for us) from the material ‘natural’ substrata of production – but is itself an advanced formation of the mercantile economy of money.  “Welthandel und Weltmarkt eröffnen im 16. Jahrhundert die moderne Lebensgeschichte des Kapitals.  Sehen wir ab vom stofflichen Inhalt der Warenzirkulation, vom Austausch der verschiednen Gebrauchswerte, und betrachten wir nur die ökonomischen Formen, die dieser Prozeß erzeugt, so finden wir als sein letztes Produkt das Geld.  Dies letzte Produkt der Warenzirkulation ist die erste Erscheinungsform des Kapitals.(…)Jedoch bedarf es nicht des Rückblicks auf die Entstehungsgeschichte des Kapitals, um das Geld als seine erste Erscheinungsform zu erkennen.  Dieselbe Geschichte spielt täglich vor unsren Augen.”
[“World commerce and world market open the modern life history of capital in the 16th century.  If we disregard the material content of the commodity circulation, the exchange of different use-values, and consider only the economic forms, which this process produces, we find its last product to be money.  This last product of the commodity circulation is capital’s first form of appearance.(…) However, we have no need to look back to the history of the genesis of capital to recognize money as its first form of appearance.  The same history plays daily before our very eyes.” (Karl Marx, Das Kapital, MEW 23, op. cit., p. 161)]

Capital is ahistorical in the sense that each day it repeats its own history – its birth out of the head of money.     

Yet capital has its own ‘internal’ temporal side – mostly neglected in discussions of its spiritual nature – this temporal side though is not value-creating but rather the limit of value, negative and sterile.  It is the time of circulation which determines the speed of turnover and accumulation, in other words the realisation of value.  This time itself must be deducted from any value realised in the actual circulation process.  “Die Zirkulationszeit kommt nur in Betracht in ihrem Verhältnis – als Schranke, Negation – der Produktionszeit des Kapitals; diese Produktionszeit ist aber die Zeit, während welcher es sich fremde Arbeit aneignet; die durch es gesetzte fremde Arbeitszeit.”
[“The circulation-time is considered only in its relation – as a barrier, negation – of the production-time of capital; this production-time is however the time, during which capital appropriates strange (fremde) labour; the strange (fremde) labour-time it has installed.” (Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 528)]

But as there would be no value if the product would remain in the warehouses, all labour which is part of “bringing the commodity to the market” belongs to the production process and adds value.  The product is only a commodity when it has entered circulation.  These two different times – the circulation time of capital, the periodicity of its turnover measured in a year and the “natural work day” as the measure of labour-time – together comprise what bourgeois political economy ambiguously calls the “labour time” of “working capital”.  The mystification, says Marx, which ensues, “liegt in der Natur des Kapitals.” [“lies in the nature of capital” (Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit., p. 534)]    

Some of this mystificatory “nature of capital” seems to swirl about Moishe Postone’s exegesis of Marx – a certain immanent ‘undecideability’ regarding the nature of capital permeates his text “Time, Labor and Social Domination”.  He seems to rediscover some of the illusions of the political economy which Marx sought to dismantle – as if they were new truths – falling into the traps of Marx’s dialectical presentation.  For instance – in his zeal to unseat the proletariat as the “subject-object of history”, a view he denounces in “traditional Marxism”, Postone contends instead that Marx’s category of capital has all the attributes of Hegel’s ‘spirit’.  Instead of the proletariat Capital is the epochal hero of Marx’s epochal oeuvre – and the “subject-object of history”.

As the name of Marx’s work is Capital and not Labour, it is not surprising that it would be seen as the overriding subject of its own production process.  For Marx though capital is a very strange sort of subject – as he writes in the Grundrisse – capital is at all times in its process of valorisation the negation of itself as the overall subject of the movement, which Marx most frequently calls circulation.  “Das Kapital aber ist als Subjekt der Zirkulation; die Zirkulation als sein eigner Lebenslauf gesetzt.  (…) Das Kapital ist daher in jeder besondren Phase die Negation seiner als des Subjekts der verschiednen Wandlungen.”
[“Capital is as the subject of circulation; presented in circulation with its own life cycle. (…) Capital is thus in each special phase (of circulation sm) the negation of itself as the subject of the various transformations.”
(Marx, Grundrisse, op. cit. p. 514)]

Oddly, the complete ‘life’ of capital, so exhaustively charted by Marx, as it moves in and out of the circulation sphere and production process is missing in Postone’s presentation.  Despite his bias towards capital as the primum movens of history – he concentrates like those authors he criticizes almost exclusively on labour and the sphere of immediate production.  

Postone is not content with anointing capital as subject of its so-called self-valorisation process - he designates capital as the subject of history, as secular ‘spirit’, claiming that this is how Marx intended his critique be understood.  Implicit in Postone’s inference is the notion that the repetitive cycle of capital valorisation and devalorisation, what Marx calls its lifeline (Lebenslauf) – its own reproduction and self-destruction process – is identical with historical process or historical time as such. 

Postone cites a crucial well-known passage from the first volume of Capital where Marx analyses the “general formula of capital” as proof of his contention:
“At this point in his exposition, Marx describes his concept of capital in terms that clearly relate it to Hegel’s concept of Geist:
It [value] is constantly changing from one form into the other without becoming lost in this movement; it thus transforms itself into an automatic subject ….In truth, however, value is here the subject of a process in which, while constantly assuming the form in turn of money and of commmodities, it changes its own magnitude,…and thus valorizes itelf….For the movement in the course of which it adds surplus-value is its own movement, its valorization is therefore self-valorization….[V]alue suddenly presents itself as a self-moving substance which passes through a process of its own, and for which the commodity and money are both mere forms.
Marx, then, explicitly characterizes capital as the self-moving substance which is Subject.  In so doing, Marx suggests that a historical Subject in the Hegelian sense does indeed exist in capitalism, yet he does not identify it with any social grouping, such as the proletariat, or with humanity.  Rather, Marx analyzes it in terms of the structure of social relations constituted by forms of objectifying practice and grasped by the category of capital (and, hence, value). (…) they possess the attributes that Hegel accorded the Geist.  It is in this sense, then, that a historical Subject as conceived by Hegel exists in capitalism.” (Moishe Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination, Cambridge, 2003, p. 75)

But is this the Subject as conceived by Marx?  Why would Marx consider capital the subject of history when he develops its forms so as to show that in its operation it is ahistorical – repeating its own history over and over again every day?  Irreversible history – the Doppelgänger of the eternal present of the life cycle of Capital – is itself a semblance (result) of a universal quantified time of capitalist production or “circulating capital” in the wide sense.  The seeming paradox of at least two different unitary times of capital would disappear if circulation were not the historical-ontological ground of Capital from which it goes out and to which it returns.  The two times: the cyclical unitary time (revolutions) of Capital in its complete repetitive cycle of being always what it is not at any particular moment - unifies within itself as its ‘necessary illusion’ – the irreversible time of universal world history. 

This ‘universal history’ though is not really history at all but as noted by Guy Debord, it is “(…) still only the refusal within history of history itself.”  
“145  With the development of capitalism, irreversible time is unified on a world scale.  Universal history becomes a reality because the entire world is gathered under the development of this time.  But this history, which is everywhere simultaneously the same, is still only the refusal within history of history itself.  What appears the world over as the same day is the time of economic production cut up into equal abstract fragments.  Unified irreversible time is the time of the world market and, as a corollary, of the world spectacle.” (Guy Debord, Society of the Spectacle, Black & Red, Detroit, 1983)

Irreversible history haunts the cyclical “life-act”(Lebensakt) of Capital as its other ‘present’, its ‘spectacle’.

The theme of ‘being of haunting’ – the ‘present’ is the unchanging eternal cycle of capital whereby present has no meaning.  If there is only present then present disappears.  History is the shadow of that eternal non-present present.  History which seems to be the most concrete of all is relegated to a negligible vaporous trail of the quasi-biological yet undying organism (organic cycle) of capital.
(Whatever does not belong to any temporal determination – is transcendental, because it seizes possession of all times.  Such as sin (Kierkegaard), decay (entropy), or the accident? Is it possible to raise the temporal itself to the power of the transcendental? To transcendentalize time?)

Capital transforms itself in the circular movement of its circulating self in its various phases of money, commodity, production process, more money, in the market, in the circulation, as rent or interest bearing capital, as credit or finance – at any specific moment always that which it is not as the subject of the whole.  If it were to be what it is, it would cease to be in its own endless process of valorisation meaning it would cease to be at all.  Hence it is temporal only in a formal sense –it can never be historical. 

In all the unitary time of capital there is not one atom of history.  Neither can one find, as Postone claims, an “immanent logic of history” in its “alienated form of social relations”. (Moishe Postone, Time, Labor and Social Domination, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 270)  In another passage Postone seems to retreat from this claim – citing “Marx’s analysis” whereby “the capital form of social relations (…)is blind, processual, and quasi-organic.” (ibid.)  Capital then is a form of ‘second nature’ – the quasi-organic – as such it cannot constitute an “immanent logic of history” – rather it is itself posited by history, not in itself historical or susceptible to self-transformation in reaction to ‘events’.  It is a parasite of events and as such absolute semblance.  When Marx refers to history in relation to capital he speaks of a “natural historical process” – a movement of the natural world for which he has discovered the general forms. 
But Postone will again attempt to rescue the historical dynamic of capital, its so-called immanent historical logic – which he seems so eager to establish.  Despite its ‘blindness’ capital is at the same time, value – somehow the more noble part of capital for Postone – and value “(…)is, as we shall see, a category of efficiency, rationalization, and ongoing transformation.  Value is a category of a directionally dynamic totality.” (Postone, op. cit., p. 272)

Marx defines value in the first chapter of Das Kapital as having as its ‘substance’ abstract human labour, whose measure in turn is the time of labour.  Abstract human labour represents a multiple complex process of reduction and quantification of human activity.  Abstract labour is first of all the most ‘simple’ form of labour or labour in its simple form – this is of course an ideal of simplification.  Marx suggests other ways of determining this simplification – it is also an average – but not just any average, it is average social labour determined by the average productivity at any given time in the social body alias capitalist society.  Marx does not describe the exact way such a social average is constructed – not in this chapter – its operation is merely assumed.  The social average is an indefinite unknown means of quantifying labour, which together with the apparent ‘visible’ abstraction of the measure of time determine the value produced by abstract human labour.  This labour thus is not the least qualified nor is it the most qualified – it is an average. (The process of proletarisation described by Marx as “original accumulation” was in most cases a degrading of the skills of labourers – the transfer of these skills to the more efficient machine for the purpose of cheaper production of larger quantities of commodities – irregardless of their quality.)  Average social time, the composite of these various processes of reduction or laying bare of labour, is not pure quantity although it is a measure of standardisation.  Value is measured by the simple duration of labour-time required for its production as a function of the standard amount of time needed for this act in a given society according to its average level of productivity.  This standard of average social labour is a hybrid of cultural, social and technological parameters – itself a model of reified time.    
Any system based on an average level of productivity, as is the case in capitalism, can hardly be said to be a “directionally dynamic totality” – as Postone argues.  On the contrary, one of the peculiar inner contradictions of capitalism – is its persistent aim to rest at a plateau – the average – to move from unrest to rest – approximating more what Benjamin refers to as a “Dialektik des Stillstands” (dialectic of stagnation) than a dynamic tendency.

Physicists studying cities and corporations have recently confirmed the same tendency of stagnation despite ‘dynamic’ appearances– from a statistical mathematical perspective.  Corporations are feeble – this is capital – they have a longevity of about 40-50 years.  Cities are indestructible – this is history – the terrain of the ‘multitude’.  Cities are a more likely subject of history.  Citing the work of Bettencourt and West, Jonah Lehrer writes in the New York Times of 17th December 2010: 
“At first glance, cities and companies look very similar. They’re both large agglomerations of people, interacting in a well-defined physical space. They contain infrastructure and human capital; the mayor is like a C.E.O.  But it turns out that cities and companies differ in a very fundamental regard: cities almost never die, while companies are extremely ephemeral. As West notes, Hurricane Katrina couldn’t wipe out New Orleans, and a nuclear bomb did not erase Hiroshima from the map. In contrast, where are Pan Am and Enron today? The modern corporation has an average life span of 40 to 50 years.
This raises the obvious question: Why are corporations so fleeting? After buying data on more than 23,000 publicly traded companies, Bettencourt and West discovered that corporate productivity, unlike urban productivity, was entirely sublinear. As the number of employees grows, the amount of profit per employee shrinks. West gets giddy when he shows me the linear regression charts. “Look at this bloody plot,” he says. “It’s ridiculous how well the points line up.” The graph reflects the bleak reality of corporate growth, in which efficiencies of scale are almost always outweighed by the burdens of bureaucracy. “When a company starts out, it’s all about the new idea,” West says. “And then, if the company gets lucky, the idea takes off. Everybody is happy and rich. But then management starts worrying about the bottom line, and so all these people are hired to keep track of the paper clips. This is the beginning of the end.”
The danger, West says, is that the inevitable decline in profit per employee makes large companies increasingly vulnerable to market volatility. Since the company now has to support an expensive staff — overhead costs increase with size — even a minor disturbance can lead to significant losses. As West puts it, “Companies are killed by their need to keep on getting bigger.” ”   (Jonah Lehrer, A Physicist Solves the City, New York Times, December 17, 2010, online)

It seems the physicist’s findings are a mathematical echo of Marx’s discussion in Volume 3 of Capital of the tendency of the rate of profit to fall (“As the number of employees grows, the amount of profit per employee shrinks.”) as always accompanied by the irresistible self-destructive need of capital to concentrate in ever-greater conglomerations (“ “Companies are killed by their need to keep on getting bigger.” ”). Odd that West presents his findings as if no one had ever discovered these ‘laws’ of capital before.

These looming elements of the ineluctable and recurring crisis of capital – the tendency of the rate of profit to fall and capital’s fatal drive towards unlimited concentration - both utter counter-movements to any dynamic of rational efficiency – are dismissed by Postone as “surface phenomena” of capital. (see “Time, Labor, and Social Domination, op. cit., page 311 note 15)  Postone’s “theory of capital” ‘de-forms’ Marx’s critique of political economy in the attempt to free capital of any blemish which could spoil his interpretation of capital as the apex of history or perfect ‘spirit’ – akin to Hegel’s Geist.
 
 
 
 
 
 

6.  The Subject as Double Substance

Although dismissive of the so-called “surface phenomena” of capital as accidental or insignificant for the analysis of its nature – Postone presents another such “surface phenomenon” – capital as an “automatic subject” (see passage cited above) as the proof, that Marx saw capital as the subject of history, as Geist.  Recalling his presentation of the “general formula of capital”, Marx reveals at the end of the next chapter entitled “The Contradictions in the General Formula of Capital” that this general formula is merely that which is visible in the sphere of circulation. Marx comes to the temporary seemingly paradoxical conclusion that because a capitalist in the long run exchanges equivalents – capital cannot originate in the circulation sphere, but neither can it not not originate in circulation.  “It is (…) impossible for capital to be produced by circulation, and it is equally impossible for it to originate apart from circulation.  It must have its origin both in circulation and yet not in circulation.” (Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I, translated from the third German edition by Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling, edited by Frederick Engels, New York, 1967, pp. 165-6)

He concludes the following chapter on the “The Buying and Selling of Labour-Power”” almost in symmetry to the ending of the chapter on the “general formula”, so as to warn the reader – what he has seen in the preceding chapters is how capital appears to expand itself spontaneously – but is not how this expansion alias surplus value really arises.  The new element he has introduced by the end of the sixth chapter – is that unique commodity which has the power within itself to create value – the commodity of labour power.  So if at the end of the chapter 4 in which Postone’s “automatic subject” holds sway Marx writes:
“Value therefore now becomes value in process, money in process, and, as such, capital.  It comes out of circulation, enters into it again, preserves and multiplies itself within its circuit, comes back out of it with expanded bulk, and begins the same round ever afresh.  M-M’, money which begets money, such is the description of Capital from the mouths of its first interpreters, the Mercantilists.(…)M-C-M’ is therefore in reality the general formula of capital as it appears prima facie within the sphere of circulation.” (Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I, op. cit., pp. 154-155)

At the conclusion of chapter 6 Marx dispels this appearance – showing it to be at the very least incomplete:  “Accompanied by Mr. Moneybags and by the possessor of labour-power, we therefore take leave for a time of this noisy sphere, where everything takes place on the surface and in view of all men, and follow them both into the hidden abode of production, (…)Here we shall see, not only how capital produces, but how capital is produced.  We shall at last force the secret of profit making.” (Karl Marx, Capital Vol. I, op. cit., p. 176)

Marx, the dramatist of capital, is constantly alternating in his presentation between the action on stage and how it appears to the audience (who are also the actors) and that other view from behind and below.  On stage the capital spectacle is an automaton – a beloved entertainment in Victorian times – “self-processing value”, “automatic subject”, “self-moving substance”, all the forms of the “general formula of capital M-C-M’ ”.  This is a formula inherited from older forms of capital – usurer, merchant capital – grasped as a system in mercantilism.  Appropriately, mercantilism was also a system of state economy.  The illusion that money directs itself under the tutelage of the state lives on in all forms of monetarism.  But Marx was not an early monetarist, assuming that money and money supply exist in a solipsistic ‘other’ economic cosmos apart from production – as Postone sometimes would like to suggest. 

(An inchoate ghostly mercantilist-monetarism haunts Postone’s occasional futurist utterances about capitalism – in such a future the market would be abolished, not the capitalist mode of producing ‘value’.  The market would be replaced by an ‘administration’ (of what?), “another mode of coordination and generalization” and the “law of value could also be mediated politically.” (Postone, op. cit, p. 291).  This sounds suspiciously like some sort of corporatism operating outside of the world market, usually associated with the fascist phase of capitalism – is this the New Chicago School?) 

Marx, though, in demonstrating how money is transformed into capital, has only set up the scene on stage to unravel it in the following chapters.  The capitalist does not just buy cheap and sell dear – he buys and sells at the value of commodities.  Marx exposes though the other indispensable commodity which capital procures in the circulation sphere – the commodity of labour power.  This commodity must be consumed by capital in the production process so that capital can re-emerge and expand itself in the circulation sphere.

So in a Hegelian sense capital flows out of itself into its negation – labour-power metamorphosed in the production sphere into abstract labour which creates value – to return to the circulation sphere where this value must be realised as M’ or capital.  But Postone further twists Marx and his inheriting of Hegelian dialectical forms.  For Postone Hegel is the source for Marx’s so-called discovery of capital as the “subject-object of history” which Postone paraphrases quite literally: “For Hegel, then, the Geist is simultaneously subjective and objective – it is the identical subject-object, the “substance” that is at the same time “Subject”(…)” (Postone, op. cit., p. 72)
But Hegel’s substance is precisely itself and not itself – “Geist and not Geist” (Adorno, Negative Dialektik, op. cit., p. 199) – and as such dialectical.  Without the “work of the negative” the substance, even if the substance were “the life of God” would be empty, bland and lifeless writes Hegel.  Adorno also criticizes Hegel for “blowing up” Geist into the “Whole” – whereas the “differentia specifica” of Geist is that it is a Subject, “subjectivistic”: “Geist, der Totalität sein soll, ist ein Nonsens (…)” [“Spirit meant to be totality is nonsense (…) ibid.] comparing this thinking to the logic of totalitarian singular parties of the 20th century.
 
Postone revives a vulgar “identity-philosophy”, denuded of the negativity inherent in both Hegel and Marx.  Waxing lyrical, he turns Marx’s critique of capital into a positive concept of pure affirmation – Capital as Geist, Subject and “homogeneous totality” (see Postone, op. cit. pp. 78-79), whereby especially for Hegel Geist is inherently contradictory and divided (entzweit) – in other words negativity. 
Marx was able to recognize the dialectic of capital and its negation abstract labour as a double subject or a hybrid substance through the forms of Hegel’s Logic and Phenomenology (e.g. Herr-Knecht, master-slave).  This negativity of substance with itself is reciprocal – capital being also the negation of abstract labour.

Contrary to Postone’s claim, that the “mature Marx” of Das Kapital had abandoned his critique of Hegel’s dialectic as an inverted mystified one which had to be turned upside down to discover its “rational core” in the “mystical cover” – Marx reiterates, in an approving response to a Russian reviewer of the Russian translation of Das Kapital, precisely this view in his Afterword to the second German edition of Das Kapital Volume I (London 1873).  But in its “rational form” Hegel’s dialectic disquiets the bourgeoisie, because its movement leaves nothing fixed, in its positive grasp of what exists it always includes the negation of what exists implying a “necessary demise” of capitalist social formations – all the more realistic, according to Marx, given the cyclical nature of capital and its always imminent “general crisis”.  The essence of Hegel’s dialectic is “critical and revolutionary” (Marx).  One wonders why Postone is at such pains to prove Marx has ‘recanted’ his revolutionary ‘demystification’ of Hegel’s dialectic. (see Postone, op. cit., p. 75)

Yet, Postone seems to stumble himself over this ‘duplicity’ of substance in Marx’s Capital – when he remarks in the vicinity of his claim that capital is the identical subject-object of history, that Marx refers both to abstract labour and capital as substance: “(…)at the beginning of Capital he (Marx) himself makes use of the category of “substance”.  He refers to value as having a “substance”, which he identifies as abstract human labour.” (ibid.)  A few sentences later Postone switches to capital as substance – but now immediately also Subject and Geist.  He is unable to show how both capital and abstract labour compose what Hegel designates, in the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, as “The living substance (…) which is only insofar as it is the movement of positing itself, or the mediation of the process of becoming different (emphasis sm) from itself with itself.” (Hegel, Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit quoted in Postone, op. cit., p. 72)  Hegel continues to emphasize that this “living substance” far from being identical with itself – is as “Subject, pure simple negativity, precisely so the splitting of the simple; or the opposing doubling, which is again the negation of this indifferent diversity and is its opposite:” [“Sie (die lebendige Substanz) ist als Subjekt die reine einfache Negativität, eben dadurch die Entzweiung des Einfachen; oder die entgegensetzende Verdopplung, welche wieder die Negation dieser gleichgültigen Verschiedenheit und ihres Gegensatzes ist:”, G.W.F. Hegel, Vorrede, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Werke in zwanzig Bänden 3, Frankfurt, 1976, p. 23)]

As Marx writes – capital is produced in circulation and not in circulation.  It is precisely due to this splitting or doubling of capital and abstract labour as the source of value, realised in the circulation of capital, that makes it impossible to grasp capital as an identity of any kind – neither of itself with itself (Postone) nor of itself with itself and not-itself – abstract labour.  When wealth (stofflicher Reichtum) as in quantities of goods (use-value) does not enter into the circulation sphere – due to forced inactivity, contraction – as in the crisis of overproduction or in a crisis of finance (like in the present – all those abandoned unfinished ghost estates in Ireland) – although these goods have been produced in the capitalist production process through the agency of abstract labour they will still have nil value – or less, as negative value, loss or debt.  The production process – so emphasized by Postone – is the site of the potential valorisation of capital – but it is also the site of the consumption of commodities, variable capital (labour-power) and constant capital (machinery, raw materials, etc)  Without the transfer of commodities produced in the production process to the circulation sphere – where they are converted into money again, they remain mere material wealth.  Hence money is not less original in the production of capital than abstract labour.  Abstract labour may be the source of value – money is the form of the realisation of value and surplus value, in other words capital.  Ricardo emphasized labour as the source of value – but Sismondi showed how value is always in danger of disappearing in the crisis, devalorising.  If Marx would truly think as Postone suggests – he would have fallen behind the level of insight of a Sismondi.

Postone most peculiarly excises the market and property relations from the process of production of capital.  He quarantines abstract labour in the production sphere, where it supposedly creates value without the intrusion of money in this process.  In this purified world of capital – class struggle and exploitation melt away like “les neiges d’antan”.
“Note that the market-mediated mode of circulation is not an essential moment of this dynamic. (…) If the market mode of circulation does play a role in this dynamic, it is as a subordinate moment (…) To focus exclusively on the mode of circulation is to deflect attention away from important implications of the commodity form for the trajectory of capitalist development in Marx’s critical theory.” (Postone, op. cit., p. 291)

The commodity form only exists in circulation.  What else is the commodity form other than the receptacle of dead congealed labour, stripped of its qualities, like Duchamp’s Bride Stripped Bare by her Bachelors, in which form it circulates (as money or commodity) in the circulation sphere – just as abstract labour is the quantitative form of living labour engaged in the production process of said commodity form?
Circulation without the commodity is empty.  The commodity without circulation has no value.  In an absurd way, Postone’s ‘theory of capital’ misses above all capital.