Showing posts with label Jean-Luc Nancy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Jean-Luc Nancy. Show all posts

Friday, 10 September 2010

Undoing Clinamen (Of Community)

 
An Idea has no sex and no face.

1.  Dasein-Gravity

Why Facebook – why not Armbook or Teethbook?  The implication is that through the face one becomes recognisable – yet the first question is “not the x you were looking for?” or “Wrong x? Search for others”.  So recognising can also mean recognising as ‘not the one’ – not as the one – also implying there are a limited amount of names (one could have called it Namebook – mimicking Lloyd’s Names) but a less limited amount of faces, putting a name to a face is now putting a face to a name.  But the face is only a point of departure for other faces – following the Heraclitean principle – the stream of ‘friends’ clustering around each face is constantly changing.  The friends of the face lead you further and further away from the initial face – and for each face and its friends it is the same.  And yet this is not a random progression or succession – because the Facebook lines never progress, they just go on – the random wandering through a crowd which might seem similar is counteracted by the mathematical probabilities of the revolving groups.  Behind the faces are not names nor names behind faces – but numbers – and a kind of set theory governing the building of groups.  One face appears with eight other faces at a time called friends – each friend instigates another group possibly but not necessarily containing the starting face.  This reflects the non-reciprocity (presumably) of those volatile tenuous friend relations – but this unreliable friend relation is a mathematical necessity for the Facebook configuration (the indefinite quasi-infinite mazurka, quadrille of Facebook) to go on endlessly.  It is the ‘clinamen’ effect – that Epicurean inclination of the atom – without which there would be neither change nor sets.  Even the non-reciprocity or defriending is essential (mathematically speaking) – to give fresh impetus to clinamen.  Otherwise it would get stuck in one tilt.  This would create Face-Blocs – the numbers alias faces must continuously move to circulate.  As the French court preacher Bossuet said, life must circulate, life must change hands.  Thus instinctively Web guardians such as certain Technorati editors feel compelled – the inner voice of the number – to urge Facebook members to defriend.  Unloading the ballast of previous clinamens is the only way to guarantee the life force of clinamen itself.  Human ‘emotions’ or ‘affects’ are the necessary drivers of the number game.  When one unchooses a Facebook friend one is promoting ontological ecology at the atomic level of the universe.

Clinanem, a concept originating in the atomism of Epicurus and Lucretius, is a function of the law of indeterminacy in the universe.  Without it nothing would ever happen let alone be created in the persistent rain of atoms into the abyss.  Clinamen induces collision – stress – rupture – all the generative acts.  But each swerve towards the other atom is necessarily a swerve away from another point – one act of clinamen constructs and deconstructs at the same time.  It is also something like ‘free will’ on the atomic level – the will to the unexpected – such as revolt. 

Clinamen is, for Jean-Luc Nancy, a metaphor for the submission or ‘inclining’ of the atom-individual towards “community”.  Even more - “Community is at least the clinamen of the “individual”.” (“The Inoperative Community” in: The Inoperative Community, University of Minnesota Press, 1991, pp. 3-4)  The atom uses its free will to join itself to an entity in which it will cease to be an “individual” – like in Carl Maria von Weber’s “Der Freischütz” – the atom qua magic bullet has one shot to hit its mark.  The principle of clinamen in ancient atomism serves rather to individuate the otherwise indistinguishable atom – in Nancy’s doctrine of community the atom’s clinamen is a retreat from its “immanence” – its autarchic absolute self.  Afterwards in Nancy’s interpretation the atom forfeits all its elasticity of self – it is only an indistinguishable part of “community”.  The ‘atom’ seems to have transformed itself discreetly in Nancy’s interpretation into an alias of Heidegger’s Dasein – the “community” into the Volksgemeinschaft.  Clinamen is the socio-genetic act of communal absorption – the atom moves ‘outside’ of itself and ‘inside’ something greater than itself – community.  Once inside there is no egress.  But community is more than just an aggregate of atoms – it is a principle of non-immanence, of always being outside of oneself – or as Nancy following Heidegger says – of ecstasy. 
Oddly though the individual or atom occupies at least two positions in relation to community – its clinamen in some way is a ‘pre-historical’ or primeval act of creation and at the same time the individual-atom is merely the abstract result of the “decomposition” of community.
This would mean though that community is primary – a view certainly favored by Nancy.  In this second version community would have ‘preceded’ the individual historically and metaphysically – the atom would not have ‘composed’ it originally by its one and only act of clinamen.  The individual is merely a part of the unravelling of community, a passive fruit of its degeneration or decadence.  But then the atom’s clinamen would have been made redundant.  Unless one could assume hypothetically that a pre-existing community, whose formation is ontologically given or apriori, would have been shattered in an equally remote time.  The remnants of this primeval cataclysm, its diaspora, re-gather in a secondary act of clinamen, each on its own, into a new imperfect body.  Such a sequence resembles the Kabbalistic concept of the ‘breaking of the vessels’.  Although Nancy insists that actually community never was – so that it cannot have been lost, the feelings of loss are only nostalgia for a chimera – perhaps the “inoperative” community implies some similar idea of an original shattering of community, which if it subsequently existed then only in an inferior haphazardly reconstructed form.

Whatever platform of reality community qua being occupies it is apparent, that Nancy continuously wavers between these several versions of the relation between community and individual.  But perhaps these are not really versions – rather Nancy’s implicit recognition that the individual or atom does not just swerve once.  That clinamen is not a finite singular act – but a principle of motion in the universe.  Otherwise he would be condemning the atom to its remaining skewered in its one and only swerve forever – the world would turn to stone eternally, history would vanish.  But obviously the principle of clinamen – one of abrupt change of course, a kind of random suddenness, with no final destination – can not be a one-off.  It would become something absolutely contingent and uncertain as a principle - if it happens once it can happen countless times.  If the atom can incline itself toward – it can equally incline itself away from a point – this is what happens when bodies cleave abruptly or disintegrate over time – on a social empirical level friendships break, love dies, empires collapse, saturation points of all kinds are reached.  Even bankruptcy can be seen as the negative clinamen of the atomic workings of the ‘community’ of Capital.  As a devout Heideggerian Nancy finds it difficult to conceive of ontological moves ‘away’ from a point – so many of Heidegger’s terms include the move towards – for instance being-towards-death, being-with, all kinds of fusional modes.  Even ‘falling’ (Verfallen Sein) is at least a move towards a kind of abyss – an ontological surrender to the force of Dasein-gravity.  Falling is something Dasein endures or experiences – falling happens to Dasein rather than Dasein doing it.  “But singularity never has the nature or the structure of individuality.  Singularity never takes place at the level of atoms, those identifiable if not identical identities; rather it takes place at the level of the clinamen, which is unidentifiable.  It is linked to ecstasy: one could not properly say that the singular being is the subject of ecstasy, for ecstasy has no “subject” – but one must say that ecstasy (community) happens to the singular being.” (“The Inoperative Community” op. cit. pp. 6-7)

Nancy’s aporia - how to think being-away within a system of thought premised on being-toward – in other words passive (willless, inoperative?) happenings and spatial (static) finite concentration?  The atom is finally deprived of its clinamen, its power of movement or acceleration, its deviation from the line.  An intermediate level of “singularity” is inserted between the atom and its clinamen.  Clinamen is.  For a Heideggerian thinking clinamen is thus ‘logically’ an empty magnetism with only one pole – only attracting never repelling.  Perhaps the new Facebook atom is rather willed and aimless, than will-less and predestined for community like the old Heideggerian atom cum Dasein (singularity) Nancy is intent on memorializing.

Still if clinamen as the founding act of community happens only once, then Nancy’s concept of community would require the abolition of chance – but in the words of Mallarmé – no throw of the dice can abolish chance. 
Degrees of ecstasy:  How to distinguish between the ecstasy of Being = Community and the ecstasy of fusion?  Is there a gradient from one to the other?  An elevation?  The path of excess? Of failure? Of betrayal?



 

 

 2.  Unbuilding

Rural spots are dedicated to keeping the accident alive.  To observe world history or the cosmos for that matter from the rural unbuilt areas is to be in a permanently arrested clinamen – or in a continuous eccentric semi-revolution.  Rural in this case is also peripheral.  One turns away from rural apparent emptiness and at the same time towards metropolitan apparent fullness.  Neither are quite what they seem.  But the uneventfulness of the rural area seems to imply it has dropped out or away from historical causality – from any causality, which does not originate in the city.  The U.S. Secretary of the Treasury under Franklin D. Roosevelt Henry Morgenthau wanted to turn defeated Nazi Germany into one big farm or cabbage patch – his plan was not realised.  Although some areas of East Germany have slipped into such a re-ruralisation on their own – Eisenhüttenstadt, Nordhausen even parts of Berlin to name a few.  It is the power of the physical land itself in absence of a human constructive will which carries out any process of decivilization.  In Eisenhüttenstadt for instance – the bureaucratic will is not absent but mostly deconstructive.  Entropy and the negative human plan coincide.  The Eisenhüttenstadt Blog nostalgically documents the progress of demolition – posting photographs of the pieces of brick and mortar falling from the crumbling facades of hotels on the main street (potentially striking the passers-by), of empty apartment blocks with the caption – this is now a flat field.  The photographic remains of every area of still erect built space looking picturesque in the setting sun or painted over with graffiti, just sunlight itself pouring through an empty unnaturally wide street, even cracked tiles where once a statue of the unicorn, the city mascot, stood are cherished like heirlooms.
The same demolishing power chewing up Eisenhüttenstadt lurks in any semi-unbuilt rural area as the constant stochastic force of the original wasteland.  The wilderness is the perpetual intermittent event of any rural space. 
There is a power in degeneracy – it is the power of undoing.  As Nancy writes – “The relation (the community) is, if it is, nothing other than what undoes, in its very principle – and at its closure or on its limit – the autarchy of absolute immanence.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit. p. 4)

One night after watching “Blade-Runner” we stepped out into the night of true nihilism – the empty streets of a ‘spectral suburb’ like village on the Thames.  What we soon saw made “Blade-Runner” seem like an optimistic heart-warming film – all those buildings in good repair, enterprising agents, streets teeming with extras – civilization is in full flower.  How much more horror is presented by the unevents of sheer living – outside of any plot or pattern.  Or if any pattern – then only the traces of clinamen.  Such an unauthored unevent accosted our eyes from which the film images were rapidly fading – we saw as we approached the old people’s flats on the outskirts of what is itself an outskirt, that something there had been quite deranged.  It turned out to be their boundary wall or what was left of it.  The walls in front of the old people’s flats had been semi-razed – unbuilt in various unrelated ways.  Columns twisted around and knocked over, bricks plucked out and partially crushed down – one wonders how it could have taken place without interference, how many hands were working on it.  Were they enchanted?  But in particular – the treatment of the hedges was astonishing.  The privet seemed turned inside out and axed through and flayed.  “Mon cœur repose sous ces débris (…)” (Gerard de Nerval)

Unremarkable scenes are the accident in its dormant state – the sparsely furnished mimicry (mimesis) of the void.  Its truth, the accident, lies on the surface although in abeyance.  ‘Aletheia’ appears in suspension.
The more characterless it is, the more indistinguishable from other scenes, the more the spot lies in ambush.  This is a principle of natural sham – its mimicry or ruse is always based on some kind of heightened normality – one is instinctively on one’s guard against the ‘normal’. 

Return to the scene of the accidents, the riverbank.  The rains have softened down the meadow especially at the stile, closest to the river.  The mud is so whipped up and smooth I almost slip.  A lady walking her dog might have seen me sliding around.  As I came to the stile crossing she spoke to me from the other side: Last winter a lady broke her leg here, one would have thought they would have put down some gravel.
I: Yes it’s very slippery.
The woman could have been one of those guardians of the rivers from the English legends – those who half warn, half frighten the traveller into his doom.  They are human abstractions of the landscape – a remnant of the old pagan economy of sacrifice.  A primitive or prototype of the exchange relation.  The victim of the river is offered in exchange for the prosperity of the community – but it is a self-activating ritual happening by chance.  The murderous rivers are often spoken of as ‘she’.  The locals living around the river Dart on the edge of Dartmoor have heard ‘her’ cry.  Of the Dart it is said:  The Dart, the Dart – the cruel Dart
Every year demands a heart…

The woman probably wanted to sound sympathetic, but it came out as a kind of threat or curse.  The logic behind it, places known to have their built in natural menace should be preserved, protected like sacred sites, and left untouched.  It also happened to be the closest point to the river’s edge.  One could just as easily slip down into the water as break one’s leg on the riverbank.
I: I didn’t feel like wearing my wellies.
She: Although you needed them.
Errors of judgement are good introductions to the accident.

The friendliness of a secret enemy can only be the working of the evil eye.  Roy, the retired mechanic, looked too inquisitively at me when asking me how I am.  I said:  Very well thank you.  Two hours later I had the flu. The mechanical evil eye works especially well at a distance.  His former partner who now runs the garage together with a Caliban assistant whose face is so disfigured I have never dared to look at him (I know it only by hearsay) operate in the same fashion.  They count on weather and natural forces to set their contraptions in motion.  Timing doesn’t matter.  They are not in a hurry.


3.  Caves

In the story “The Immortal” by Borges troglodytes play an important part.  They are a valuable literary fixture – cave dwellers, ancient geography – mentioned in Montesquieu’s “Lettres Persanes” – also in Flavius.  Troglodytes are the children of Abraham by a wife after the death of Sarah.  The natural inclination in the garden is also the formation of caves – another proof of the essential correspondence between the vegetable and mineral in nature.  The vegetable caves are dark damp places made by plants growing on top of plants, piling up roofs of foliage upon armatures of branches.  The natural ‘geodesic’ forms are produced by the struggle of plants for hegemony.  Plants are cave producers if not cave dwellers. Is this the will in plants?  According to theories of metempsychosis this ‘will’ comes from souls on their restless cycle of transmigration now inhabiting the plant.  Mme de Staël quotes Schubert’s philosophy of plant will.  Schopenhauer incorporates these ideas of will in non-human creatures or entities into his general philosophy of will, although he has only scorn for Schubert’s “Symbolik des Traumes” (Symbolism of Dreams).  Nietzsche wrote disapprovingly of Schopenhauer’s obsession with will: “ 127. Schopenhauer, mit seiner Annahme , dass Alles, was da sei, nur etwas Wollendes sei, hat eine uralte Mythologie auf den Thron gehoben;(…)” (Fröhliche Wissenschaft, München, 1988, p. 483) (Schopenhauer, with his assumption, that everything which is here, can only be something which wills, placed an ancient mythology on the throne;(…)).  Obviously Nietzsche excludes himself from those elevating will to the cause exclusively at work in the universe.
When the neighbour’s startling burglar light strikes the Scots pine it looks like an ancestral tower.  The garden skyscraper.  Same old will.  The spiders stretch their tripwires from bush to bush – the tips of the Berberis and the rose are oddly tilted – but the will isn’t theirs.  Determined appearances are in this case most false – the determination is hiding in the spider.
 
The race of cave dwellers lived in Arabia Felix, on the African Red Sea coast – those children of Abraham mentioned by Flavius.  They were said to have lead the Turks down secret passages in times of war.  Borges uses all of these attributes (elements) in his story.  The narrator finds the semi-conscious stupefied troglodyte waiting for him like a loyal dog ready to lead him back out of the labyrinth away from the City of the Immortals.  The City was so perversely constructed so as to ensure a permanent noisome presence of evil in the universe, polluting past and future, even threatening the stars.  Somehow Borges hints that this City might be a parable for the City of London – especially the part around the Barbican.  The story starts in London – the frame is a manuscript found in a set of Pope’s Iliad sold to a Princess of Lucinges by an antique dealer.  The year is 1929, the year of the Great Crash.  The caves are in London too – the underground, the tunnels. 





 
4.  Fascist Communion

Nancy shows himself through the eyes of Bataille.  Bataille is an authentic witness of fascism – he lived through the distressing period, which Nancy calls the “mortal conflagration of ecstasy”.  In Nancy’s text “The Inoperative Community” - it is Bataille’s swaying one is led to see - between the “poles of community and ecstasy”, a rhythm dictated by an age in which these poles of transgression were what was then “being-in-common”.  In the course of this swaying, community and ecstasy and being change places frequently as another player – sovereignty - appears and disappears.      
Sovereignty in Bataille as one understands from Nancy’s reading of Derrida’s reading of Bataille is an intrusion from Bataille’s lifelong preoccupation (obsession) with Hegel’s master-slave dialectic.  Derrida refers to Bataille’s “unreserved Hegelianism” – considered by both Nancy and Derrida to be a weakness or at least a limit of his text.  Sovereignty is what prevents Bataille from quite completely abandoning or condemning the subject as ‘unreservedly’ as Nancy does.  The subject is sovereign – although at the same time “Sovereign is NOTHING.”. (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit., p. 18)  Sovereign is the master – his truth though is finally the slave’s consciousness.  This was Hegel’s never-ending scandal for Bataille.  Community and ecstasy – is that one possible translation of slave and master?

Bataille’s eye only opens at his own peril – to see is to die.  The Medusa curse of consciousness.  Some of this danger hovers over Nancy’s text – or does he just set up zones where it might land without possessing the death-defying consciousness of the Hegelian master, but rather the consciousness of the self-preserving slave – so that the angel of death just passes over?

For Bataille ‘sovereignty’, if not superior to community – at least exists on another plane.  Out of an experience of disappointment with all “communitarian projects” of his time, the “betrayal of communism” and his “fascination with fascism” or “fascist orgiastics” – Bataille detaches sovereignty from anything ‘common’ and allots it to those living in “accursed isolation” – lovers and the artist.  Only they seem to be resistant to the fusion of community and its fascist orgy.  Here though ecstasy deserts community for sovereignty.  Sovereignty as embodied in the sovereign isolation of lovers or the artist is ecstatic.  “Now (…) it was impossible for him (Bataille sm) to link forms of sovereignty — or ecstasy — to the egalitarian community, indeed to community in general.  These forms — essentially the sovereignty of lovers and that of the artist, the one and the other and the one in the other set apart from the orgiastics of fascism, but also from communist equality — could not but appear to him as ecstasies (…) without any hold (…) on the community into which they nonetheless had to be woven, arealized, or inscribed, (…)” (Nancy, “The Inoperative Community” op. cit., p. 20)  Such a sovereignty of lovers and the artist seems to have survived at least as a fading memory in the relation of no relation postulated by Badiou as the amorous “scene of two” or in his designating art as one of the other four truth processes – similar to the truth processes science and love – at least these three potential loci of truth-events occur in antagonistic isolation from any sort of being-with.  Badiou unlike Nancy is precisely concerned with the unearthing of new subjects of truth – more or less corresponding to truth processes.  The 4th truth process – politics – seems to undermine though Badiou’s typology of ‘sovereign’ subjects – who is the subject of the truth of politics – the sovereign or the ‘community’? 
(see Spectres of Heidegger at Birkbeck, Faust Series Opus 9, 3rd August 2010)

It is not just Bataille’s swaying one sees in Nancy’s text – Nancy himself is suspended between the same two poles of community and ecstasy – never sure in which direction he is moving at any given moment.  He is like the Tarot figure of the hanging man – who hangs open eyed from his feet from a gallows – acutely cognizant (“the clear consciousness of the communal night”) of all his surroundings, but unable to come to a clear decision about the multitude of details presenting themselves to his upside-down fixed gaze.
“(…)the paradox of a thinking magnetically attracted toward community and yet governed by a theme of the sovereignty of a subject.  For Bataille, as for us all, a thinking of the subject thwarts a thinking of community.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit., p. 23)

Why is being-in-common in Nancy’s sense antithetical to sovereignty?  Isn’t being-in-common already sovereign according to Nancy in that it is that entity to which ‘singular being’ is exposed or abandoned, just as it is to any other form of sovereignty except that in the case of being-in-common sovereignty presents itself directly as finitude?  Being-in-common is both that which presents itself in finitude and the ‘court’ – the law – to which being-in-common is presenting – where it has its “hearing”.  Community as law is sovereign toward being-in-common as finitude – passing judgement on finite singular beings.  Is the judgement of community as law not a subject?  A work?  Is that not an immanent circularity of being-in-common?     

In fact, it is a paralysis or circularity of thought, which Nancy is describing, (equivalent to his bizarre idea of an atomless clinamen), a motionless movement, a trembling standstill in the text – circling around something he cannot quite phrase (nor not phrase) – but alternately touching community, ecstasy, death, extermination.  In a kind of confession - he semi-discloses a chaste Christian lust for the fascist excess – what he refers to as fascist orgiastics.  Speaking of Bataille and “several others” Nancy refers to their “fascination with fascism inasmuch as it seemed to indicate the direction (…) of an intense community, devoted to excess. (…) Fascism was the grotesque or abject resurgence of an obsession with communion; it crystallized the motif of its supposed loss and the nostalgia for its images of fusion.  In this respect, it was the convulsion of Christianity, and it ended up fascinating modern Christianity in its entirety.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit. p. 17) 

One wonders what that is - ‘fascist orgiastics’ – the granite blocks of party slaves at the Nuremberg Parteitag waiting with one bated breath for the word of ‘communion’ from their master?  That does not look like an orgy.  An orgy has to do with touching, saturnalia – the kiss and coitus of the masses.  The communal orgy must in some way mimic the joy of lovers.  Once again one of Nancy’s paradoxes exposes itself as the inner ressentiment of the text towards ‘being’ which would evade the law alias community, ‘being’ which is not abandoned to that law.  “Community is given to us – or we are given and abandoned to community: a gift to be renewed and communicated, it is not a work to be done or produced.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit., p. 35)  And as such – this community, a gift, which you cannot even give back if you wanted to (although Esposito more a realist will speak of how to become immune to this gift) – has its ways of resisting what in turn resists its gift of itself: “Community is, in a sense, resistance itself: namely, resistance to immanence. (…) (resistance to the communion of everyone or to the exclusive passion of one or several: to all the forms and all the violences of subjectivity).” (ibid.)

“Lovers form the extreme though not external limit of community.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit., p. 38) (Nancy imitates and undermines Bataille’s partiality for lovers).  But lovers in Nancy’s view merely demonstrate ecstasy for the benefit of community – they set a sort of standard of sharing between ‘singular beings’ (not subjects), which the community can easily appropriate.  This does not occur as a matter of course – but it is community’s potential.  Because although between lovers is where “ecstasy, joy touches its limit” – community is ecstasy – so lovers must be exposed to community or are its exposure of its own innermost possibility.  This is the node in Nancy’s text where he is most magnetically drawn to fascism or to ‘fascist excess’ as the alleged paroxysm of communion (“delirium of incarnated communion”, ibid.) – because in his view only in the fascist orgy can community become the lover of itself and at the same time touch itself as a community of lovers.  But what does this touching look like?  It is a touching of the limit.  Just as one is hoping to discover what the communion-orgy of the fascist masses might be – Nancy shies away from the transgression his text desires and drops back down into an image of a work, not of love: “Lovers touch each other, unlike fellow citizens (unless, once again, in the delirium of a fanaticized mass or in the piling up of exterminated bodies – wherever it is a matter of a work).” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit., 39)  In this parenthetical remark prefaced by “once again” the text folds upon itself revealing its abyssal trajectory.  The parenthesis contains (and segregates) the ‘groundless ground’ of community which Nancy conceals and reveals incessantly throughout his text – as if it mirrored his own process of thinking and unthinking of a thought: – that the “fanaticized mass” meaning the three-headed hybrid: the fusion - Nazi state-people-movement is what Nancy desires in community and that only in this extreme form can community realise its potential for communion - which is at the very least when ‘citizens’ touch one another.  But the only example he can think of is the touching of dead bodies or rather exterminated bodies (analogous to the Christian worship of the unique dead body of Christ) – whose inert existence came about as the ‘work’ of the communion.  The communion takes place not through the direct erotic touching of the community of itself or of the deified ruler but ‘sublimated’ through the communal touching of the communion’s erotic work of extermination.  This resembles a typical structure of perversion – as in de Sade’s “republic of crime” – the perverse entity constitutes itself erotically through the total appropriation and expropriation of the body – its own and the other’s.  Klossowski in his analysis of de Sade’s idea of ‘community’ discovers in his utopia of the limitless body a process quite similar to Nancy’s difficult and elusive concept of “compearing” (com-paraît):  “An inherent operation of the phantasy of the perverse is the abolishing (divesting) of property on one’s own body as well as the other’s.  The perverse operator inhabits the body of the other as his own and in this way communicates (apportions) his own body to the body of the other.” (Pierre Klossowski, “Sade und Fourier” in: Lektüre zu de Sade, Frankfurt, 1981, p. 224)  Except, in opposition to Nancy’s ‘compearing’, which is the sharing and splitting of singularities exposed in community - in de Sade’s perverse cosmos the abolishing of the limit (‘sharing’) between bodies is done on a strictly venal and pecuniary basis.

Nancy seems to retract and nullify his claim to have discovered the joy of lovers in ‘the delirium of the fanaticized mass’, which is Nazism – for community is, according to Nancy, above all else, not a work – it is inoperative or non-sacred transcendence.  He only allows himself to begin to speak of love, – the touching of the piled up exterminated bodies in the camps (those who pile up touch the bodies and bodies ‘touch’ one another in the piles of the death work) – but ends with “a matter of work” – thinking perhaps that the classification as work will immunize the thought against its own volupté.

It seems more ‘proper’ to say work in the context of the extermination act than love – although was it not the ‘work of love’ – the sexualized love of Volk and Führer which spawned the Auschwitz planet and its new idea of work embodied in “Arbeit macht frei”?  Although Nancy tries to displace work with love in his ideal notion of fascist communion – work inevitably asserts itself.  It is the simple resistance of the sheer economical nature of fascism to any contrived transcendence.  This despite the fact, that fascism is the spiritual ‘messianic’ other of capitalism – hence so precious for its survival.  Bataille grasped the intimate connection between a fascist ‘theory of value’ (its discovery of heretofore unknown sources/agencies of value) and sacrifice, death, excess of endless consumption.  They had for him a predominantly economic ring. 
If there is transcendence in fascism then only through work – but what kind of work?
The seminal Nazi Gestalt, its generic singleton, fixated in a work by Ernst Jünger, which so impressed Heidegger, was not the Lover rather the Worker. (Der Arbeiter - Herrschaft und Gestalt)

What then exactly is the “inoperative community”?  Besides revealing that it is not a work nor dedicated to any kind of production and that although not sacred but a sort of replacement for the sacred, Nancy does little to dispel the mystery of this loose appellation of being.  It is in any case a Being.  One can be forgiven for not quite understanding – not even Agamben who ploughs the same furrow can say much more than - “The only coherent way to understand inoperativeness is to think of it as a generic mode of potentiality that is not exhausted (…) in a transitus de potentia ad actum.” (see Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer, Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Stanford University Press, 1995, p. 62)  Why then say “inoperative”? – if this does not mean broken or obsolete at the very least it is a kind of idleness – perhaps an expectant one – but not one in which one does anything in particular which might become a ‘subject’, one only undoes – is it a mode of potentiality of the end – a kind of waiting for the end or a community towards the end?  Or a readiness as in ready-to-hand, awaiting a work which cannot yet be conceived.  Is this work-to-come perhaps Heidegger’s “Ereignis” (final event or appropriation)?  That is why the community still bears work in the negative sense in its name – a cancelled work but one, which could be renewed at any moment.  Still, it is not just a defunct artefact of abandonment – although one is abandoned to it.  Nancy hints at what the unworked work of the inoperative community might be – or rather what sort of work will resist being unworked even in the inoperative community.  This appears in a footnote appended to the claim: “Communication is the unworking of work that is social, economic, technical and institutional.” (“The Inoperative Community” op. cit., p. 31)  It is not though the unworking of “the political”.  The footnote contains a clue to the provenance of the “inoperative community” – it is a being with a particular openness for the political: “I do not include the political here.  In the form of the State or the Party (if not the State-Party), it indeed seems to be the order of a work.  But it is perhaps at the heart of the political that communitarian unworking resists.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit., p. 158)  Why does the political suddenly appear in the midst of community, supposedly merely the locus of fraternal sharing, now the order of a work of a State or the Party?  What State-Party might he be referring to – certainly not the Communist Party?  Nancy with typical Heideggerian Bauernschläue (peasant slyness) seems to have hidden the purpose of his seemingly purposeless communication-community in a footnote - it is the base for a political eventuality– one whose potentiality includes a State-Party.  The “inoperative community” is not just an anodyne being-in-common – it is a coming State – an existing one would hardly need to ‘resist’, it already is.

Is communitarian resistance Nancy’s form of anti-capitalism? Or is it rather ‘fascinating fascism’ - which habitually assumes this guise?  Fascism cures the state for capitalism, another aspect of its being the hypocritical other of capitalism, its negation and fulfillment.  Negation means the immanent negation of capital within itself exported to the fascist plane of the political.  Here capital disguises itself in the character mask of political theology – in its time of regeneration (palingenesis) or healing in political ecstasy (outside of itself) it assumes the characteristic messianic face of fascism.  Capitalism abandons itself in the ‘political’, which is fascism, as if it were in hiding from itself until the necessary purgative time of negative reproduction is completed. This is the night of Bataille’s ‘la part maudite’ of the general economy - when capitalism must go to the archaic roots of all expenditure for its rejuvenation in blood.

“The Inoperative Community” shares the same thinking expressed in some of Heidegger’s later writing on the future of “total mobilization” after the “interruption of the myth” caused by the defeat of the Nazi State in 1945.  Faye in his analysis of Heidegger’s writings – Beiträge zur Philosophie and On Ernst Jünger has deciphered in them a vade mecum of Heidegger’s political ‘instructions’ for posterity:  “If we had the least doubt about what is really going on in the Beiträge, a passage from his recently published writings, On Ernst Jünger, would dispel it.  In a series of paragraphs grouped under the heading “The Question of Truth” (Die Wahrheitsfrage) and subtitled “Truth and figure” (Wahrheit und Gestalt), we can now read the following. “The attribution of rank is the total representation of total mobilization (for the passive, active, and dictatorial types)(the many, the few, the unique).”
This time, Heidegger shows his hand.  The conjuration of the three circles exposed in the Beiträge isn’t a triad of ideas but the concerted and clandestine activation of a power directed toward the historical advent of a dictatorship. (…) Heidegger continues, in the Beiträge, to hold to his interpretation of Jünger’s “total mobilization” which he conflates with the Hitlerian and dictatorial relation between Führung and Gefolgschaft.  It is true that what Heidegger describes in the Beiträge forms an invisible and apparently idle community, a silent conjuration.  But its purpose is to prepare and wait for the unique time and place at which the “people”, assembled according to and by means of that invisible community, will be able to found their “truth”, whose law they will enforce over the whole Western world, or even the entire earth.” (Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger, The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 281)

Heidegger’s “invisible and idle community”, the “silent conjuration” of the faithful would appear to surprisingly illuminate the enigma of the “inoperative community”.  At least it serves as a striking precedent for such a thought of community in waiting. 
The “political” could be regarded as the ‘code’ in Nancy’s text for the thinking of such a ‘risorgimento’ of a fascist State-Party-People.  The inoperative community would be the cadre (Bund or ‘the few’) in whom this return is continuously inscribed in being and the ‘law’ to which the submissive many are abandoned.  Presumably ‘the unique’ would eventually arise in it too.  In great contradistinction to the founding era of fascism in the twentieth century – the ‘post-modern’ fascism of the “inoperative community” does not seem to have any one particular territory nor ‘metaphysical people’ – it is nomadic, anonymous, headless, deterritorialised like the ‘multitude’ – it is a kind of Luft-fascism.  The Luft-fascism of today has only one tangible ‘homeland’ as yet - in its writings – its “Grab in der Luft” (“grave in the air”, Paul Celan, Todesfuge - Death Fugue).  “The outline of singularity would be “political” – as would the outline of its communication and its ecstasy.  “Political” would mean a community ordering itself to the unworking of its communication, or destined (emphasis sm) to this unworking: (…) To attain such a signification of the “political” does not depend, or in any case not simply, on what is called a “political will”. (…) it implies writing.  We must not stop writing, or letting the singular outline of our being-in-common expose itself.” (“The Inoperative Community”, op. cit. pp. 40-41)

Nancy’s coy love of fascism and its annihilation of the subject known as ‘fascist communion’ is a love, which dare not speak its name.  One can almost hear Bataille laughing. 









Tuesday, 3 August 2010

Spectres of Heidegger at Birkbeck


1.  Ants and their Occupations

The mornings belong to the ants.  They show that occupying a vacant premise – even if the vacancy is most temporary and brief – is built into species in general.  It is a space perception of even the lowliest of creatures.  Ants are particularly territorial.  Their behaviour certainly lends credence to Heidegger’s claim that Dasein is in itself “spatial” (räumlich).  Dasein possesses itself as space and as matter of necessity possesses or occupies the space of other Daseins.  ‘Being-with’ or ‘Being-in-the-world’ is not just peaceful coexistence.  The sheer presence in the world of other Daseins impinges on the spatiality of all other Daseins.  Heidegger’s view seems almost Hobbesian.  ‘Possession is nine tenths of the law” is a truism of English law, showing deep knowledge and acquiescence in the ways of species.  But unlike human nature for Hobbes or English and Scottish political economy – for Heidegger Dasein is a fiction of singularity.  Dasein is not the autonomous bellicose wolf struggling against all the other wolves – the war of all against all, homo homini lupus.  Not that.  Heidegger deviates from the received wisdom of the ancient world.  Dasein is not a subject, an “I”, separate and distinct from the “Other” – Dasein is just like all other Daseins – together in their substantial identity they constitute the “world” or the “Mitwelt”, the world-togetherness.  Dasein is both originally spatial and bracketed together with other Daseins in the World-with.  Dasein is not just territorial, it is in itself territory or container.  Heidegger’s ontology is a kind of Dasein-geopolitics.  Dasein carries it spatiality in its name – Da or here.  It finds itself ‘here’, it is an integral component of its ambient world as is the world an extension of itself.      

The individual or singular ant, like Dasein, has its spatiality inscribed in itself as an existent – but like Dasein of the first part of “Being and Time” its singularity is an artificial construct, subtracted from its complete Dasein as a particle of the ant ‘colony’ or Volk (People) unfolded in a later section (74).  Read backwards – the Dasein depicted in the first part of “Being and Time” as an ‘unhoused’ or exposed fragment in uncanny fear of the nameless could never hope to survive on its own.  One senses that this exposition is leading via numerous digressions to a sort of ‘rescue’ of Dasein from its abject state of homelessness and abandonment.  Dasein will be repatriated into its organic ‘home’ in the Volksgemeinschaft after its artificial expatriation in its “Un-Zuhause” (un-home).

Dasein’s homelessness in the first section though is tempered or almost negated by the primacy in Heidegger’s philosophy of “Umwelt” (surrounding world) over the “I” or consciousness.  His theory was greatly influenced by the anti-Darwinist ‘new biology’ of his time especially that of Jakob von Uexküll – later metamorphosing into proper ‘raciology’.  If Dasein is essentially grounded in the ‘Umwelt’ or ambient world as a biological existent – the concept ‘Un-Zuhause’ seems a foreign implant or a relic from the ‘cultural pessimism’ (Spengler?) of the time.  Dasein has little in common with the melancholic subject of “Ich bin der Welt abhanden gekommen” (I am lost to the world) of Rückert’s poem set to music by Mahler.  As a biological fixture of a biological ambient world – and not a conscious subject, Dasein is incapable of getting lost.  It is also not conscious of differences between itself and other Daseins – the “Being-with” of “They” (das Man) necessarily gathers and erases all differences in the single “Umwelt” (surrounding world) comprising all Daseins.

Yet, the “authentic existence of self” (das eigentliche Selbstsein) is not a “state of emergency of the subject detached from the They” – the authentic self is an “existential modification” of the “They”. (Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, 1986, p. 130)  At no point in the Daseinsanalytik (Analysis of Dasein) are existents monadic or antagonistic to one another.  On the contrary, even before Dasein’s historical destiny in the Volksgemeinschaft is sounded in section 74 – the World-with is so constituted so that no opposing counterpart to Dasein is conceivable, only mere repetitions of itself.  As Stephen Mulhall summarizes affirmatively – “In short, Dasein’s Being-in-the-world is a Being-with others: it shares its world with beings that genuinely are its Others – beings capable of inhabiting or dwelling within that same world, creatures who are ontically distinguishable yet ontologically identical.” (Inheritance & Originality, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard, Oxford, 2001, etc, p. 244)
It is impossible to deduce any exclusion from the World-with of Dasein – as in the case of Agamben’s ‘homo sacer’.  But what is a World-with without a World-against?  Being-with without Being-apart? 

Unlike Dasein ants can recognize vast differences amongst themselves or between one another.  A colony of ants of about 40 square meters (one also measures ants in the extension of their colonies or “Räumlichkeit” - spatiality) will kill any foreign ant straying into their precincts.

When I see a single ant wing on a pure sheet of paper in the printer tray, I throw away the paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
2.  Spectrality

Jean-Luc Nancy, in his recent public lecture “On Communism” (3rd July - online) at the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities in London honoured Heidegger as the “first thinker of the ‘with’ or ‘cum’” – he was referring to the notion of Mitsein (Being-with) from “Being and Time”.  Communism according to Nancy is an apparition of an idea of Volksgemeinschaft or ‘community’ fatefully emerging from the modalities of Being-with.  Leaving aside the anachronism of such a claim, certainly communism and its thinkers existed long before Heideggger – Mitsein for Heidegger is at best a passing or deficient inauthentic mode of Dasein.  Being-with is an indifferent social tautology – sliding quickly into the “They” (das Man) mode in which no particular social being (Nobody) and at the same time the composite of being-with-others are deposited.  Being-with transformed into the “They” appears to Dasein as an external power from whom it receives its “world”.  The “They” haunts Dasein just as Dasein’s being-in-the-world ‘haunts’ the world.

But is ‘Mitsein’ even a unique concept in the tradition of German idealism, Heidegger’s more obvious source?  Kant’s categorical imperative is also an immanent ineluctable “Being-with” – the haunting presence of the collective other inside the individual consciousness.

For Socrates this Being-with of the categorical imperative was fatal.  The singular existence – Socrates – injected with the categorical imperative of the polis acceded to his own extermination by his own hand.  Montaigne wonders why Socrates does not even try to escape – it would have been possible, if he had wanted to evade the justice of the polis.  His friend Crito pleaded with him to allow himself to be rescued.  His futile attempts are recorded in Plato’s eponymous dialogue.  But Socrates is so much a part of the polis – he can only conceive of himself as one of the jury condemning himself to death – and the one chosen to carry out his own sentence qua polis.

Seneca was also his own executioner.  He was condemned to commit suicide by Nero, not by a polis – the personal bondage seems greater, less abstract than in Socrates’ case, as Seneca’s judge is the emperor Nero, formerly his pupil.  Being-with in Heidegger’s sense has more to do with such direct bonds of fealty – rather the norm of human society until its ‘emancipation’ via Capital.  Being-with under the regime of Capital is sublimated or reified in the commodity relation (the social relation amongst things) and its protective legal apparatus.  Every relation under this regime is one of radical separation, seemingly happening on its own by ‘invisible hand’ – the original and ongoing separation of the ‘general worker’ from the means of production and his product.  These can be material or immaterial – Guy Debord refers to the “proletarianisation of the world”. (Society of the Spectacle, Detroit, 1983, 26.)   The separation drives the ‘general world worker’ into the forced collectivity of the workplace whether it be a factory, office, institution, family or any relation of dependency, the ‘spectacle’.
Separation though precedes any new bondage.  These new collectivities have been euphemistically re-fetishized in recent post-Fordist theory as the featureless ‘multitude’.  Any particular ‘Being-with’ can be severed at a moment’s notice according to the dictates of the Market, Capital and any of its Powers, or das Man (the They) whatever guise the ‘unnatural supernatural thing’ assumes. The ceaselessly repeating acts of dissolving or separating are immanent moves within Capital’s Parmenidean Being.  Everything moves and nothing moves.    

The individual is separated from his needs or desires, which are downgraded to mediated needs overshadowed by the immediate ones of Capital or what is called merely the Economy.  The universal equivalent money quantitatively regulates and separates all relations between humans in the ‘community’, which are not either determined by new forms of fealty or the other universal equivalent – guilt/ debt (Schuld). 

As such Being-with once again only appears as something separate or beyond Dasein – capricious, unpredictable, all-powerful, “spectral and demonic” - as despotic fate.  Such fate though when it fulfils itself seems random, never transcendent – a calamitous accident even when ‘good fortune’ arrives.  Anything, which just comes, can go again as quickly.  The principles of discontinuity, ‘shock’ and intermittence are preserved. 

And yet, as Benjamin notes, capitalism is a religion, having a cult but no dogma except utilitarianism, no week day only feast days and creating all pervasive guilt but no atonement. “Capitalism is the celebration of a cult sans rêve et sans merci [without dream or mercy] (…)each day commands the utter fealty of each worshipper. (…) the cult makes guilt pervasive.” (Walter Benjamin, Capitalism as Religion, Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 288)
In this fragment Benjamin speaks of the all-consuming debt/guilt (Schuld) as the movement of capitalism through and with humanity.  Even God is incorporated in this debt/guilt (Schuld) and must seek atonement (interest?).
He refers to the ‘demonic’ double meaning of Schuld.  The religon of debt/guilt.  Or rather cult.  Benjamin also sees Nietzsche as the thinker of the cult of guilt which is capitalism – although not calling it that so explicitly.  Nietzsche evolved his genealogy of morals (and social domination) from the double-bodied idea of guilt and debts, two meanings of the German word Schuld.  But it is not just guilt – it is active punishment, not the same as atonement – one can be punished endlessly without ever atoning – not even temporarily.
Guilt in the religion of capitalism produces itself.  It needs no intermediary bodies or transgressions – sin is itself only another name for repressed capital, ‘paying itself interest on the hell of the unconscious’ (ibid).

Capitalism is itself ‘guilty’ – a kind of deviant god.  And those who worship it are infected daily by a renewed portion of its guilt.  As capitalism inherited all previous totalities – it is tainted by sheer time.  The repetitive time of its own processes of valorisation is a grotesque mimesis of the unmeasured time of history corresponding to what Marx calls its “original accumulation”.  This is the equivalent of capital’s original sin.  But as capitalism repeats everything – it must also constantly repeat its original sin.  It is not as if there were no atonement – it is just forever deferred or in other words the debt service on interest and principle is nil for a period of infinity.  In the religion of capitalism this infinitely deferred payment is called redemption.  As Kafka said, there is enough hope, an infinitely great amount of hope, - only not for us.  

Yet what is this guilt other than a spiritual cover malaise for that ghostly abstraction – the imaginary transfinite quantity called the ‘national debt (Staatsschuld)’ – “the only part of the so-called national wealth which enters into the total possession (property) of the modern nations.”? (Marx, Bd 23, p. 782)  Whether as guilt or debt, the gift of capitalism is separation or isolation of all from all endured simultaneously as a spectral unbreakable never-ending being-obliged.   

In other words in the ‘society of the spectacle’ being-with is the enforced way of being-separate.


3.  Heidegger’s Return to Metaphysics

When Dasein finds itself in the wrong space or when its expansion or self-exteriorizing is misdirected – ‘ek-stase’ undoes itself or comes properly to itself in the sense of ‘standing in nothing’.  When the Wehrmacht became mired in Stalingrad – this was negative space in a metaphysical sense, Dasein glued itself to existence.  The collective Dasein, or Dasein sublated in the Volksgemeinschaft ceased movement, came to a halt or reached the limit of its Being-With.  One can apply Heidegger’s ontological terms to the vagaries of the collective Dasein of the German people, just as he does himself, for German history and politics are the ‘model’ and source of his concepts, either ‘esoterically’ or ‘exoterically’ depending on the historical period and the addressee.  The politically zealous Volksgenosse Heidegger commented: “The motorisation of the Wehrmacht was a metaphysical action.” Another example of Heideggers ‘nazifying’ of metaphysics is his pronouncement – “Racial selection is a metaphysical necessity”.   This sort of utterance belongs to Heidegger’s high manifest Nazi period when he no longer used the term ‘metaphysical’ for the philosophical tradition he was intent on destroying (Descartes for example), but rather as the universal designation for all actions connected to the “metaphysical Volk”, the German people under its Führer, bound by Führer Eros.  Just as he considered his philosophy to have been transubstantiated in the Nazi entity – every physical manifestation of this entity was immediately metaphysical – apodictic and supreme.  The Nazi world was immediately body and spirit – a sensuous super-sensuous party-state-people.  A model for Heidegger’s return to metaphysics was Hitler’s speech in August 1933 defining race as “primarily spirit”. (see Emmanuel Faye, Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy, Yale University Press, 2009, p. 23)  Heidegger’s promiscuous use of metaphysical was purely in keeping with his time – in Nazi parlance physical is metaphysical, finitude is infinite, just as the German race is in itself ‘spirit’.

Erich Rothacker, a race philosopher closely associated with Heidegger was quite specific in his existential-historical doctrine of race – the percentage of Nordic blood was certainly higher in the Scandinavian peoples but the characteristic superiority of German ‘race’ derives from the “Prussian spirit” and the spirit of the NSDAP (the Nazi party). (Faye, ibid.)  Prussia in 1934, at the time of the publication of Rothacker’s historicized race doctrines, is already a historical shell – legally and existentially defunct, absorbed like the rest of German existence into the totality of Nazi party and Nazi state.  Prussian spirit has been swallowed by Nazi spirit like everything else – indeed the elimination of difference could not be more complete, the ontology of the same in the metaphysical-physical Volksgemeinschaft more perfect.  Still there is movement – a continuous adjusting and oscillation in the proportions of metaphysical and physical in the official Nazi ideology.  As in Heidegger’s philosophy – whatever the obvious and tedious tactical reasons for presenting a ‘universalistic’ legitimisation of the Nazi dictatorship – there is an unavoidable presentiment in the actors of that time of a ‘metaphysical’ malheur, something intangible, ineffable, unnameable which must be ‘faced’, the silent ‘call’ of conscience mentioned in “Sein und Zeit” – firmly rooted in an inexplicable existential guilt (“schuldig-sein”).   A whole race has to be trained to bear the guilt, to hear the call.  “Prior to any knowledge of it - is being guilty.  And only because Dasein is guilty in the ground of its being and as thrown and falling closes itself off from itself, is conscience possible, when the call of this being guilty at the core makes itself otherwise understood.” (Ursprünglicher als jedes Wissen darum ist das Schuldigsein.  Und nur weil das Dasein im Grund seines Seins schuldig ist und als geworfen verfallendes sich ihm selbst verschließt, ist das Gewissen möglich, wenn anders der Ruf dieses Schuldigsein im Grund zu verstehen gibt.” Sein und Zeit, op. cit. p. 286)

One is reminded of the memorandum style of the pact in Himmler’s speech to a secret meeting of the SS at Poznan in October 1943 -  “Ich meine die "Judenevakuierung": die Ausrottung des jüdischen Volkes. (...) Von Euch werden die meisten wissen, was es heisst, wenn 100 Leichen beisammen liegen, wenn 500 daliegen oder wenn 1000 daliegen. Und dies durchgehalten zu haben, und dabei - abgesehen von menschlichen Ausnahmeschwächen - anständig geblieben zu sein, hat uns hart gemacht und ist ein niemals genanntes und niemals zu nennendes Ruhmesblatt.”
(“I am talking about the "Jewish evacuation": the extermination of the Jewish people. (...) Most of you will know what it means when 100 bodies lie together, when there are 500, or when there are 1000. And to have seen this through, and - with the exception of human weaknesses - to have remained decent, has made us hard and is a page of glory never mentioned and never to be mentioned.”  See Heinrich Himmler speech, text and recording, online)
The Nazi entity’s move towards Gleichschaltung and sameness is at the same time a ‘separation’ from the ‘surrounding world’ of the other nations, a self-ostracizing, as when Hitler seceded from the League of Nations.  Heidegger particularly urged his students to support this act.  The ‘world’ cannot contain both the Nazi state and the Others – trapped between physical excess and metaphysical paucity – the Nazi state claimed the position of unique metaphysical subject. 
But there can be only one metaphysical subject and its own particular spontaneity.

The metaphysical excess of the physical inscribed in the Nazi body and its will to exterminate was a reverse mimesis of the impossibility of that body ever touching its metaphysical-ontological malheur physically.   
 
 
 
 
         


4.  The End of Space

Negative space has more the character of fate – as in the collective fate of the Volk in its Gemeinschaft - than open unlimited space.  Where Dasein or Volk touches the limits of its space, fate has found its address.  It is the location of finitude. 
Ekstase is the term which Heidegger introduces to break the solipsism of self.  It is the ‘outdoors’ of Dasein in the sense that it is the potential of Dasein to move outside of itself.  But why is ekstase even necessary if in the original constitution of Dasein – the other is already present in the form of Mitsein (Being-with)?  Ekstase would be not so much to leave oneself – to move ‘hors de soi’ but rather to leave the other or others with whom one is ontologically welded.  Heidegger in one strand of his Daseinsanalytik suggests exactly that – Dasein is lost or fallen into the comfortable homeliness of the They – the amalgamated Other or Nobody – but arrives at its own authenticity only when ‘vereinzelt’ (singularised) in its mode of Angst or Unheimlichkeit (uncanniness).  Only then can it perceive itself as thrown into the world – its original being-in-the-world is the cause of its ‘Angst’ – and the unique inaudible ‘call’ of its conscience.  All this would suggest that Mitsein is an inferior state to the state of being ‘singular’.  At this recurring point or junction in his analysis of Being Heidegger’s ontology swings wildly between Kierkegaard and Hegel – or between the concept of an authentic singular existential Dasein and what Sartre would call Heidegger’s ‘bastard form of idealism’ (see Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant, Editions Gallimard, 1943, p. 295)

 Kierkegaard criticized Hegel for obliterating or drowning the individual in the “race”.  “How often have I shown that fundamentally Hegel makes men into heathens, into a race of animals gifted with reason.  For the animal world “the individual” is always less important than the race.” (quoted from Kierkegaard’s Journal entry 1850 in Abraham Joshua Heschel, A Passion for Truth, New York, 1973, p. 141)
Although Kierkegaard’s polemic simplifies and distorts Hegel’s insight into the drama of consciousness, it certainly would apply to Heidegger.  “Rassengedanke” (race thought), a phrase coined by Heidegger after 1933, is primarily a thinking of humans as animals, species, natural aggregates or congregations like ants.


5.  Being-with versus the “Two of Love”

Sartre calls Mitsein (soi-avec) ironically “la transcendance heideggerienne”.  He sees it as a “concept of mauvaise foi (bad faith)”. (Sartre, op. cit., p. 295)  Mitsein does not in any way open the self or Dasein to the Other.  Dasein remains enclosed in its own existential container – precisely because the outside or other is an immanent element of its own ontological structure.  If being-with is part of the ontological structure of being, that says it is there by nature, essential and universal.  And if this is “proved” writes Sartre, then it becomes impossible to explain any “être-avec concret” – the ontological coexistence which appears as a structure of my being-in-the-world apriori cannot serve as a foundation of an ontic être-avec of a particular friendship or any other association.  This is symptomatic, according to Sartre, of Heidegger’s general difficulty in passing from the “plan ontologique au plan ontique” (Jean-Paul Sartre, L’être et le néant, Editions Gallimard, 1943, p. 293) – in Heidegger’s overtly Nazi period the same hiatus appears between the metaphysical and the physical.
Like Nancy, Sartre refers to parallels between Heideggger’s concepts and those apriori concepts of Kant.  As Nancy remarked in his talk at Birkbeck Heidegger’s existential categories are modelled on Kant’s transcendental conditions – the apriori of knowledge.  But Heidegger substitutes existence for knowledge, Dasein for Bewusstein – the apriori condition of existence is the being-with.  This, says Nancy, is what makes Heidegger an important thinker of the ‘community’ or even communism.  Sartre draws another conclusion – Heidegger’s être-avec is an apriori condition like the categories in Kant’s critique of pure reason - unifying all my potential experience – but there is no necessity that this être-avec constitutes the ‘opening’ of my being to the other.  No force can move Dasein from its insular Mitsein as an ontological ground of itself to the contingency of the other.  Being-with as an apriori quasi-transcendental condition of my existence merely compounds the solipsism of self.  This accounts for the peculiar stasis of Heidegger’s thought.  When the outside of self in the form of the other(s) is subsumed apriori within the singular existence – it disappears and ceases to be outside.  When the self ‘flees’ itself in its inauthentic mode towards the They – it is not moving anywhere outside of itself.  Even the “hors de soi” of the ‘ek-stase’ is not a move to the outside of self – because the outside is ontologically already and always there.  The self flees self towards self.  “(…) et le monde apparait comme pure distance de soi à soi.” (“(…)and the world appears as a pure distance of self to self.”  Sartre, op. cit., p. 295)  Outside of self is included in the definition of self as Mitsein or Mitdasein – hence there is no outside of outside of self as self – outside is the apriori structure of inside self.

Perhaps the immobility of Heidegger’s Mitsein is also caused by what Sartre calls its mode of ‘ontological solidarity’ (foreshadowing Habermas’ “Lebenswelt” - lifeworld) – Heidegger eschews the confrontational opposition of the battle of consciousnesses, “the keen encounter of our wits” – the existences in Mitsein are more like placid members of a team (équipe), side by side, although Heidegger does allow for indifference, just passing by and other ways of being oblivious to the factual other.  Yet without the tension of an opposition there is no “you and me” – there is only a “deaf” we.  Despite the conflation of Dasein in the otherless Mitsein, much of Heidegger’s rhetoric still clings to the Hegelian dialectic – as when he speaks of the “Unselbstständigkeit” (non selfhood) of Dasein and its reliance upon being recognized by the other as the medium of being itself for itself.  In fact Dasein often lapses (reverts) into a self – hardly distinguishable from Hegel’s concept of consciousness in “Phenomenology of Spirit”.  “Das Seinsverhältnis zu Anderen wird dann zur Projektion des eigenen Seins zu sich selbst “in ein Anderes”.  Der Andere ist eine Dublette des Selbst.” (The existence-relation to the Other is a projection of the own existence to itself “in an Other”.  The Other is a double of the self.”)
(Sein und Zeit, op. cit. p. 124)   

The “Two of Love” or “Scene of Two” is what Badiou calls the amorous relationship.  He is adamant though that this is a relation of no relation, a disjunction.  He rejects the “fusional” notion of love – although he still seems to concede that it exists – as a “disaster” of the type represented by Wagner’s Tristan and Isolde.  In “Logic of Worlds” he groups such subjects of love amongst the “obscure subjects”, those who darken truth.  His objection to the fusional conception of love is an obvious reference to Heideggerian ‘archetypes’ – “Love is not that which from a Two taken as structurally given creates a One of ecstasy.  This objection is tantamount to an objection against being-for-death (…) the obstinate sacralizing of the encounter, of the terror inflicted by the world. (…)” (Alain Badiou, “What is Love?” in Conditions, London, 2008, p. 181)  The disaster ensuing from such love is not caused by this love – it has its origins in the “philosopheme of the One”. (ibid.)
But if the amorous ‘relation’, generally believed to be the closest between humans, is a disjunction, an absolute difference – how can the structure of Dasein in its affectless state, its ontological neutrality, be an apriori ‘being-with’?  These two theoretical schemes are themselves a disjunction – excluding one another.  If love is not a Mitsein (being-with) – how can Dasein as an indifferent ontological identical particle harbor in its deep ontological strata the constitutional ‘fusion’ with any and all others?  Although Badiou’s concept of love seems to totally repel a Heideggerian notion of ontological fusion – the philosopheme of the One – it is possible to regard each as the possibility of the other.  If one were to combine these theoretical ‘fictions’ – then the general association of Daseins are inextricably locked into one another via Mitsein – whereas in the midst of Mitsein (being-with) periodically occurs the ‘miracle’ or ‘event’ of the amorous encounter – a phenomenon of higher intensity than the average Mitsein.   Amorous events differ uniquely from ordinary being-with as they are relations or configurations of absolute disunity.  Love would be exclusive not in its tighter bonding of Dasein – but in the manner in which it removes the constraint of being-with from the two of love.  At least in this sense, Badiou’s scene of the two could occupy a unique position in the generality of being-with.  Otherwise, what would distinguish love as a truth process (one of Badiou’s four) – from any other dyadic structure?  Any of them could be seen as disjunctive positions.  If though being-with is the general constrictive ‘law’ of Dasein, love would be an exemption from this law – love creates greater distances between existences instead of bringing them closer.

Edward Hopper’s paintings of couples and single figures seem to be visual treatises on the disjunction of the two of love.  In one of his paintings a man is looking out of the window of a rather seedy hotel room on the railroad lines, a woman is reading in a dark part of the room.  In “Summer in the City” a man is sleeping face down and nude and the woman is sitting on the edge of the bed in an undergarment and staring into a square of sunlight shaped by a large sash window frame on the floor.  In “Sunlight on Brownstones” both man and woman are looking in the same direction into a sunlit scene not visible in the painting.  In all of Hopper’s paintings of the scene of two each figure is sequestered in an invisible zone, their actions unrelated – their gaze never meets, yet they are strangely arrested in their motion by the presence of the other in the scene.  Hopper’s female figures are often versions of his wife Josephine.  He even used her face and figure in a painting called “Girlie Show” depicting a heavily rouged strutting burlesque dancer wearing only a G-string, stiletto heels and red painted nipples. His wife became his generic female figure by virtue of her exclusive ‘disjunctive’ relation with her husband.  As an artist’s model – she is further distanced as she undergoes the “dying of the subject in the painting” (Hopper).  The world for Hopper had shrunk to her person.  The scene of two says Badiou guarantees the One of humanity – not to be mistaken for the philosopheme of the One.  The One of humanity is “the historical body of truths”.  This is somehow logical.  Love is the relation of no relation.  The Other (in the exclusive sense of the Lover) is the substitute for the World – if the self or existent fuses with the World concentrated in the Other (qua Lover) he ‘loses’ the World.  Hence it is a matter of necessity and almost urgency – the separation of the two must be more extreme than the separation from an indifferent Other. 

But for Heidegger and for his interpreter Nancy, being-with (Mitsein) is an inferior preliminary sketch for a much tighter form of absolute social fusion of Dasein.  Being-with is not applicable to the concept of the two of love. The singular Dasein undergoes other transformations on its progress from inauthentic They to the apotheosis of Dasein in its historical mode or destiny of Volksgemeinschaft.  Its singularity is removed (retracted) as it melts into the historical destiny of the People.  It lands there because its destiny was preordained even as a singular Dasein – when the timeliness of destiny is perfected, Dasein hands itself over freely to what was always waiting for it.    In section 74 of “Sein und Zeit” all the familiar characteristics of Dasein are modified accordingly – instead of freedom of projected ‘thrown-ness’, being-towards-death, fallenness, uncanniness, care, flight from self, Nichtigkeit, being-guilty, the silent call of conscience - Heidegger situates Dasein immovably within a tradition of a People – an inheritance (Erbe), repetition of what has been and an amorphous “Kampf” (struggle).  The world also shrinks to the environs of that Volk as if in the ‘two of love’ – but unlike in the ‘two of love’ separation is ontologically impossible – there are no separate ‘positions’ (subjects) within the fractal like mass of the Gemeinschaft.  Nancy admits in his talk that the ‘with’ of ‘being-with’ vanishes into the Volksgemeinschaft when it becomes the fate of Dasein.  Even one’s being-towards-death is no longer one’s own, Dasein dies a totally different death in the Gemeinschaft – nameless, multiple, identical.  All this is intrinsically present though in the commonplace being-in-the-world of Mitsein.  Heidegger alludes to this simply in section 74: “Das Geschick setzt sich nicht aus einzelnen Schicksalen zusammen, sowenig als das Miteinandersein als ein Zusammenvorkommen mehrerer Subjekte begriffen werden kann.” (“Fate is not made up of singular fates, any more than being-with-others can be conceived as the coming together of a plurality of subjects.”) (Sein und Zeit, op. cit. p. 384)
The form of the Volksgemeinschaft is best categorized in Badiou’s terms as a type of fusional love of the ‘we’.  There is no opposing Other – only a We.  We fuses with itself in the Volksgemeinschaft to become a One.  One cannot really call this ‘we’ a collective subject, as there is only ‘one side’ – and no object. Heidegger still insists on the futurity of his construction – saying that even in this equilibrial state of Dasein embedded in the repetition of the ‘Good’ or its inheritance – Dasein remains ecstatically open.

Dasein meaning Heidegger is expectant that history would complete the lacuna in his concept of the historicity of Dasein in the Gemeinschaft.  The Other of the Gemeinschaft can not be a position within it – because by definition the Gemeinschaft has ontologically no outside of the being-with-others.  The radically separate yet galvanizing subject-object of the undifferentiated mass of the Volksgemeinschaft is a necessary lack (steresis) – to be filled when “Dasein chooses its heros”.  The hero Dasein chose was the Führer.  The Nazi entity was a mass form of fusional love between the One and the Many – the fusional bloc of the “We” bound to its world by its sexualized love of the Führer.